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ABSTRACT 
The proposed research is a comparative case study of State governments that have 
attempted to repeal State legislative 'term limits' (N = 8). The study will examine the 
institutional processes and the behavior of political actors culminating in an institutional 
output in the form of legislative statutes and judicial decisions concerning the repeal of 
term limit legislation. The theoretical propositions explored in this research are derived 
from decision-making theories, democratic theories of representation, and the findings of 
the literature on State legislative term limits. The States selected are Florida, Idaho, 
Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming. All of the legislative and judicial decisions included in this 
research occurred between the dates of September 1999 and May 2004. The 
methodologies employed include: empirical analysis of numeric data, content analysis of 
official documents regarding judicial decisions and legislative statutes, and 
impressionistic examinations of other possible relationships. The goals of this research 
are to generate testable hypotheses as to which factors had an effect on the decision to 
either repeal or retain State legislative term limits, and then to empirically test those 
hypotheses in a holistic manner. The positive findings for legislative decisions pertain to 
institutional structure and to a lesser ext�nt voter preference. Judicial decision-making is 
found to rely on the legal model, focusing on the wording and clarity of term limit 
measures and pertinent portions of state constitutions. 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
Proposals to impose limitations on the number of terms that a legislator may 
serve-----commonly known as 'term limits '-have been a recurring feature of the 
American political system since the Founding. Indeed, before the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787, the Articles of Confederation provided for term limits for members 
of Congress. No person could be a delegate to Congress for more than three years in any 
six year period, and no member of Congress was allowed to serve in the office of 
president for more than one year in any three year period. 
From 1787 to the present term limit proposals have been extremely contentious due to the 
ambiguity of the Constitution on the question of qualifications for office, whether the 
people or the various States may add qualifications beyond those specified in the United 
States Constitution, and fundamental disagreement about whether mechanisms of direct 
democracy such as ballot initiatives are a complement or a detriment to the U.S.A. 's 
representational federal democracy (Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996). 
A. Research Questions 
The purpose of this project is to expand our understanding of the political and 
policy implications of term limits in state legislatures by examining efforts to repeal term 
limits for state legislators. It is guided by three basic research questions: 
1 
1) What have been the effects of term limits on policymaking and governance? 
2) Do different effects across states explain why some repeal efforts have 
failed while others were successful? 
3) Do variations in state governmental structure and constitutional content 
explain why some repeal efforts have failed and others succeeded? 
I answer the first question by describing how term limits have impacted the 
policymaking process. Information on legislative turnover, legislative output, and 
changes in the functional relationships between the three branches of state government­
legislative, judicial, and executive-add to our understanding of how term limits have 
affected governance in the states selected. 
There is expected to be variation across states in the effects produced by term 
limits (Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2003; Chadha and Bernstein 1996). Detailing 
comparisons between these activities across states should provide preliminary 
explanations that can be explored, and fr?m which generalizations can be drawn, 
regarding the success or failure of repeal efforts. One basic presumption would be that 
the following states would be more likely to repeal term limits, particularly by legislative 
statute: those states which experienced greater legislative volatility due to turnover 
(Greenblatt 2002; Doron and Harris 2001), those where there was a more pronounced 
reduction in the quantity and quality of bills and statutes enacted into law 'post-term 
limits' (Schraufnagel 2004; Michaud 2001), and those in which the power of the 
legislative branch post-term limits can be observed and demonstrated to be reduced 
relative to the executive branch (Blair and Barth 2005; Dometrius and Wright 2005; 
2 
Moen, Palmer, and Powell 2005; Cain and Kousser 2004; Cooper 2004; Sarbaugh­
Thompson 2002; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). 
The third question assumes that political officeholders promote their own self­
interest to the extent that institutional limitations or constraints allow. In other words, 
state legislators and judges do what they can get away with, dependent upon how they 
calculate utility maximization. Moffett (2004) uses this logic as the explanation for the 
findings that the existence of term limits has less of a deterrent factor for office-seekers in 
states with low pay and short tenures. Also, Penning (1996) found that term limits had an 
impact on the desired career paths of challengers and incumbent legislators ( see also 
Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell 2001 ). Based on these criteria, it is hypothesized that state 
legislatures whose members have greater incentives to remain in office in terms of salary 
and other benefits will be more likely to repeal term limits than do states whose 
legislators receive fewer rewards. Likewise for judges; state high courts whose members 
are popularly elected or retained by popular vote will be hypothesized to support term 
limits because term limits are very popular with the electorate. Conversely, high court 
judges who are appointed by other elected officials may be more likely to support the 
repeal of term limits due to a different set of preference ordering in their legal decision­
making (Cain 2002; Ainsworth 1993). Political actors have an effect on political 
institutions,' but as James Madison theorized, institutional structure can constrain political 
officeholders' behavior or channel that behavior in what can be described as a path­
dependent manner (Erickson 1993). An additional research question is whether there is a 
3 
significant difference between the legislative and judicial branches in their decision­
making processes regarding term limits. 
B. Justification for the Research 
Only over the past ten years have political scientists examined the effects that 
state legislative term limits have had on politics and governance. There are case studies 
that examine the effects of term limits in a single state or two. Another avenue of 
research examines the effects of state legislative term limits across states nationwide, 
including in the analysis many or all of the states with term limits. So, while research on 
the effects of term limits on political institutions and the behavior of political actors at the 
state level has become abundant, academic interest and analysis is almost non-existent in 
examining the attempts-whether successful or unsuccessful-to repeal term limits in 
states that have had them. This research is intended to remedy this gap in the state 
legislative literature in political science by identifying the factors that influence the 
decisions to repeal, rescind, or invalidate state legislative term limits. 
I believe that this research makes a meaningful contribution to the existing 
scholarship on state legislative term limits. Those original studies which began around 
1990 had goals that were two-fold: first, to identify who among the body politic supports 
and opposes term limits, and second to generate hypotheses regarding what the future 
effects of term limits would be. The second wave of research examined legislative 
turnover. As term limit laws were being enacted-many of which not taking effect for 
many years after. passage-scholarly interest focused on quantifying projected turnover 
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rates caused by term limit statutes. Academic interest also focused on predicting the 
qualitative changes to the legislature, since term limits would institutionalize cyclical 
turnover. 
From about 1996 until the present, scholars have been observing and measuring 
the effects of term limits on institutions and groups (legislatures, interest groups, political 
parties, and other groups) with quantitative methods as data becomes available. Research 
has also qualitatively examined term limits' effects on individual lobbyists, women, 
minorities, business entrepreneurs, hitherto careerist legislators, and new lawmakers 
entering a changing and unstable institutional environment. 
A next logical step in the development of research on state legislative term limits 
is to look at efforts in state government to repeal term limits that had been in place for a 
meaningful length of time. As will be explained in the 'case selection' section of chapter 
four, all eight cases chosen for comparative analysis in chapters five and six had term 
limits in excess of seven years before the repeal attempt. Thus the political effects and 
possible policy effects of term limits can be studied as a causal factor in determining the 
success or failure of repeal efforts. 
This is meaningful to the overall knowledge compiled in the field of political 
science because term limits is an issue where the elites-here referring to the leaders in 
government and non-government organizations-are at odds with the masses. The 
American public overwhelmingly supports term limits, even when they continue to vote 
for incumbents at an extremely high rate (National Council of State Legislatures 2006 at 
www.ncsl.org; Shaw and Ragland 2000; Elhauge 1998; Friedman and Wittman 1995; 
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Dick and Lott 1993). Term limits are simultaneously popular with the people and 
unpopular with state legislators, lobbyists, Democratic Party leaders, and among 
Republican leaders and officeholders in locales where they hold power (Smith 2003; 
Moncrief and Thompson 2001 ; Kurfirst 1996). A fundamental precept of democracy .is 
that the government is responsive to the needs and wishes of the governed. I believe it is 
important to explore issues where American public opinion appears incompatible with 
the actions of state lawmakers and judges, in order to connect scholarly research with 
political practice. 
I also believe this project has utility for political science in that it explicitly 
incorporates multiple areas of research within the discipline. This dissertation is in the 
area of American Politics, state politics in particular, and one of the focuses of this 
research is on term limits as·a ballot initiative and more broadly as a mechanism of direct 
democr�cy. However, it relies heavily on drawing comparisons across states, so 
important ideas and methods from the Comparative Politics sub-field are used. It is 
constructed around seven chapters. The introductory chapter one includes sections on the 
theory employed, expectations and hypotheses derived from the literature and theory, the 
methods utilized to generate and test the hypotheses, and the primary data that is used. 
Chapter two addresses various strains of political philosophy and theory. It 
begins with an examination of term limits in the ancient political systems of 'democratic' 
Athens and 'republican' Rome. Term limits here are conceptualized as a prescribed 
'rotation of office' for elected officials. The historical overview next shifts to the 
American experience with term limits, detailing the philosophical and judicial arguments 
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both for and against term limits that have arisen in American political thought. The 
theoretical focus concludes with an examination of the American federal system, and the 
history of term limits in state governments and constitutions. 
Chapter three surveys the political science literature on state legislative term 
limits: who supports them, their utility, their prospects, and the subsequent study of the 
multi-dimensional institutional effects of term limits on governance in the American 
states. Chapter four is a brief overview of all the states with term-limited legislatures. It 
will analyze political activities pertaining to enacting, modifying, and repealing term 
limits. This chapter concludes with the rationale and justifications for a more detailed 
examination of the repeal efforts in Florida, Idaho, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming between 
the years 1999 and 2004. 
Chapter five is a comparative case study of state high court decisions regarding 
four specific term limit statutes; chapter six is a comparative case study of four state 
legislatures' actions to repeal existing term limitations for legislators. Chapter seven 
details the findings of the research conducted in chapters five and six, and the findings 
are interpreted. The thesis concludes with a final analysis of how studying this sample of 
repeal efforts adds to the existing body of knowledge regarding the effects of term limits 
on polit�cs, policy-making and governance in the American states. 
C. Theory 
The theoretical underpinnings for this research derive from the Rational Actor 
Model, which stress individual self-interest in a lawmaker's decision-making 
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calculations, applied at the aggregate level to the state legislature and judiciary as a whole 
(see Weingast 1979; Downs 1957). For legislators, other theoretical perspectives to be 
used in this study are the dichotomous 'trustee theory' versus 'delegate theory' of 
representation. Some individual lawmakers voted for term limits based on what the 
majority of their constituents wanted, called the delegate theory or by other nomenclature 
(Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984; Pitkin 1967). Other legislators based their vote on 
what they decided was the best thing to do, or the trustee theory. It is theorized that there 
are multiple permutations in the trustee theory leading to various modes of preference 
ordering by the trustee. Some lawmakers are rational actors maximizing their utility, 
others base their vote on what is best for their district, and still others vote according to 
what they believe is best for the entire political community (Krehbiel 1998; Rohde 1979; 
Weisberg 1979). Thus an important theoretical assumption is that political officeholders 
promote their own self-interest to the extent that institutional limitations or constraints 
allow. 
Other theoretical approaches brought to this research pertain specifically to 
judicial decision-making. Various models of high court decision-making exist that are 
based on such determining factors as 'the legal model' , "public preferences" (McGuire 
and Stimson 2004), "bargaining" (Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman 1998), "attitudes" 
(Segal and Spaeth 1993), "conflict" (Ulmer 1984), and "agenda setting" (Caldeira and 
Wright 1988). Judges who are elected and/or retained by the voting public are 
hypothesized to be more influenced by public preferences in their decision-making 
regarding the constitutionality of term limits. Judges who were selected rather than 
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elected to their positions are hypothesized to be less influenced by public preferences and 
more so by the other factors mentioned. 
It is important to note that the theories used to explain the behavior of state 
legislators come from the legislative literature that in some instances includes all 
legislators, but is often focusing only on Congress and the national level of government. 
Likewise, the decision-making of high court judges comes primarily from the literature 
on the U.S. Supreme Court. In regards to the legislative arena, the motivating factors 
applied to decision-making are the same for both state legislators and members of 
Congress. Members in each legislative institution seek to achieve the same objectives: 
re-election (Fenno 1978), perks and benefits, choice committee assignments (Rohde and 
Shepsle 1973), maximizing governmental spending in their districts, performing 
constituent service, producing sound public policy (Krehbiel 1991 ), and using their 
position to seek higher elected office (Rohde 1979). For a comprehensive evaluation of 
the various activities that prospective and incumbent legislators engage in, see Mayhew 
(1974). 
Regarding the state high courts, the only difference among the motivating factors 
employed by judges is that the U.S. Supreme Court is the final arbiter for judicial 
decisions that involve federal questions; so in certain circumstances state high courts can 
serve an intermediary role. I believe, however, that the distinction is negligible for the 
purposes of this research, and that the behavioral motivations for U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices can be applied to state high court judges as well. This research project thus treats 
the motivating factors contributing to political action as the same for state legislators and 
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national legislators, and as comparable for state high court judges and the national high 
court (Moncrief 1999). 
D. Hypotheses and Expectations 
The hypotheses are structured according to the fundamental research questions 
and theory used to guide this project. They are separated into legislative hypotheses and 
judicial hypotheses, as the expectations regarding decision-making are assumed to be 
slightly different between the two branches. The legislative hypotheses are based on 
three conceptual dimensions: 
1) The delegate theory of representation 
2) The trustee theory of representation tempered by the institutional structure 
3) The subsequent effects of term limits on the institution and its members 
The judicial hypotheses are also based on three factors: 
1) The delegate theory as applied to maximizing utility 
2) Ideology or ideological factors 
3) Legal theory, most important of wq.ich is precedent 
The first legislative hypothesis is based on the delegate theory of representation. 
LHl: States that adopted term limits by ballot initiatives are less likely to repeal 
term limits than states that adopted them through legislative statute. 
According to the delegate theory, legislators reflect the popular sentiment of their 
constituents in their policy choices and voting behavior. Term limits are tremendously 
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popular with the voting public (see the National Council of State Legislatures' Web site, 
where term limits are tracked by Jennifer Drage Bowser). So according to the delegate 
theory of representation lawmakers will do what they can to enact and then retain term 
limits on themselves, as it is the 'will of the people' for them to do so. Scott and Bell 
(1999) concluded that the presence of the citizen initiative was the only significant factor 
as to whether or not a state adopted term limits. This research seeks to determine if there 
are similar findings for repealing term limit laws. 
The next three legislative hypotheses are constructed according to institutional or 
structural factors that reflect how term limits would alter the 'rules of the game' in a 
manner that runs contrary to the lawmaker's self interest. 
LH2: The fewer the specified number of terms in the law, the more likely that the 
state legislature repeals the term limits. 
LH3: The higher the legislators' pay and compensation package, the more likely 
that the state legislature repeals term limits. 
LH4: The larger the legislative staff, the more likely that the state legislature repeals 
term limits. 
Based on the trustee theory of representation, legislators that have served more time in 
the institution and have larger staffs bring more government spending into their district 
and produce more legislation than do less tenured lawmakers (Maddox 2002; Lee 2002; 
Reed et al 1998; Moore and Hibbing 1996; Moore and Steelman 1994; Payne 1991 ). 
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Having greater institutional memory-due to more time in office and a larger staff with a 
greater collective knowledge of important issues and policy choices-enables the 
'trustee' legislator to enact better public policy. Hence LH2 and LH4; LH3 is based on 
economic self-interest. The more financially lucrative the position is, the more likely that 
the legislator as an individual and the legislative body as a collective group will use their 
political power to repeal term limits. 
The final two legislative hypotheses are based on the subsequent effects of term 
limits on the institution and its members. 
LHS: The higher the turnover rate before the introduction of term limits, the less 
likely that they are repealed. 
LH6: State legislatures with Republican majorities are less likely to repeal term 
limits than in legislatures without a Republican majority. 
One of the effects of term limits is institutionalized cyclical turnover and a higher degree 
of turnover: more new members entering the state legislature than before the enactment 
of term limits with a corresponding drop in legislative experience (Apollonio and La Raja 
2006; Meinke and Hasecke 2003; Scott 1996; Cohen 1995). The literature abounds with 
critics and opponents of term limits citing their harmful effects and using these ill effects 
as reasons not to have limitations. When bad legislation is produced, and it invariably is, 
changes that have affected the institution are given the blame. Therefore I expect that 
legislatures that experienced a smaller increase or no increase in turnover will have less 
incentive and political ammunition to repeal the term limit law than states with a greater 
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increase in turnover after term limits were instituted. Hence LH5; LH6 is the result of the 
fact that term limits have been much more of a Republican issue, favored by Republican 
lawmakers and opposed by Democrats (see HR104-67 from March 6, 1995 that 
accompanied H.J. Res 2). Term limits for Congress were an important component of the 
House Republicans "Contract With America" (Gillespie and Schellhas 1994) and a plank 
on the party platform at the 1988, 1992, and 1996 Republican National Conventions 
(Rausch and Copeland 1996; Richardson 1991; Coleman 1988). While many 
Republicans supported term limits based on their purported merits, other Republican 
leaders, lawmakers, and aspiring legislators supported them simply because they were 
popular with the people (Coburn 2003; Sanford 2000; Shin 1998; Nelson 1996; Kamber 
1995). They could thus be used as a campaign issue to supplant Democratic majorities 
with Republican ones in legislatures at all levels of the American Federal system. Term 
limits are thus both a mechanism for prescribed turnover and a powerful political weapon 
to use against long-serving incumbents. 
The judicial hypotheses are based on the particular factors that influence the 
interpretation of constitutions and laws, as well as the judicial decision-making process as 
a whole. The delegate theory as applied to maximizing utility refers to the 
conceptualization that judges are political actors, and like all political actors they base 
their decisions and actions according to who they are beholden. 
JHl: States that have some form of voter accountability over their state high court 
judges-elected high court judges or 'retention ballots' (i.e., the Missouri Plan}­
are less likely to invalidate term limits than states that appoint those judges. 
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States that elect or retain judges at the ballot box have a constitutional system that is 
intended to give the voting public more control over the judicial branch of government. 
As such, the judges' actions and decisions are expected to reflect the will of the people in 
determining 'the rules of the game' ( who can be elected and for how long/how many 
terms). Appointed judges are expected to order their preferences and make their judicial 
decisions based on a different calculation of utility maximization: one that more reflects 
the interests of those who appointed them than the voting public. 
The second judicial hypothesis is based on the ideology of the court in question, 
which is itself the aggregate of the ideological dispositions of its members. The 
Republican Party in its articulation of public policy positions has publicly embraced term 
limits, while the national governing body of the Democrat Party has never endorsed term 
limits. Based on these facts, the state high courts comprised of elected Republicans or 
were 'Republican-appointed' are expected to support term limits on their merits more so 
than high courts that were Democrat-appointed or elected as such. 
JH2: The more conservative the high court, the less likely they are to invalidate 
term limits. 
I assume that Republicans are more conservative than Democrats overall, despite regional 
differences in ideology across party lines. I understand that using party affiliation as a 
proxy variable for ideology may be problematic. However, given the limitations in 
empirically determining the ideology of judges in their decision-making, it is the closest 
approximation that can be used for this research. 
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The final two judicial hypotheses are derived from the conceptualizations of how 
a judge interprets a law and a written document such as a state constitution, collectively 
known as legalism (Segal and Spaeth 1993). Judges and legal scholars over time have 
articulated various methods of legal or constitutional interpretation. Interpretations are 
often based on a textual-contextual continuum, by the dichotomy of 'original intent' 
versus an evolving document, and by the precedent of previous decisions. 
JH3: The less clear the wording is in the term limits measure, the more likely that a 
state high court ruled it unconstitutional. 
JH4: The less clear the state's constitution is concerning adding qualifications for 
legislative office, the more likely that a state high court ruled the term limits 
measure unconstitutional. 
Judges that subscribe to a more textual interpretation of legal documents are expected to 
be more likely to invalidate 'flawed' legislation because it was poorly worded, hence 
JH3. The expectations that produced JH4 are that judges are more likely to reject a 
constraining statute like term limits unless the state constitution is favorable to the people 
amending the qualifications for legislative office; and that if all other issues are equal, the 
state high court will follow the precedent established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
1995 US. TL v. Thornton case. This decision stated that neither state governments nor 
the Congress itself could add to the qualifications for office. In other words, the 
qualifications clause was deemed explicit, and only by amending the U.S. Constitution 
could there be prescribed limitations on congressional tenure. 
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In sum, my hypotheses are grounded in the prior findings made by political 
science research on theories of representation, decision-making by political actors, and 
legislative term limits. They have been constructed to address and answer the research 
questions. The three research questions in conjunction beg a more fundamental question 
that this project seeks to answer. Namely, which is the most important set of factors 
leading to a repeal of a state legislative term limit provision? Is it the effects of term 
limits on policy-making, state governance, and the political process? Or, is it due more to 
factors pertaining to the institutional structure? In other words, is it the unintended 
consequences and harmful effects attributed to term limits, or the ease with which 
popular laws can be rescinded that has the greater role in state governments repealing 
term limits? 
E. Methods 
This research project utilizes three levels of explanation. The legislative 
hypotheses LHl through LH6 are quantitatively tested. The purpose is to establish causal 
connections as to which factors contributed to the enactment of legislation that repealed 
term l!mits for state legislato�s. These findings can be quantified, from which 
generalizations can be drawn. The judicial hypotheses JHl and JH2 are also tested in a 
quantitative manner, as the characteristics described in these hypotheses can be 
determined explicitly. 
The remaining two judicial hypotheses are addressed using a qualitative research 
strategy. More specifically, the methodology employed to answer JH3 and JH4 is a 
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'content analysis' of the judicial decisions and other documents found to be pertinent to 
the term limit proposals and rulings. In particular, I searched for statements made in the 
judicial decision, or any background communication by state high court judges, which 
pertain to the wording or clarity of the term limit law and the state constitution regarding 
qualifications for legislative office. 
There are "Other Factors" that are explored in an impressionistic mode, based on 
perceptual explanations as to why term limits were repealed or retained. This level of 
explanation isn't rigorously empirical nor wholly qualitative, but rather more 
hypothetical in nature. I include these because there may be other contributing factors 
that cannot be tested directly or by constructing proxy variables. 
OFl: The greater the public support is for term limits, the less likely that the state 
legislature repeals them. 
Lawmakers frequently cite public support for the decisions that they make. Survey polls 
across multiple states are not directly comparable in an empirical manner. However, it 
seems rational and logical to infer that in states where the public support for term limits 
has been demonstrated to be very high, lawmakers are more reluctant and less likely to 
repeal them than in states where the support for term limits by the public is a bare 
majority. So the degree of public support for term limits may be an important reason 
why term limits were retained. 
The second impressionistic factor explored here is referred to at length in the 
literature on state legislative term limits. 
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OF2: The greater the perception among legislators that the term limit legislation 
was worded to confuse or misinform the voters, the more likely that the state 
legislature repealed them. 
Public officials will often blame the opposing side of misinforming the public, leading 
people to favor a proposal that is contrary to their interests. Opponents of term limits 
charge that its supporters laud them as remedies to fix government, but that this claim is 
fals_e and that term limits actually have adverse effects for the political system (Lopez 
2003; Rush 1998; Gurwitt 1996; Polsby 1993; Mann 1992). This then justifies repealing 
term limits because they were enacted due to chicanery by groups and individuals, or by 
characterizing term limit supporters as 'well-meaning but wrong'. 
Two more additional factors will be explored. First, is there a 'copy cat' 
phenomena occurring? Adopting term limits became a national trend in the 1990s, 
following California's lead (Price and.Neves 1991). Is there any indication that late 
adopters of term limits are mirroring the actions of early adopter states? Second, is 
regional emulation occurring? Four of the five states which had term limits and were 
chosen for more in-depth comparative analysis are located in the western part of the 
United States known as the Mountain West: these being Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming, and 
Utah. The fifth state and the exception is Florida, which has repeatedly upheld term limit 
challenges. I will explore the possibility that term limit activity is imitated by 
neighboring states. Another possible inference is that the two work in conjunction: there 
is a 'copy cat' effect based on regional emulation or proximity. 
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F. Primary Data 
Chapter four will briefly explain the activity regarding term limits and repeal 
efforts in all of the states that have had legislative term limits. It will conclude with the 
rationale and justifications for a further examination of select cases. Chapters five and 
six will thus contain more detailed comparative analyses of the selected eight cases in 
five states. For the cases selected see Appendix A. 
I conclude this introductory chapter with a brief description of the primary data 
used in the comparative analysis sections, chapters five and six, and a preliminary 
overview of the repeal efforts in these five states. In the case of Florida, the attempted 
repeal by the judiciary failed on September 2 of 1999. The case was Ray v. Mort ham, 
742 So. 2d 1276 (1999). The legal rationale for the court's decision will be explained 
and analyzed. The next case chronologically is Oregon. There were six bills proposed in 
the legislature during April of 2001. SJR24 would have repealed term limits. SJRl ,  25, 
and 40 would have removed chamber-specific limits on terms. HJR41 would have 
modified term limits. All of these measures failed. HB2674, however, passed and 
became 2001 Or. Law, Chap. 45. It gave lawmakers affected by term limits the right of 
appeal to the state court system. This moved the repeal effort from the legislative branch 
to the judicial. In January of 2002 the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the term limit 
law as unconstitutional. The case was Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231, 233, 37 P. 3d 
989 (2002). 
The research hypotheses will be the basis for examining the political processes 
involved throughout the Oregon repeal efforts. I will look for published committee 
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meetings and any other government document related to the term limit statute and bills 
affecting term limits (particularly SJR24 and HB2674). This research will also examine 
newspapers and other forms of media for information regarding the efforts to repeal the 
term limit provision. 
The other five cases will be examined in the same manner, depending on whether 
the legislature or the judiciary is the decision-maker, and whether or not it moved from 
one branch of government to the other after a failed repeal. Idaho is a case where the 
Judiciary upheld term limits as constitutional. The case was Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 
Idaho 560: 38 P. 3d 598. It was filed on December 13 of 2001. Subsequently, the State 
legislature repealed term limits with the passage of HB425. The Governor vetoed the bill, 
and the Legislature overrode the veto on February 1 of 2002. The vote was 50-20 in the 
State House, and 26-8 in the Senate. 
The Utah Legislature repealed its 1994 term limit laws (20A-10-101, 20A-10-
102, 20A-10-201, 20A-10-301) in March of 2003. SB240 became Session Law Chapter 
181, effective 05/2003, and the Governor signed the bill into law. The repeal effort in 
Wyoming was likewise initiated by the Legislature, and also in March of 2003. Unlike 
Utah's vote, however, HB157 failed in the Wyoming legislature. Afterwards the repeal 
attempt moved to the Judiciary, where the State High Court invalidated the term limit law 
as unconstitutional. The court case was Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY49, 88 P. 3d 1050. 
The decision was handed down on May 4 of 2004, repealing Wyo. Stat. Ann. 22-5-103 
(the 1992 Term Limit law). 
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I thus intend to first demonstrate how the process unfolded. Then, in the 
'hypotheses-testing' sections I seek to understand and explain why the process developed 
and resulted as it did. I believe that this will enable me to draw some preliminary 
conclusions-which can be generalized-as to which factors had an effect on the final 
decision to either repeal or retain term limits. 
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CHAPTER2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TERM LIMITS 
This chapter contains seven sections. First, I trace the concept of limiting the 
duration or number of terms for elected office back to the political thought of ancient 
Athens and Rome, known historically as 'rotation of office' or 'rotation in office' 
(Struble 1980; Cotton 1979; Whitridge 1889). The rotation principle is a 'consecutive 
term limit' , rather than an 'absolute' term limitation which involves a lifetime ban from 
legislative service. Next I link these conceptualizations to the intellectual tradition of 
America's Founding Fathers (Erickson 1993; Petracca 1992). Rotation of office, or term 
limits, under the Articles of Confederation is examined. Term limits under the Virginia 
Plan and the debate regarding their inclusion into the U.S. Constitution are also detailed. 
The chapter continues by tracing the history of term limit activity in the executive and 
legislative branches of the national government, detailing the American experience with 
term limits. 
After explaining term limits as a continuation of classical republican political 
thought from ancient Greece and Rome to Eighteenth Century America and describing 
the history of term limitation efforts in the United States, the legal arguments regarding 
their Constitutionality are analyzed. Here the crucial question regarding congressional 
term limits is how to interpret the 'qualifications clause': can the states or the people add 
qualifications, or do term limits require an amendment to the Constitution. In particular 
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the 1 995 U.S. T.L. v. Thornton decision by the U.S. Supreme Court is considered and 
analyzed. The chapter closes by examining American Federalism and how it relates to 
term limits in state government. 
A. 'Rotation of Office' in Democratic Athens and Republican Rome 
A cursory glance at the map of the State of Tennessee gives some evidence to the 
proposition that the political community formed and developed in Colonial America was 
influenced by the two-millennia old traditions of Hellenistic Greece and Republican 
Rome. Towns in Tennessee were named after such historical locales as Athens, Rome, 
Sparta, and Carthage, to name a few. The Founding Fathers responsible for the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, the Federalist Papers, and the U.S. Constitution used aliases such 
as 'Publius' , 'Brutus', and other Roman nomenclature when engaged in written political 
discourse and dialogue. Even the names of the two main political parties in the U.S. 
come from this tradition. 
This emulation is most evident in early American political thought. Most notably 
Madison, Hamilton, and Jefferson were influenced by the writings of John Locke, the 
Baron de Montesquieu, and others both contemporary and historical. The European 
theorists during the Enlightenment were in turn influenced by the classical republican 
writings that can be traced to Machiavelli and to a lesser degree Thomas Aquinas, and 
before them to Cicero and Roman political thought during the Republic. The foundations 
of Roman political thought, like much of Roman culture including even their pantheon of 
gods, were imported from the Greek city-states. So although Doron and Harris (2001 ) 
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first date the tension on whether to have term limited or permanent political leaders to the 
time of Saul being appointed the first king of Israel, there is agreement among scholars 
that a continuous line of political thought concerning term limits exists beginning with 
Aristotle's writings and culminating in the Federalist Papers and the U.S. Constitution 
(Petracca 1996; Erickson 1993). Doron and Harris (2001) trace the modem idea of term 
limits along two parallel historical lines: one from the secular, Hellenistic civilization of 
the Greeks and the other from the Old Testament, Judeo civilization of the Hebrews. 
The classical republican tradition in European political thought begins with the 
writings of Aristotle-his "Politics" and "The Athenian Constitution"-and term limits 
are but one of many components to this tradition (Doron and Harris 2001; Erickson 1993; 
Petracca 1992; Struble 1979; Cotton 1979). Republican government refers to a mixed 
constitution as devised by Aristotle, incorporating 'rule by one', 'rule by the few', and 
'rule by the many'. Cicero calls this a 'composite state'. It is lawful in the Aristotelian 
sense because republican government derives from the consent of the community, 
adheres to the rule of law, and opens participation to most all citizens as prescribed by the 
law. Based on these conditions, 'republican government' is distinguished from 
'authoritarian government'; historically, what was first called a 'polity' then became a 
'republic', and is now referred to broadly as 'democracy' (Linz 1998; Cotton 1979). 
'Rotation in office', or rather the rotation of officeholders, is a key component of 
republican government. Whitridge (1889) credits staunch Andrew Jackson supporter 
Silas Wright-Congressman, Senator, and Governor of New York during the 1820s to 
40s-with embedding the term into the American political lexicon. According to Cotton 
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(1979), the seventeenth century English political philosopher James Harrington 
incorporated Aristotle's ideas of the state to the conceptualization of republicanism in his 
day; Harrington's ideas in his utopian "Oceana" influenced the evolving 
'parliamentarian-ism' of the English political system and by extension the American 
colonies (See also Erickson 1993 ; Struble 1979; Pocock 1970). Aristotle held the view 
that a well and properly ordered state was needed to bring about constitutional harmony, 
or balance, for the community; and that the root causes of civil discord--disharmony or 
imbalance in the state-lay with inequality of property and inequality of political offices. 
Cotton (1979) makes this point explicitly, citing Sir Ernest Barker's translation of the 
Politics of Aristotle: "If the members of a state are equals in all significant respects, for 
justice to be done, they all must play a part in the ruling of the state, which implies 'their 
being ruled as well as their ruling', and therefore involves rotation of office." 
This strikes at the heart of political thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The principal fear that the political writers of the day shared was towards 
excessive state power, and the crucial question was how to limit it. The republican 
remedies which came from the Aristotelian political tradition were twofold: first, limit 
governmental power by dividing it into separate 'branches' that have institutional checks 
on each other, and second, to limit by rotation the number of terms in office for 
individuals. The former was purported to provide institutional constraints on the 
accumulation of power by the state, and the latter was to prevent particular officials from 
acquiring an overabundance of personal power through long term or lifetime positions 
(Petracca 1996; Sinclair 1988 Pocock 1970). 
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The American colonial leaders were influenced by not only the theoretical 
writings of the Hellenic Greeks and Roman republicans on forms of government, but also 
by studying the actual political institutions in Athens and Rome. Struble ( 1979) asserts, 
"The educated class studied ancient constitutions and cited them as relevant to the 
American experiment." Those who created the American political system knew that in 
ancient Athens and Rome the polis rotated its elected officials. The Athenians elected 
their council of five hundred annually and by lot, with the further provision that no man 
could serve on it more than two years in his life (Sinclair 1988; Staveley 1972). In Rome 
during the republic, "magistrates held office for a fixed and brief period, and the more 
exceptional the power of an official was, the briefer his term of office was" (Abbott 
1963 ). The term magistrate refers here to an authorized representative of the people who 
conducts secular, public duties. These magistracies were elected posts with short terms 
of office, in which the incumbents were proscribed from running for re-election. The 
highest magisterial position, which corresponds closely to modem executive functions of 
government, is the consulate. The Roman citizenry elected two consuls who served for 
one year; after a period of ten years a citizen could hold the office again (Sinclair 1988). 
B. Under the Articles of Confederation 
One of the defining elements of democracy is that it is government based on free 
and fair popular elections. Terms of office are for fixed periods of time, after which 
those who hold power must again be reaffirmed-meaning reelected-by the voting 
public in order to retain their position of power. As Linz ( 1998) points out, "the idea of 
26 
electing someone for life to exercise effective power, or representatives for unlimited 
time (without ever having to stand again for election) does not fit into our thinking about 
democracy." It hasn't been indicative of the American political system since 1787, when 
Alexander Hamilton's plan for the U.S. Constitution-lifetime Senators and a President 
for life-was rejected by the assembled delegation. 
America's Founding Fathers were the political leaders and thinkers of their day. 
Whereas the Constitution of 1 787 omitted the republican idea of rotation in office, the 
preceding national constitutional document embraced it as a central element in its 
representational scheme ( Corwin 1991 ). The wartime Continental Congress became the 
national Congress of the United States with the ratification of the Articles of 
Confederation in 1781. Article V stated: "No state shall be represented in Congress by 
less than two, nor more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a 
delegate for more than three years in any term of six years." In addition to Article V 
limiting the terms of office for all members of Congress, Article IX established the 
unicameral Congress "to appoint one of their members to preside, provided that no 
person be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one year in any term of 
three years." 
The inclusion of term limits for elected officials under the Articles of 
Confederation continued a tradition of rotation in office already established in the 
American colonies. It was based on the republican ideas and practices of ancient Athens 
and Rome, and was passed down through the political ideas of English intellectuals such 
as James Harrington, William Blackstone, James Burgh, Thomas Bradbury, William 
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Godwin, Henry Neville, and to a lesser extent John Locke (Petracca 1994). In addition, 
the principle of rotation in office arrived in the American colonies by way of the Dutch 
who settled New Amsterdam, and colonial New York continued the practice (Beard 
1914). Rotation of office was also in the text of the New England Confederation of 1643 
(Petracca 1996). 
The colonial tradition of term limits in the form of a prescribed rotation of office 
was evident by its widespread inclusion in colonial charters and state constitutions 
(Erickson 1993). William Penn's "Frame of Government", written in 1682, affirmed the 
importance of rotating officeholders including the governor, councilors, and members of 
the general assembly (Petracca 1992). George Mason wrote term limitation into the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights (Erickson 1993). By 1777 seven of the ten new state 
constitutions had term limits that were more than a prescribed rotation of office: they 
limited the amount of time that their governors could serve in office (Petracca 1992; 
Kallenbach 1952). These states were Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Six states limited the terms of sheriffs and 
members of the governors' council, three states required rotation of senators, and 
Pennsylvania restricted the reelection of legislators to the lower house (Petracca 1992). 
Doron and Harris (2001) note "the declining support for term limits roughly 
correlates with the decline of the Articles of Confederation; perhaps there is even 
somewhat of a causal link." The United States Government faced a systemic crisis due to 
the defects of 'the Articles' , and among the Founding Fathers there were calls to fix the 
grave deficiencies in the American constitutional design in order to form a more perfect 
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umon. These defects included the inability of Congress to collect taxes and the 
corresponding state control of funding the national government, the dependency on the 
states to supply troops in times of war, and other sovereign powers granted to the state 
governments at the expense and detriment of the national Congress. Congress under the 
Articles proved inept at containing civil insurrection during the Whiskey Rebellion, could 
not coerce some states to pay their nominal share of taxes, and even had opposition and 
difficulty in enforcing the term limitation requirement for members of Congress in 
Article V. When the three-year term of office expired in 1784, the representatives of 
Rhode Island refused to leave office without a struggle (Doron and Harris 2001; Petracca 
1992). So as the delegates met in Philadelphia in 1787 with the initial intention of 
restructuring the Articles of Confederation, the concept of term limits was challenged and 
criticized by some leaders as being, among other things, 'anti-democratic'. 
C. Proposed for the United States Constitution in the Virginia Plan 
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1 787, who were tasked with 
amending and thereby fixing the defects in the governmental structure of the Articles of 
Confederation, quickly agreed to scrap the document altogether. Through various 
compromises and political wrangling a new constitution was forged. Term limits was 
one of the institutional mechanisms present under the Articles that were discussed and 
ultimately rejected. The leaders in the American states were divided over term 
limitations and prescribed rotations of office. Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, 
Richard Henry Lee, Edmund Peyton Randolph, George Mason, Patrick Henry, George 
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Washington, John Adams, and James Madison reportedly favored term limits (Doron and 
Harris 2001; Elhauge 1997; Erickson 1993; Struble and Jahre 1991). In 1782 a 
committee of Congress including Madison and Hamilton praised frequent elections and 
the frequent rotation of members of Congress as '.'a constant check upon them" and as 
"the true source of security in a representative republic" (Warren 1937). 
Alexander Hamilton was the most well known advocate who best articulated the 
case against term limits. His arguments persuaded other delegates to oppose their 
inclusion in the new constitutional document (Doron and Harris 2001; Petracca 1992). 
Here we see the split beginning between Madison and Hamilton regarding the new 
constitution, one that resulted in the two men forming opposing factions that later became 
the 'Federalist' and 'Democrat-Republican' political parties. Whereas Madison and 
Hamilton both believed that frequent elections in and of themselves would produce a 
frequent rotation of officeholders, Madison favored term limits on the merits in order to 
give legislators more independence from their narrow constituencies, while Hamilton 
strongly argued for the retention of incumbent lawmakers as a reward for good public 
service (Elhauge 1997; Erickson 1993). 
Edmund Randolph proposed term limits in his reading of the Virginia Plan at the 
Constitutional Convention on May 29, 1787. The Plan itself was written primarily by 
Madison. The proposal mandated the exit, after a single term, of all incumbents in the 
lower chamber of the national legislature. There would thus be an entirely new House of 
Representatives every two years, and since in this initial proposal the lower house would 
elect the upper house, term limitation would have an effect on the composition of the 
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senate and thus affect the entire legislative branch (Erickson 1993). Term limits were 
subsequently dropped from the Virginia Plan on June 12 without debate by a unanimous 
vote, and the idea of banning consecutive terms was altogether rejected by the fourth 
week of the Convention (Richards 1996; Struble 1979). 
The absence of a rotation requirement in the finished Constitution was strongly 
denounced by the Anti-Federalists, in George Mason's words, as an abandonment of"a 
very important and truly republican institution" (Richards 1996; Gorusch and Guzman 
1992; Petracca 1992; Kenyon 1955). Similarly, Thomas Jefferson believed that the 
absence of rotation, along with the omission of a bill of rights and a 'balanced budget' 
provision, were the three most notable flaws in the document (Gorusch and Guzman 
1992). The proponents of the new constitution asserted that the short term of office for 
the House of Representatives, the staggered elections for Senators, the checks and 
balances between the separate branches of government, and the vested power of the states 
to regulate elections and elect senators would provide sufficient safeguards from an 
overly powerful national government. 
Those collectively known as the Anti-Federalists opposed the ratification of the 
new constitution. Their opposition ironically stemmed from the same negative view of 
human nature shared by the authors of the new constitution. Whereas Madison and 
Hamilton felt that the new constitutional design would restrain and punish vice, the Anti­
Federalists chided the Federalists for their optimism and excessive confidence in the 
future virtue of elected officials (Kenyon 1955). The proposed constitution failed to 
provide adequate protection against the exhibition of these tyrannical impulses, according 
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to its opponents. Most of the Anti-Federalist criticism reflected the specific fear that the 
president and senators would be "perpetually reelected", the Senate would become "a 
fixed and unchangeable body of men", and the president would be "a king for life" 
(Ketcham 1984; Kenyon 1955). Delegates at the ratification conventions in New York, 
Virginia, and North Carolina proposed amending the new constitution to include rotation 
for the presidency, similar to that prescribed in the Articles of Confederation (Petracca 
1992; Kallenbach 1952). The notion to limit the terms of the U.S. Presidency was 
eventually realized with the passage of the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1951. 
Proponents of the new constitution countered these arguments with their own. 
New Yorkers Alexander Hamilton and Robert R. Livingston, along with Roger Sherman 
of Connecticut, made three arguments against term limitations: the people have the right 
to elect whoever they will, rotation reduces the incentives for public accountability, and 
rotation deprives the community of experienced public servants (Malbin 1992; Petracca 
1992). Cecilia Kenyon (1955) describes the Anti-Federalists as "men of little faith" 
whose theory of republican government reflected a deep distrust of elected officials 
holding strong, centralized power. So due to the strength of Hamilton's arguments, the 
association of the rotation principle with the structurally flawed Articles of 
Confederation, and the pressing need to compromise in order for the document to gain 
the needed approval of nine states, term limits were left out of the U.S. Constitution. In 
August of 1789 Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina proposed a 
constitutional amendment to limit the terms of national elected officials, but it was never 
voted on (Petracca 1992). Thomas Jefferson, George Mason, and Richard Henry Lee 
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continued efforts toward a "rotation amendment" through 1 789, the first year that the new 
constitution was the supreme law of the land (Struble 1979). While term limits as a 
popular principle of republican government was excluded from the Constitution, the 
philosophical objections to "perpetuity in office" became the prevalent norm for 
presidents, senators, and members of the House of Representatives throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Gorsuch and Guzman 1992; Petracca 1992; Struble 
1979). 
D. Historical Overview of Term Limits in the Executive Branch 
George Washington's voluntary retirement and peaceful transfer of presidential 
power after two terms in office set an important precedent for the American political 
system and established a normative standard of behavior for executive officeholders 
(Doron and Harris 2001 ; Peabody 2001 ). While not a vocal advocate of rotation in office 
during the ratification process of the Constitution, George Washington and his Vice 
President John Adams supported this form of term limits. Washington wrote to Madison 
near the end of his first term: "The spirit of government may render a rotation in the 
elected officers of it most congenial with the ideas of liberty and safety" ( as cited in 
Whitridge 1889). In the words of John Adams, "Representatives and counselors . .  . like 
bubbles on the sea of matter bourne, they rise, they break, and to the same return. This 
will teach the great political virtues of humility, patient, and moderation, without which 
every man in power becomes a ravenous beast of prey" ( as cited in Mal bin 1992). 
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Gettell (1928) notes that the rotation principle extended from elected officials to 
appointed ones following Washington's two terms in office, as President Jefferson 
advocated a strict adherence to rotation of office in order to prevent the formation of a 
permanent bureaucracy. This practice "gradually spread to the appointive positions" at 
the state and local levels of government, according to White ( 195 1 ), "such as sheriffs and 
justices of the peace." Hence the rotation principle was part of the democratization 
movement that characterized the early American Republic (Petracca 1992; White 195 1 ). 
It was a component of the Jeffersonian Revolution of 1800, and was further expanded in 
1829 when Andrew Jackson took office (Kallenbach 1952). The seventh president 
instituted an unprecedented turnover in the executive bureaucracy during his eight years 
as President (Struble 1979). Frederick Whitridge (1889) contends in "the first two years 
of his administration", Jackson made "ten times as many removals as all his predecessors 
had together made during forty years." Jackson made use of a federal statute passed in 
1820 that "legalized and made easy rotation in office"; it limited the district attorneys, 
territorial officers, collectors, and postmasters confirmed by the Senate to a four year 
term of office by making their terms expire after the date of the President's inauguration 
(Whitridge 1889). 
Jacksonian democracy, also known as 'The Era of the Common Man', 
emphasized a wide degree of popular participation in government. Rotation was viewed 
as a mechanism to prevent corruption in office and to prevent government from being a 
means of promoting individual interests (White 1962). Notable public figures such as 
James Madison, Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and John Calhoun condemned the 
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application of rotation in office to administration (Petracca 1992). Jackson's Whig 
political opponents criticized the practice as excessive political patronage that reduced 
impartial public service to a mere party agency (White 1962). In Whitridge' s article 
entitled "Rotation in Office" ( 1 889), the author argues that the aforementioned statement 
by George Washington regarding rotation and "all" that was "said about change, or 
rotation, in offices" by the Founding Fathers pertained to only the elected offices. 
Whitridge goes on to assert that the practice of rotating appointed positions became a 
partisan football in New York state politics, and that the council of appointment of New 
York-consisting of the Governor and four state senators elected by the lower house­
"wholly prostituted its power to partisan ends" ( 1 889). 
Until 1 860 the rotation principle remained identified with the republican creed; 
however, during the last few decades of the nineteenth century it became directly 
associated with ' the Spoils System' of public administration (Petracca 1 992). In tum, 
Max Farrand ( 191 8) asserts that the spoils system ironically marked the rise of the class 
of the professional politician, which ultimately led to the decline of term limits in the 
form of rotation as a popular principle of democratic governance. As Doron and Harris 
(2001)  phrase it, Andrew Jackson's "dedication to the principle of rotation in office 
helped produce some deleterious effects on the support for the issue." So, in sum, the 
decline of the rotation principle has been attributed to numerous factors, beginning with 
being associated with first the dysfunctional Articles of Confederation and then the 
discredited spoils system. 
35 
Second, the size and responsibility of those in the federal government in 
Washington evolved over time from being "quite limited" and unattractive as a career 
into becoming prestigious and powerful positions as the authority and size of the federal 
government expanded towards the end of the nineteenth century (Borchert and Copeland 
2003; Petracca 1992; Polsby 1968). This made the rotation principle less attractive 
amongst the political elite. Third, the culture and norm of professionalism made 
legislative and administrative careerism acceptable and associated careerism with 
effective governance (Borchert and Copeland 2003; Petracca 1992). Finally, Petracca 
(1992) contends that the Progressive Movement from the 1890s through the 1920s fought 
to remove the corrupt and politicized administration that was associated with the spoils 
system. 
The opposition to executive patronage and the corresponding decline in the 
popularity of term limits did not extend to the chief executive office. The two-term 
tradition remained the norm for the office of the presidency. Jefferson continued the 
practice begun by George Washington, further strengthening it as a political norm. In 
1824 and 1826 the Senate passed constitutional amendment proposals to limit the 
president to two terms, and Andrew Jackson urged the adoption of an amendment 
limiting the president to a single term of four or six years (Kallenbach 1952). This single 
term principle in turn became a short-lived political norm (Peabody 2001 ). Between 
1836 and the election of the eighth President, Van Buren, until the twenty-fifth president 
McKinley's election in 1896, only Lincoln and Grant served two consecutive terms. 
Grover Cleveland served two non-concurrent presidential terms. Kallenbach (1952) cites 
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the earlier research of Herman V. Ames, who noted that the constitution of the 
Confederate states adopted in 1861 limited the President to one six-year term. Ames is 
again referred to by the same author in noting that on December 15, 1875, the House of 
Representatives passed by a vote of 234 to 18 a resolution declaring that a departure from 
the two-term tradition would be "unwise, unpatriotic, and fraught with peril to our free 
institutions" (Kallenbach 1952). 
I raise these points regarding the one-term and two-term traditions in order to 
better explain the ease with which the Twenty-Second Amendment passed both houses of 
Congress, ultimately instituting presidential term limits. It prohibits a person from being 
elected to the office of President more than twice and caps the number of years that can 
be served at ten. I see a confluence of factors resulting in the passage of this 
Amendment. First, from the literature on term limits there is agreement that, distinct 
from legislative term limits and term limits for appointed civil servants, limiting the 
tenure of the most powerful elected office in the American political system remained 
highly popular with the American people. The only exceptions were in times of war 
when there was a serious threat to the existence of the United States. During the years of 
1836 until 1896 when serving one term had become the political norm, the only two 
presidents who served two consecutive terms were elected in times of crisis, and without 
the support of southern constituencies. Grant's two terms were during Reconstruction 
when Union troops occupied the South except for Tennessee, and Lincoln's reelection 
was during the Civil War. Unlike Grant's elections, Southern voters were eligible in 
Lincoln's first term, but three candidates-a Democrat, a Southern Democrat, and a 
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Constitutional Unionist-fractured the electorate so that Lincoln won with less than forty 
percent of the popular vote. 
Franklin Roosevelt faced a similar situation in 1940. At that time, he declared 
that he did not wish to be a candidate again; however, the president's popularity and the 
perceived need for stable leadership at a time of national peril won out over the deeply 
entrenched two-term tradition and the fear of executive tyranny (Doron and Harris 2001; 
Goodwin 1994). It is also an American cultural proclivity that when a national security 
threat appears to dissipate, there is a political backlash to restore the earlier status quo. 
Note the reactions to reauthorizing the Patriot Act in 2005 and 2006, and the return to an 
isolationist foreign policy almost immediately following the end of the First World War. 
Similarly, David McCullough (1992) labeled the Twenty Second Amendment "a rebuke 
to the memory of Franklin Roosevelt and his four terms." As evidenced by FDR 
breaking the precedent, the only way to enforce the two-term tradition was by amending 
the Constitution. 
Third, support for presidential term limits was supported at various times by both 
Democrat and Republican parties, and also crossed regional divisions as well. The 
Democrat Party supported term limits due to the legacy of Andrew Jackson, and the 
Republican Party began to support presidential term limits in a progressively stronger 
fashion with each reelection of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Even Democrats again 
supported presidential term limits as World War Two wore on. The American Institute 
of Public Opinion polls conducted from 1936 to 1947 showed Democrats against 
presidential term limits until December 1943; after that point Democrats continually 
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supported 'two-terms for the president' until the Amendment was passed (as reported in 
Kallenbach 1952). 
So, in sum, I see three factors at work regarding the enactment of presidential 
term limits. 
1. The American tradition of placing restrictions on their leaders 
2. The behavioral norm of two presidential terms 
3 .  The widespread nature of popular support for presidential term limits 
E. Historical Overview of Term Limits in the Legislative Branch 
Following the exclusion of term limits from the Constitution, there were no 
serious efforts to institute consecutive or absolute limitations on members of Congress 
between the year 1 789 and the decade of the 1990s. During this two hundred year period, 
however, the institution of Congress transformed to a radical degree in many significant 
respects. It is widely argued that these changes to the legislative branch in the nation's 
capitol led to conditions that brought a new relevance to the idea of term limits (Doron 
and Harris 2001; Petracca 1996; Gorsuch and Guzman 1992; Struble and Jahre 1991). 
Ongoing throughout the early years of the American republic, members of 
Congress largely followed the patterns of limited service that were established by George 
Washington for the presidency, as well as the norms at the local and state level for a 
citizen to choose public service for a short period to fulfill their civic duty and then return 
to their civil occupation (Borchert and Copeland 2003). In addition, the city of 
Washington during this time lacked the advantages of prestige and culture that other large 
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American cities enjoyed (Borchert and Copeland 2003). The District of Columbia was a 
mosquito-infested, inhospitable place where members of the new government lacked 
status, authority, and wealth. This, however, changed as the nineteenth century 
progressed. Congressional terms became longer when three inhibiting factors changed 
nearly simultaneously: the quality of life vastly improved, the powers of the federal 
government greatly expanded, and the seniority system developed which rewarded longer 
congressional tenures (Borchert and Copeland 2003; Doron and Harris 2001; Rausch and 
Copeland 1996; Grant 1995). 
It would be logical to infer that as the Congress and in fact the whole federal 
government became more powerful, congressional members enjoyed more power and 
patronage, and then in turn congressional tenure increased. Couple this with the growth 
of the idea of professionalism in public service due to the excesses of the spoils system, 
and the end result was that the American cultural stigma against perpetuity in office had 
been lifted for the national bureaucracy and legislature. Being a Member of Congress 
became a desirable career. That being the case, it was in the self-interest of its members 
to use their power to increase the advantages of incumbency. The powers of political 
patronage-jobs and favors-and the distribution of public expenditures to a 
congressman's district or state-'political pork'-increase the likelihood for reelection. 
Turnover and tenure in the House of Representatives from 1790 until 2000 indeed 
followed this surmised trend. According to data provided by Borchert and Copeland 
(2003), the number of House Members who had served twelve years-the figures used 
are the average numbers for five Congresses or ten years-began to rise by a noticeable 
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degree in the 1870s. From these calculations, congressional tenure has increased steadily 
each decade ever since, and conversely House turnover has continually declined. The 
only exceptions were during the Great Depression in the 1930s when the Democrats 
became the legislative majority, and when the Republican Party recaptured both branches 
of Congress in the 1990s. Independent data compiled by Struble ( 1979) shows that from 
1824-96 there was a turnover rate in the House of fifty-one percent; and of further 
importance is the manner of turnover. Withdrawal of incumbents prior to general 
elections was by far the largest component of House turnover: thirty-five percent (Struble 
1979). Struble uses this data to show "chronologically the wax and wane of the spoils 
form of rotation introduced by the Jacksonians", thus linking how rotation in office for 
the bureaucracy affected rotation in Congress ( 1979). 
An ever-expanding federal government marked the twentieth century, whose size, 
scope, and power grew at the expense of state governments, individuals, and collective 
entities in the private sector. The ideas that fueled the debate between the Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists about the nature of democracy and representation-and arguably 
constituted some of the causes of the Civil War-became somewhat dormant, or rather 
devolved into States' Rights arguments. In the century's latter decades the American 
public grew more vocally dissatisfied with big government and its failed policies. The 
old debate about democracy and representation gained new relevance and became 
important once again. The post-Watergate Era precipitated a discussion over limiting the 
terms for both houses of the Congress; in 1979 and 1980, several bills were introduced to 
limit members on Capitol Hill to twelve years of service (Rausch and Copeland 1996). In 
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1988, 1992, and 1996, the Republican Party included term limits as a plank in their 
platform (Rausch and Copeland 1996; Richardson 1991; Coleman 1988). Congressional 
term limits were also proposed by the state legislatures of South Dakota and Utah in 1988 
and 1983, respectively: both resolutions called for a constitutional convention (Rausch 
and Copeland 1996). 
Anger and cynicism by the American public led to various proposals for 
institutional reform. Many of these proposals shared the view of government held by the 
Anti-Federalists, which assumes that democracy means government by the people, 
directly (Malbin 1992; Corwin 1991 ). In a representative democracy government by 
'more of the people' was to be preferred to government by 'fewer of the people', hence 
rotating office was advocated to increase the number of those who participate. So among 
the proponents of direct democracy were those who advocated term limits. Libertarian­
minded think tanks like the Cato Institute and public interest groups such as U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. are two of the many organizations and citizen groups that promote term 
limits as a cure for what ails the American polity ( Crane 1991 ). While the Republican 
Party embraced this popular sentiment at the national level, no real action occurred on 
term limits before the fall of 1990 when the issue moved onto the political agenda in the 
form of the citizen initiative (Rausch and Copeland 1996). 
Chapter four will detail the enactment of term limits in various state governments 
for state lawmakers. Here it suffices to say that the spark of term limit activity in 1990 
was the result of citizen initiatives predicated by immense popular support for term limits 
as a proposed solution to career politicians and 'big government'. Federalism in the 
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American system-more specifically Article I, Section 4-gives the states explicit 
authority and wide latitude to determine the times, places, and manner of congressional 
elections. So in addition to passing term limits for state legislators, by 1 995 nearly half 
the states had imposed term limits on their federal representatives as well (Rotunda 1 995; 
Sullivan 1 995). Legal challenges ensued questioning the constitutionality of the states 
adding qualifications to the eligibility for federal legislative office. Arkansas, where the 
voters adopted a state constitutional amendment that denied ballot access to persons who 
had been elected to three terms in the House of Representatives or two terms in the 
Senate, was the test case that was argued before the United States Supreme Court in the 
fall of 1 994 and decided in the spring of 1 995 (see US. TL Inc. v. Thornton, 51 4 U.S. 
779). Centering on this case, I will lay out the various arguments supporting and 
opposing the constitutionality of congressional term limits. 
F. Constitutional Arguments For and Against 
An amendment to the Arkansas constitution, which passed by popular initiative in 
1 992, denied ballot access to Members of the U.S. House and Senate from Arkansas who 
had served a set number of terms in office. The Circuit Court for Pulaski County, 
Arkansas entered a judgment that the ballot access restriction violated the Federal 
Constitution's qualifications clauses in Article I. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment of the Circuit Court (see US. TL. v. Thornton 1 995). Upon assuming 
jurisdiction over this legal case, the United States Supreme Court had to decide whether 
the qualifications specified in the Constitution are the exclusive qualifications, or, 
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conversely, only the minimum qualifications with respect_ to state authority over 
congressional representation (Zubler 1995). Other important questions to be determined 
by the Court in their decision were, first, is a term limit an impermissible 'qualification' 
under Article I, sections 2 and 3 or a permissible 'manner regulation' under Article I, 
section 4 (Gorsuch and Guzman 1992)? Second, did the Framers of the Constitution 
understand the qualifications listed in Article I to prohibit both the Congress and the 
states from adding qualifications for office (Price 1996)? 
The issue of imposing term limitations for Members of Congress raises important 
questions regarding numerous political rights that pertain to the people and to the states. 
These include: the right to candidacy, the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice, 
the right to vote effectively, the right to associate, the states' right to regulate, and the 
people's right to limit ballot access for federal office based on the Tenth Amendment 
(Latz 1991; also, see Appendix B). As with other democratic principles, there is a trade­
off when interpreting the Constitution between competing liberties or rights. Oliver 
Wendell Holmes stated that the right to free speech is not absolute: one cannot scream 
'fire' in a crowded, enclosed area. Nor can anyone mail white powder as an 'anthrax 
joke'; thus the right to free expression often clashes with the right to maintain domestic 
tranquility. 
Enacting term limits presents a similar conflict. Which is more important as a 
democratic principle: the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice, or the right of the 
people through their elected state lawmakers to add qualifications for federal office or 
limit ballot access? In the narrow 5-4 US. T.L. v. Thornton decision (1995), the former 
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principle was the main determining factor for the majority opinion written by Justice 
Stevens, while the latter principle was the argument presented by Justice Thomas in the 
dissent. For the decision and case syllabus, see Appendix C. 
Three factors favored upholding the lower courts' rejection of state imposed term 
limits, as stated in the majority opinion. First is the aforementioned 'democratic 
principle' cited by Justice Stevens, which holds an expansive view of voter choice 
(Elhauge 1997). In other words, term limits violate the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments (Corwin 1991). Next is the concurrent opinion written by Justice Kennedy 
that state imposed term limits are a form of "state interference" in the American federalist 
system of government established by the Constitution (Elhauge 1997; Richards 1996; 
Sullivan 1995). Third, the Court cited the 1969 Powell v. McCormick case (395 U.S. 
486, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491, 89 S. Ct. 1944) as precedent (Elhauge 1997; Richards 1996; 
Sullivan 1995). This earlier decision examined the power of Congress to impose 
qualifications on its members other than those set forth in the text of the Constitution; the 
ruling was that the House is "without authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his 
constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the 
Constitution" (Powell v. McCormick 1969). 
A sizeable body of literature developed in political science periodicals and law 
journals debating the constitutionality of state imposed term limits. These pre-date the 
Thornton decision as well as include criticisms and support for the Court's findings and 
rationale. The U.S. Supreme Court cited the aforementioned arguments supportive of the 
45 
Thornton decision. I find four basic arguments against the Court's decision from the 
literature. 
1. The states can add qualifications 
2. The people can add qualifications 
3. The states can regulate the 'manner' of elections 
4. The 'original intent' of the Framers of the Constitution 
Elhauge ( 1997) argues that the states can add qualifications to those listed in 
Article I, sections two and three (see also Price 1996; Richards 1996; Grant 1995; 
DeCarli 1993; Corwin 1991; Latz 1991). In the Thornton decision, the majority opinion 
stated that the Constitutional debates and early history in America regarding the idea and 
practice of term limits were inconclusive in and of themselves (Elhauge 1997; Richards 
1996). Some scholars dispute this view. It has been noted that under the Articles of 
Confederation the states could add qualifications; further, Thomas Jefferson directly 
addressed this question, unlike Hamilton and Madison, believing the affirmative (Elhauge 
1997; Richards 1996). More importantly, several states did impose additional 
. qualifications in early post-Constitution practice. The Pennsylvania Constitution 
continued to impose term limits on its congressional representatives, Virginia required its 
congressmen to be property owners, five states required federal legislators to be residents 
of their districts, and three states required congressmen to have been residents for at least 
one year (Elhauge 1997; Richards 1996). James Madison was seated in the first 
Congress from a state that added its own qualifications for federal office, and had no 
recorded objections to Virginia's authority to do so (Price 1996). 
46 
Concurrent with this argument is the contention that other laws violate the 
qualifications clause. Other state limits on ballot access have been upheld against 
qualifications clause challenges, an example being statutes requiring state officeholders 
to resign before seeking a federal position ( Corwin 1991 ). Citizenship and Inhabitancy, 
two of the three qualifications, were defined by state common law in 1 790 and the first 
federal statute on naturalization merely supplemented these definitions; thus there were 
varied definitions of those concepts in early post-Constitution practice (Price 1996). In a 
letter to Thomas Jefferson on October 8, 1788, Madison noted, "every citizen throughout 
the state [of Pennsylvania] shall vote for the whole number of members allotted to the 
state . .  . It is perhaps to be desired that various modes should be tried, as by that means 
only the best mode can be ascertained" (Price 1996). After the enactment of the first law 
requiring elections to be conducted by district in 1842, four states ignored the law and 
elected members to the twenty-eighth Congress on an at-large basis; and these legislators 
were seated (Price 1996). Lastly, twenty-nine of the forty-eight states were already 
choosing U.S. senators by direct election at the time of the enactment of the Seventeenth 
Amendment in 1913, in clear violation of Article I which states that the state legislatures 
select senators (Rotunda 1995). 
The second argument against the majority opinion in the Thornton case was 
expressed in the dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas, writing the dissent, held the view 
that nothing exists in the Constitution that deprives the people of each state of the power 
to prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent the people 
in Congress. This is because the Constitution is silent on the question and no bar to 
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action by the states or the people was explicitly expressed, so the people of Arkansas 
enjoy reserved powers over the selection of their representatives in Congress. Thus the 
qualifications clause restricts state power only in preventing states from abolishing all 
eligibility requirements for membership in Congress (US. T. L. v. Thornton 1995). This 
view was also articulated prior to the Thornton decision by DeCarli ( 1993). In addition, 
Fried (1995) notes that the Constitution purports that its source of 
Authority comes from "We the People of the United States", so whereas states may not 
add qualifications to the Constitution, the American people can through the agency of 
state power. 
The third argument is that the states can regulate the 'manner' of elections under 
Article I, section four of the Constitution. This line of reasoning incorporates states' 
rights arguments and states' interests, thus calling into question the understanding of 
American Federalism as articulated by the majority opinion in the Thornton case. The 
logic behind this argument is that the states had to ratify the new constitution because 
sovereignty lay mainly with the state governments under the pre-existing constitution. 
The U.S. Constitution is the written 'social contract' between the new government, the 
existing state governments, and the American people. Elhauge ( 1997) brings into the 
debate the default rule dealing with contracts: resolving a dispute between parties 
involves referring to rules understood to apply by default unless the parties contract out 
of them. Given this, any limitations on state power in the new constitution needed to be 
explicit, thus the Tenth Amendment grants the states broad powers to regulate the ' times, 
48 
places, and manner' of elections and add qualifications that they are not explicitly 
prevented from imposing (Grant 1999; Elhauge 1997; DeCarli 1993). 
The fourth argument uses the legal method called 'originalism', which seeks to 
ascertain by various means the 'original intent' of the Framers of the Constitution 
regarding a disputed provision. According to Price (1996), the Framers did not have a 
prolonged debate over the qualifications clause because they were unconcerned about it, 
and when they did discuss it they did so primarily in the context of limiting the power of 
the federal government. DeCarli (1993) focuses on the wording used in sections two and 
three of Article I, "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not . . .  " and "No Person 
shall be a Senator who shall not . . . " meet the age, U.S. citizenship, and residency 
requirements; if the Constitution had meant to have settled the qualification of members, 
the wording would have been 'every person ' who meets a, b, and c shall be eligible to a 
seat. He concludes that these requirements were not intended to delimit the qualifications 
of members, but that the Constitution merely enumerated a few disqualifications within 
which the states were left to act (DeCarli 1993). 
In sum, critics of the Court's ruling in U.S. T.L. v. Thornton have challenged every 
point in its decision. The majority's view of the nature of American Federalism was held 
to be incorrect, or at least "ill-defined", so it is argued that the states have broader powers 
over regulating elections than the Court determined (Zubler 1995). Specifically, the 
states can add qualifications to federal office based on historical precedent: writings by 
Madison and Jefferson seem to support this, and historical practice after the ratification of 
the Constitution demonstrates that states have restricted ballot access and required 
49 
additional qualifications for federal legislators. According to some critics, the people can 
also add qualifications. They are the ultimate source of authority that ordained this new 
constitution, and the Tenth Amendment reserves power to them that is not delegated to 
the United States. Since the qualifications clause is unclear on adding qualifications, as 
the Court determined in the Thornton ruling, the people can require additional 
qualifications for members of Congress. Lastly, critics who examined the original intent 
of the Framers of the Constitution contend that the qualifications specified in the 
Constitution are only the minimum: thus they are the floor rather than the ceiling in terms 
of state governments or the people of a given state adding to the qualifications listed in 
Article I. 
G. Federalism, Representation, and Term Limits in State Governments 
The Supreme Court's legal rationales detailed in the US. TL. v. Thornton ( 1995) 
decision clearly demonstrate a lack of consensus regarding term limits, and more broadly, 
disagreement regarding the nature of federalism in the American political system. The 
advocates and detractors of the constitutionality of state imposed term limits used the 
same theory, federalism, to interpret the same body of historical evidence, yet produced 
completely antithetical results (Richards 1996). The ruling in the Thornton case, by a 
narrow 5-4 vote, also demonstrates the degree of disagreement regarding the roles of the 
states and the national government in the federal system. There exists a duality of 
authority in the American political system, but as evidenced by the Thornton decision, 
the states can only limit their own constitutionally prescribed powers (see Rotunda 1995 
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regarding the direct election of senators prior to the Seventeenth Amendment). The 
prevailing interpretation of the Constitution is that neither the Congress, the States, nor 
the people in a particular state can limit ambiguous federal powers such as those 
governing the qualifications for federal representatives. 
The decision in U S. TL. v. Thornton (1995) ended the recent debate over 
instituting congressional term limits short of amending the United States Constitution. 
So while the Constitution has been interpreted to allow Members of Congress to serve as 
many terms as they can be elected, state governments rely on their own constitutions to 
determine qualifications for legislative office. These "laboratories of democracy", as 
coined by Justice Louis Brandeis in 1932, have historically been sources of 
experimentation to political, social, and economic questions (Morehouse and Jewell 
2004). Fifteen States have legislative term limits at present; other states had term limits 
and later repealed them as 'failed experiments'. This thesis will next examine the ever­
growing body of scholarly literature on legislative term limits before focusing on the 
current status of term limits in the American states. 
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CHAPTER3 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON STATE LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS 
This chapter contains six sections. I begin by chronicling the numerous advocacy 
groups and public policy institutes which focus on term limits. I then categorize and 
detail the scholarly literature on legislative term limits. I previously addressed the 
sizeable body of literature developed in political science periodicals and law journals 
debating the constitutionality of state imposed term limits in chapter two, as well as the 
writings about term limits historically. In this chapter I examine five categories of term 
limit research. First, who among the American people supports term limits and why; 
next, the initial predictive literature either published before state legislative term limits 
were to take effect, or before the effects could be gauged. Third, I focus on the case 
studies that research either one or two state legislatures; afterwards, I examine the 
literature on the institutional effects of term limits across states. The case studies and 
cross-sectional research on the institutional effects start primarily around 1996; by this 
time term limits were beginning to effect the composition and operation of a number of 
state legislatures. I finish the chapter by examining the effects of term limits on political 
parties and interest groups. 
From a review of the term limits literature, and from surveying various lists of 
interest groups, advocacy groups, and research institute ' think tanks', I have identified 
twelve nationwide groups that specifically focus on the term limits issue. Many existing 
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groups, interests, and organizations discount or reject term limits as a solution for career 
politicians and big government, including "nearly every interest group with business 
before the state legislature" (Basham 2001). Term limits are also opposed by most 
elected officials in all levels of government, 'the American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees', organized labor led by the AFL-CIO executive council, the 
League of Women Voters, the American Association of University Professors, and 
certain state chapters of national organizations (Rothenberg 1992). Among the advocacy 
groups who focus on term limits as a core issue only 'Let the People Decide' (LTPD) and 
'Common Cause' have actively opposed them, and LTPD has never been a major player 
in the debate (Rothenberg 1992). The focus of Common Cause is primarily on campaign 
finance reform, and the group strongly believes that term limits are the wrong solution for 
the problems with the American political system. The ten groups who advocate term 
limits are: the Cato Institute, U.S. Term Limits Inc., Heartland Policy Institute, 
Independence Institute, John Locke Foundation, Americans For Limited Terms, Term 
Limits Legal Institute, Americans Back in Charge Foundation, Committee on Limiting 
Terms, and the National Committee to Limit Terms (Rausch 2002). 
These groups have complicated genealogies and most have become dormant or 
have operated under the radar of media exposure in recent years. Four political reform 
interest groups continue to actively press for term limits for Members of Congress and 
have adopted grassroots strategies to implement term limits at the state and local levels of 
government. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. is the most prominent and well-funded nationwide 
term limits advocacy group. They maintain an extreme position regarding term limit 
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proposals: in their desire for ' real' term limits U.S.T.L. has publicly denounced term limit 
bills that allow more than 4 terms in the House of Representatives and state legislative 
houses and 2 terms in the U.S. and state senates. The Cato Institute, a research institute 
and interest group, advocates a free market economy and libertarian political principles. 
The organization views term limits as a much-needed reform to reign in big government 
and return control back to the people (Crane 1991). The Independence Institute is a free 
market think tank based in Golden, Colorado. In press releases they strongly push for 
term limits and regularly cite with praise any member of Congress who voluntarily steps 
down-called "self-limiters" by the Independence Institute (Bucher 1998). Finally, there 
is the John Locke Foundation. In their "Agenda 2002: A Candidate's Guide to Key 
Issues in North Carolina's  Public Policy" the group advocates term limits in order to 
eliminate the "advantages of incumbency" and to "weaken the power of special interests" 
(Hood 2002). 
A. Who Supports Term Limits? 
Legislative term limits have been tremendously popular nationally since their 
adoption for state legislators in California, Colorado, and Oklahoma in 1990 by way of 
the ballot initiative. They have appeared as ballot initiatives in twenty-one states between 
the years of 1990 and 1994, and passed in all of them by overwhelming margins (Karp 
2004; Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002; Boeckelman and Corell 1996). Survey data from 
1947 to 1990 show an increase in support for term limits for U.S. Senators over time 
from a slim majority to two-thirds support, and public opinion remains strong for House 
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term limits though the numbers drop precipitously when the questions are about specific 
term limit proposals rather than general survey questions about the merits of term limits 
(Shaw and Ragland 2000; Magleby and Patterson 1994). Determining which segments of 
the American public support or oppose term limits is of intrinsic value to scholars, 
elected officials, and political pundits alike. Who in fact supports term limits? The 
answer at times is situational: who supports term limits is often determined by why they 
are supporting it. The question then becomes: are term limits an end goal, or merely the 
means to a separate end? 
Public support for term limits is attributed to numerous, though often overlapping, 
rationales. These include partisanship, ideology, voter dissatisfaction with specific 
institutions, overall political cynicism, group under-representation, and self-interest (Karp 
2004; Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002). Term limits are popular with the American people, 
and this fact is reflected abundantly in the literature. Magleby and Patterson (1994) 
found term limits to be similarly popular with Republicans, Democrats and Independents 
when examining degrees of support based on partisanship. Contrarily, Southwell and 
Waguespack (1997) concluded that partisan attachments outweighed the voters' belief 
about the efficacy of term limits though both factors were at work; thus term limits had 
less of an effect on Republican incumbents than Democrats running for reelection. Stein, 
Johnson, and Post (2002) qualified this conventional wisdom that term limits are mostly a 
Republican issue, finding that support is more a function of the incongruence between an 
individual's party affiliation and that of their representative. So Democrats are more 
likely to favor term limits if their representative is a Republican, and the same holds true 
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among Republican voters regarding legislators who are Democrats. In other words, self­
interest dictated support or opposition to term limits (see also Karp 2004). This 
supported the earlier research by Donovan and Snipp (1994), who concluded that those 
affiliated with the under-represented party in a state legislature were more likely to favor 
term limits. 
Ideology, which often mirrors party affiliation but not necessarily so, has a more 
direct relationship with support for term limits. Though Karp (2004) found self-interest 
to be more important than party affiliation or ideology, he also found that conservatives 
favored term limits more than liberals. This coincides with the rationale of voter 
dissatisfaction with political institutions, as conservatives are more likely than liberals to 
distrust government and the public sector (Karp 2004). Also, there is a strong consensus 
that individuals who are cynical of the political system overall, and feel alienated from it, 
are more likely to support term limits (Karp 2004; Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002; 
Southwell and Waguespack 1997; Southwell 1995). Lastly, under-represented groups­
women and minorities in particular-were found to favor term limits more than the 
average citizen (Donovan and Snipp 1994). This was refuted in subsequent research by 
Boeckelman and Corell ( 1996), who concluded that whites and Republicans were more 
likely to vote for term limitations than minorities or Democrats in the states of California, 
Colorado, and Oklahoma where state legislative term limits were first adopted in 1990. 
So why do cynics, conservatives, Republicans, under-represented groups, and 
partisans whose party is the minority in the legislative arena strongly support term limits? 
The answers from the literature are numerous. High-priced campaigns, seemingly 
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endless incumbency due to non-competitive elections, the undue influence of lobbyists, 
and the failure by Congress and the state legislatures to act decisively on important issues 
have earned elected legislators the displeasure of the American people (Shaw and 
Ragland 2000; Cooper 1999; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1998; Gerber and Lupia 1996; 
Magleby and Patterson 1994 ). In sum, the support for term limits stems from legislators' 
unresponsiveness and ineptness. Term limits are a seemingly straightforward and simple 
solution to an unresponsive government controlled by a professional political class. 
The push for term limits raises another important question in the literature. The 
charge has been made that since 1992 voters have been viewed as lacking "the courage of 
their convictions . . .  the same voters who in fourteen states imposed term limits" reelected 
all but six of 116 members of Congress, according to Nelson (1995). Some scholars 
blame the voters, or as Wildavsky ( 1992) phrases it, "the complexity of recent proposals 
undermines citizens' ability to comprehend what they are voting for." This disposition to 
blame or question the voters' intelligence spawned political research into this apparent 
paradox. Why do voters support term limits while they simultaneously reelect those they 
want to rotate out of office? One view is that term limits is "an anti-politics and anti­
politician approach" to a problem that the American people "have instructed politicians 
not to solve" (Nelson 1995). Another viewpoint purportedly solves this intellectual 
dilemma. 
Olson ( 1992) used survey data to explain why voters supported and opposed 
initiative 1-533, a 1991 proposal stating "Shall there be limitations on terms of office for 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, State Legislators, and Washington State members of 
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Congress?" This initiative failed. Olson (1992) cites a survey conducted by the Analysis 
Group based in Washington, D.C., from November of 1991. The top five reasons "that 
influenced" the respondents "most at the time" of their vote were as follows. For 
supporters of the initiative, the reasons were 'We need new faces and new ideas' (42%), 
'Elected officials vote themselves pay raises and are mainly interested in themselves' 
(11 %), 'Things are log-jammed and nothing gets done' (10%), 'Special interests and 
political action committees have too much influence' ( 1 0%), and 'Politicians don't listen 
to the people' (8%). For those opposed the reasons were 'Voters should be able to vote 
for whomever they want' (24% ), The loss of the clout of the Washington congressional 
delegation' (21%), 'It does not make sense to be the only state to have term limits' 
(19%), 'The loss of Speaker Tom Foley' (8%), and 'The law was unconstitutional' (8%). 
In all, 65% of the respondents who opposed the measure cited reasons that can be 
summarized as self-interest. Those voters, for the most part, saw the cost outweighing 
the supposed benefits of term limits. Among supporters, 52% gave rationales that 
contained an unfavorable opinion of politicians: their corruption, unresponsiveness, 
ineptness, loyalty to special interests, the proclivity to authorize pay raises for 
themselves, and other perks and privileges. The most cited answer, 'We need new faces 
and new ideas' (42%), infers in a vague or polite way that long-serving incumbents are 
deficient in some undefined aspect: either being unwilling or unable to adequately serve 
the needs of the people. 
The survey responses chosen by the initiative's supporters point to an alternative 
answer to the paradox of supporting term limits while simultaneously re-electing 
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legislators. Namely, it suggests that voters are more sophisticated than many scholars 
give them credit for; they are capable of making intricate, complex choices about politics 
(Skalaban 1998). The responses chosen by the measure's opponents also point to this 
explanation. The voters of Washington State did not want to unilaterally cede the power 
they perceived they had accrued from long-serving representatives. Unless all districts in 
the state and all states in the Union collectively agree to turn out their senior incumbents, 
those that do enact term limits on their representatives are knowingly putting themselves 
at a disadvantage to non-term limited districts and states (Elhauge 1998). 
This solution to the voters' paradox of reelecting those that the people also want 
to term limit is expressed in different ways throughout the literature. According to Dick 
and Lott (1993 ), incumbents grow less responsive over time to the voters in some ways 
while at the same time their skill in transferring wealth to the constituency increases with 
seniority. So if all districts remove their incumbents simultaneously, voters would 
benefit and specific districts and states would not be putting themselves at a relative 
disadvantage, depending "on the shape of the voters' utility function" (Lee 2002). An 
individual may love their own state legislator or congressman and despise all the others, 
but will give up 'their guy' if the playing field can be made level across the board and 
power is evenly distributed throughout the state and/or country with all of the career 
politicians having the same term limitations. 
A different answer is presented by Friedman and Wittman (1995), who argue that 
voters exhibit a rational choice or desire to shift or redistribute power from the one main 
political party to the other, from one branch of government to the other, and from districts 
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with long-term incumbents to representatives who have served only for a short span of 
time. This conclusion was also reached by Glaeser ( 1 997), who pursued the question of 
why voters would put themselves at a known disadvantage by imposing term limits on 
their representatives. Glaeser ( 1 997) found that risk-adverse voters prefer cycling 
between liberal and conservative candidates rather than having an entrenched careerist 
incumbent that imposes a single ideology on the entire electorate for the foreseeable 
future. Recent research by Chen and Niou (2005) developed a spatial model that showed 
that voters are more likely to support term limits if the incumbent's position is farther 
from the median voter' s  position or if the incumbent' s party is more moderate. 
In concluding this section on who supports term limits and why, Mark Petracca 
( 1 992) has written extensively on political scientists and term limits. The reasons that 
political scientists are "predisposed to oppose term limits" are not due to "self­
indulgence", but because the dominant paradigm in the discipline values 'professional ' 
legislators over 'citizen-legislators' ,  efficiency over participation in democratic theory, an 
elitist skepticism about voters, a commitment to the conservation of political leadership, 
liberal political leanings that are inherently 'anti-term limits' ,  and because most political 
scientists see term limits as a threat to academic professionalism (Petracca 1 992). An 
analysis of the main journals for state legislators substantiates this claim. The Fall 200 1 
issue of "Spectrum: The Journal of State Government" contains a symposium on term 
limits: twelve of the fourteen articles by state political leaders and political scientists cast 
term limits in a negative light. Further, most articles in "State Legislatures" emphasize 
an almost singular theme: term limits result in "the dismantling of state legislative 
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professionalism" (Kousser 2005; Straayer and Bowser 2005). For most scholars and 
practitioners, professionalism is associated with effective governance, while term limits 
result in amateur legislatures devoid of institutional memory and effective lawmakers 
(Kousser 2005; Straayer and Bowser 2005; Petracca 1992). 
Beyond who among the public supports term limits, Scott and Bell (1999) explore 
why some states have adopted term limits for their state legislators while others have not. 
Their conclusions strongly indicate that the presence of the ballot initiative within the 
state is the only significant determinant; so state governments that allow mechanisms of 
direct democracy into their political systems tend to reflect the public's strong support for 
term limits, while those states that do not have direct input by the people into the 
legislative agenda are much more likely to not have term limits. When Wildavsky (1992) 
states that "over-reliance on constitutional initiatives combined with citizen approval of 
legislative term limits . . .  guides and constrains policy" and the "normal functioning of 
democratic institutions", he echoes the mainstream sentiment among many political 
scientists and most elected officials that term limits and other initiatives undermine and 
weaken representative democracy. Much of the early, predictive literature regarding the 
future effects of term limits reverberates this theme. 
B. Initial Predictive Literature 
Bernard Grofman (1996) aptly characterizes the early predictive literature on 
legislative term limits as "hypotheses in search of data". Much of the research prior to 
1996 concerns their likely consequences (Boeckelman and Corell 1996; Benjamin and 
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Malbin 1992; Will 1992). Since hard evidence was then unavailable, the resulting body 
of literature contains an abundance of often-contradictory speculation (Mondak 1995a, 
1995b; Moncrief et al 1992). The more empirical work at this time-which was done 
with quantitative methods-examined projective turnover rates for the U.S. Congress 
(Francis and Kenny 1997; Opheim 1994; Moncrief et al 1992). 
Among the speculative literature, some research points to the fact that hard data is 
unavailable to support the hypothetical claims that are made. This is expressed in various 
ways. According to Greene (1995), "we don't know" the effects of term limits, as there 
are "unintended consequences" to something as far reaching as term limits which 
mandates frequent turnover in legislatures leading to an altered composition and new 
leadership structure (see also Mann 1994). Rush (1998) surmises that there are "hidden 
costs because it is special interests that push for term limits." Bruce Cain (1996) 
predicted that the effects would vary across states, depending on whether there is a 
'professionalized' or 'citizen' legislature (see also Everson 1992). Legislatures are 
characterized as 'professional' if they have larger staff, longer session lengths, and higher 
pay (Kousser 2005). Term limits would purportedly have a greater impact and effect on 
professionalized legislatures than citizen ones (Cain 1996; Everson 1992; Moncrief et al 
1992). Lastly, Barcellona and Grose (1994) believed that "time will not tell" because the 
effects will be viewed through "ideological lenses". Those predisposed to oppose term 
limits will note the adverse effects, while supporters will focus on what they see as the 
positive results. Due to the indeterminacy of the effects, Greene (1995) implores that we 
not tinker with the U.S. Constitution and enact congressional term limits. Rather, we 
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should experiment with term limits at the state level to see their effects. So the states 
would act as laboratories of democracy for the term limit experiment, echoing the 
comments of Madison and Brandeis on the subject. 
There is an abundance of research that focuses on the effects that term limits 
would have for legislators, the institution, and legislative functions. As a point of 
departure, term limits would increase legislative turnover, introducing new faces into the 
institution in a prescribed, set cycle (Franklin and Westin 1998; Reed and Schansberg 
1995; Theilmann and Wilhite 1995; Jewell and Whicker 1994; Moncrief et al 1992; 
Hibbing 1991 ). This is supported by most research, with some scholars making the 
churning effect of increased turnover a basic assumption in their analysis. In a review of 
Reed and Schansberg' s 1995 work, the author states that increased turnover is "scarcely 
news; if term limits did not promise to shorten careers and increase turnover, no one 
would care about them one way or another" (Jacobson 1995). However, there is not 
universal acceptance of this claim. Cain ( 1996) qualifies this effect, saying that it will 
affect the person, but probably not the political party or the dominant ideology in the 
district. The claim is outright rejected by others. These dissenters assert that a lack of 
turnover is not a problem because it does not exist, thus term limits are unnecessary 
(Hansen 1997; Mann 1994; Ledbetter 1991; Ornstein 1990). These authors cite statistics 
that show a high degree of turnover already in existence, so term limits would merely 
alter the method of turnover, not necessarily the frequency of it. 
Barring the research that discounts or rejects the supposition that turnover in 
legislatures will increase, term limits are expected to change the legislative culture to an 
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extreme degree (Barcellona and Grose 1 994). Malbin and Benjamin (1992) see a drastic 
change in "incentives and norms". Greene ( 1995) calls term limits "a blunt tool. . .  for 
reversing professionalism." According to Jewell and Whicker ( 1994), term limits will 
produce legislators who "don't care" about the institution. This is because the "value of 
holding office" will be altered (see also Reed and Schansberg 1996). Hibbing ( 199 1 )  
states that this change in institutional culture will be an improvement, thus one "for the 
better". On the other side, Becker (1990) writes, "Only an unrealistic view of human 
nature could presume that taking away the right to continue at a job will improve 
performance" and the attitudes of those in the institution. 
A change in the political culture, in turn, may have an effect on legislative 
behavior between Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives. Hansen 
( 1 997) asserts that term limits would make legislatures more partisan: more bickering, 
more in fighting, and less compromise and consensus being reached. Jacob ( 1994) sees 
the opposite: when term limits took effect in California in 1993, with a massive influx of 
freshmen lawmakers, "the first state budget passed on time in recent memory" due to a 
"less partisan session". Jacob hypothesizes that this would be indicative of how term 
limits would affect other legislatures as well. It is also surmised that many of these 
incoming legislators will be women and minorities, thus diversifying the composition of 
the institution (Sincere 1995; Moncrief and Thompson 1992). Thus the institution would 
be more representative of the population as a whole after term limits take effect (Petracca 
1994; Will 1992; Crane 199 1 ). Fiorina (1 994) hypothesizes that term limits would 
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change the incentive structure for typical Democratic candidates in some state 
legislatures, which would affect their partisan composition. 
The altered composition of legislatures due to term limits raises another debate 
within the literature regarding the lack of experienced lawmakers. After a cyclical 
rotation of office is instituted, experienced legislators will be replaced by those deemed 
'amateurish' (Hansen 1 997; Jewell and Whicker 1 994; Mann 1 994; Moncrief and 
Thompson 1 992; Ledbetter 1 991 ). While on its face calling the legislature amateurish 
seems to be a normative claim, scholars who hold this view cite specific changes that 
term limits will bring about that warrant this characterization. Having inexperienced, or 
amateur, lawmakers will result in a loss of institutional memory. These new legislators 
will initially have less ability to successfully interact with lobbyists and the other 
branches of government; and term limits will result in an increased learning curve for 
representatives in deciphering how to introduce bills, work in a committee system, and 
function in positions of legislative leadership. 
Others see experienced lawmakers as part of the problem with democratic 
government, and beyond that, dispute the assertions made by term limit opponents (Jacob 
1 994; Petracca 1 994; Crane 1 991 ). House members often have prior experience in state 
government, and likewise, state legislators frequently have experience at the local level 
(Petracca 1994). Moreover, Asher (1 973) states that the learning curve to be an effective 
representative is greatly exaggerated. Additionally, there are other kinds of experience 
missing from the more professionalized legislatures (Petracca 1 994 ). According to 
Squire ( 1 992) the level of professionalization is negatively related to the proportion of . 
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women serving in office and to the degree of occupational diversity. So, in sum, 
experience is discounted because it maintains a more homogeneous legislative body 
whose experience consists of servicing constituents in order to be reelected and being 
adept at spending taxpayers' money (Petracca 1994). At the national level Canon (1990) 
notes that amateurs are influential in providing democratic accountability in elections, 
resisting socialization pressures in the institution, party building, policy change, and 
institutional change. Thus proponents assert that term limits will introduce a new type of 
legislator: one who has a broader range of skills and experience and brings new ideas to 
the legislative institution. Fowler ( 1996) disputes this assertion, arguing that term limits 
will not introduce "a different kind of politician": legislatures will remain dominated by 
well-educated, higher-status, white males. 
The debate regarding an influx of a 'new breed' of citizen legislator prompts the 
question as to whether enacting term limits would increase political corruption. Cohen 
and Spitzer (1996) assert the affirmative: their analysis utilizing "the basic prisoners' 
dilemma and politics" with regards to "payoffs" show that in the final term an incumbent 
will sell out to special interests, "loot where he can", and ignore the constituents' 
concerns. Coyne and Fund (1992) voice the negative: the longer the tenure in a political 
office, the greater the ability and propensity to know how to line one's own pockets from 
the public coffer and be bought off by special interests ( see also Crane 1991 ). On the 
topic of government spending, Reed and Schansberg ( 1996) showed that terni limits 
would have very little, if any, effect on overall spending; it would be "so small as to be 
practically negligible." This view of the theoretical relationship between tenure and 
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spending was supported by the research of Reed ( 1 998), in which it was concluded that 
spending would decline "slightly". Contrarily, the analysis by Payne ( 1 99 1 )  found that 
"excluding members with over twelve years of experience would produce a more fiscally 
conservative Congress"; this was based on the author's  contention that "the most 
commonly suggested limit on congressional tenure is twelve years-that is, six terms for 
representatives and two terms for senators." Will ( 1 992) also claims that reducing tenure 
with term limitations would reduce governmental outlays and downsize the federal 
budget. Additionally, Moore and Steelman ( 1994) concluded that the House of 
Representatives would engage in less 'pork-barrel' spending if term limits were 
instituted. At the state level, Moore and Hibbing ( 1 996) forecasted less state spending in 
term-limited legislatures. Finally, Good ( 1999) in her analysis of "The Future Trends 
Affecting �ducation", sponsored by the 'Education Commission of the States', 
determined that future state spending on education would be cut to a harmful extent in 
term-limited state legislatures. 
Regarding overall legislative performance, virtually all the research that focused 
on performance concludes that term limits would have a negative effect. Becky Cain 
( 1 994) believed that the time horizon for legislators would be reduced, thus term limits 
would discourage the allocation of government funds to important long-term projects (see 
also Mann 1994). Likewise, Malbin and Benjamin ( 1992) stated that term limits "would 
reinforce the inclination of legislators to think and act in the short term, without sufficient 
consideration of long-term institutional consequences." These results were corroborated 
by the research of Cohen and Spitzer ( 1 996). Mondak (1995) concluded that term limits 
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would produce "a substantial reduction in the quality of the House of Representatives." 
Squire ( 1998) saw that professionalism leads to an increase in performance, and that term 
limits are the antithesis to legislative professionalism (see also Kousser 2005). A 
conflicting conclusion is put forth by Reed and Schansberg, where they first found that 
term limits do improve legislative performance (1994), but in subsequent research the 
results were inconclusive (1996). 
A strong consensus exists regarding how term limits would affect legislative 
leadership. The power distribution in the institution would change dramatically 
(Rosenthal 1992). The expected result of this is a weakened leadership in an unstable 
institutional environment (Capell 1996; Scott 1996; Jewell and Whicker 1994; Moncrief 
and Thompson 1992). The change in legislative leadership is one result of term limits 
that in turn alt_ers legislative career paths and career choices; this assertion was prevalent 
in the early literature (Cain 1994; Copeland 1992; Fowler 1992; Moncrief and Thompson 
1992; Paddock 1991). This was qualified by later research by Penning ( 1996), who 
determined that this phenomenon varies according to political context; in other words 
there is state-to-state variation of the effect. Malbin and Benjamin ( 1992) asserted that 
strong party leadership in the legislature would decline as well (see also Glazer and 
Wattenberg 1996); and according to Capell (1996) interest groups would replace political 
parties to a significant degree in candidate recruitment. 
Elizabeth Capell ( 1996) predicted a zero-sum relationship between the power of 
interest groups and legislative staff: "Staff will no longer be useful to interest groups, 
either as a policy resource or as a communication channel." Thus legislative staff would 
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be weakened under term limits as interest groups are strengthened. Most scholars 
determined the opposite effect, that term limits would increase the power of legislative 
staff because new legislators would have a greater need to rely on staffers than would 
experienced lawmakers (Hansen 1997; Cain 1994; Moncrief and Thompson 1992). 
Returning to interest groups, there are competing views as to whether term limits would 
augment their influence or diminish it. For some, limitations on tenure would not benefit 
interest groups (Reed and Schansberg 1995; Meiners and Miller 1992). Kristol (1993) 
asserted that term limits would break up the "iron triangle" of interest groups, 
bureaucrats, and legislators that enable interest groups to get what they want from 
lawmakers. Other scholars have predicted that term limits would give more power to 
other political actors such as interest groups and bureaucrats (Good 1999; Capell 1996; 
Jewell and Whicker 1994; Phillips 1994; Cohen and Spitzer 1992; Fowler 1992; Malbin 
and Benjamin 1992; Moncrief and Thompson 1992; Ledbetter 1991 ). Bruce Cain ( 1996) 
asserted that term limits would only help well-funded interest groups gain influence. 
A strong consensus exists that limitations on tenure would shift power to the 
executive branch because the governor would be facing mostly inexperienced and lame 
duck legislators (Capell 1996; Jewell and Whicker 1994; Boeckelman 1993; Cain 1994; 
Malbin and Benjamin 1992; Moncrief and Thompson 1992; Ledbetter 1991). 
Additionally, scholars who looked at partisan balance concluded that term limits would 
have an effect. Studies by Gilmour and Rothstein ( 1994) and Reed and Schansberg 
(1995 and 1994) predicted that Republicans would benefit, primarily due to the fact that 
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at the time there were Democratic majorities in most state legislatures. Moncrief and 
Thompson (1992) surmised that Southern Republicans would benefit. 
The literature focuses on two aspects of the relationship between legislators and 
their constituents, or the voting public. These are 'responsiveness', meaning ruling in the 
public interest, and 'public accountability'. Here again I found opposing viewpoints and 
rationales. Term limits would undermine the incentives of reelection, inducing 
representatives to pursue their own goals and be unconcerned about the preferences of 
their constituents (Glazer and Wattenberg 1996). Similarly for Cohen and Spitzer (1996), 
term limits would remove the incentives that lawmakers have to be accountable for their 
legislative behavior; after all, they must leave office after a few terms ( see also 
Boeckelman 1993). Becky Cain (1994) asserts that term limits result in legislators always 
thinking about the "next job, giving them an excuse not to be responsive to the people 
who elected them." Gerber and Lupia (1996) concluded that there is no proven 
relationship between increased competition in elections and subsequent increased 
responsiveness by representatives, which is the logic used by term limit proponents. 
Contrarily, Mixon ( 1996) argues that the private interests of long-serving incumbents 
diverge from that of their constituents and the wider public (see also Coyne and Fund 
1992; Jacob 1992; Crane 1991 ). A predictive model by Chen and Niou (2005) indicates 
that term limits, or the threat of term limits, increases the responsiveness of politicians' 
policy platforms. 
According to Mann ( 1994 ), proponents have failed to make a persuasive case that 
term limits will remedy legislators' lack of accountability, as "it would deny the 
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democratic connection rather than revitalize it." Jacobson (1 995) contends that they 
would clearly reduce the cost of ignoring district sentiments when casting votes or taking 
positions. This is congruent with the aforementioned rationale for term limits held by 
James Madison: that they would give legislators some separation and independence from 
their narrow constituencies. Proponents argue that limitations on tenure would change 
the internal calculations of legislators from focusing on "what's in it for me" to one of 
"what's best for the country" (Jacob 1 994), meaning the public and their constituents (see 
also Petracca 1 992; Will 1 992). 
One of the main arguments put forth by proponents of term limitations is that they 
will restore competitive elections, thus opening representation to more people and to 
different types of people (Gerber and Lupia 1 996; Armor 1 994; Jacob 1 994; Coyne and 
Fund 1 992; Petracca 1 992). Elections become more competitive because increasing the 
frequency of 'open seat' elections is another way of stating that fewer incumbents are 
running for reelection. Thus term limits would remove the powers of incumbency in 
many elections that enable politicians to make a career out of legislative service (O'Keefe 
and Steelman 1 997; Theilmann and Wilhite 1 995). Theilmann and Wilhite ( 1 995) also 
claim that term limits would reduce campaign spending, even though statistics show that 
spending is higher in open seat congressional races (see Kernell and Jacobson 2005). 
Their logic is that term limits reduce the benefits of holding office, which would reduce 
the effort put forth in capturing that office. This would then be reflected in how much 
money is raised and spent. Focusing on state legislatures, Reed and Schansberg (1 994) 
argued that state legislative term limits would increase competition in congressional 
7 1  
elections. Francis and Kenny (1997) make a similar contention, that state legislative term 
limits would increase competition for "higher offices". 
The counter conclusion is that there would be fewer effectively contested 
elections under term limits (Moncrief et al 1992; Copeland and Rausch 1991 ). According 
to Mann (1992), potential challengers will wait until the seat becomes open, so 
incumbents will have an easy time of it until they are forced to vacate their legislative 
seats. Fowler (1992) insists that term limits as the lone form of political reform will not 
alter the entrepreneurial, candidate-based politics with media-dominated campaigns and 
weak party organizations; thus elections will not become more competitive (see also 
Mann 1994 and Wildavsky 1992). It is also argued that voters will be less informed 
about candidates and rely more on party labels when voting (Jacobson 1995). 
Lastly, Wildavsky (1992) sees term limits as a threat to representative democracy. 
They and the overall initiative process would lead to bad public policy, because 
deliberation by legislators would be replaced with the uninformed or misinformed public 
voting on important issues that are given either the 'thumbs up or down' without room 
for compromise or nuanced position-taking. Likewise for Mann (1994 ): "Mandatory 
rotation destroys the primary incentive used by the Federalists in writing the Constitution 
to nurture a deliberative democracy." Petracca (1992) argues the opposite: term limits 
enhance the "overall quality of representation by creating a reciprocity of responsibility 
and experience among rulers and ruled." Thus among proponents and opponents of term 
limits we see disagreement over the role that mechanisms of direct democracy such as 
term limits and other ballot initiatives play in the American system. The debate over the 
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nature of democracy and representation in the U.S.-the Federalist versus Anti-Federalist 
points of view-is reflected in the predictive literature on legislative term limits from the 
1990s until 2006. 
C. Case Studies 
The vast preponderance of research focuses on the states of California and 
Michigan. California was the second state to enact term limits for state legislators, as 
Oklahoma had passed them earlier in 1990. The Public Policy Institute of California 
sponsored studies on the term limits initiative, Proposition 140 (Kousser 2005; Cain and 
Kousser 2004). A number of Doctoral Dissertations have also been written in recent 
years that look at the effects of term limits in California (Goldberg 2003; Nalder 2003; 
Kousser 2002; Van Vechten 2002). These present the most comprehensive analyses, 
being richer in detail than the more brief articles in the academic journals. 
The case study literature on the effects of term limits in California give answers to 
most all of the questions, issues, and problems addressed in the early predictive literature. 
There is unanimity in the view that term limits have increased turnover, thereby reducing 
average tenure for legislators (Goldberg 2003; Basham 2002; Daniel and Lott 1997). 
According to Nalder (2003), turnover rates almost doubled from 1990 to 2000. There is 
disagreement as to whether the increased turnover in tum resulted in more competitive 
elections. Some research found that the margin of victory in elections remained 
unchanged (Cain and Kousser 2004; Van Vechten 2002), whereas a conference paper 
presented by Clucas (2003) argues that elections have been closer (as did Goldberg 2003; 
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Basham 2002; Chi and Leatherby 1998; Daniel and Lott 1997). In addition, studies by 
Price and Neves (1993a) as well as Daniel and Lott (1997) saw an increase in the number 
of challengers. This finding is refuted by Goldberg (2003 ), who saw fewer candidates 
overall, though there were slightly more challengers in the open elections than in races 
with an incumbent. Stanley Caress (1996) observed that there were more special 
elections, because more officeholders have left their positions to run for higher office. As 
an aside, on the question of partisan behavior, Price and Neves (1993a) and Kousser 
(2002) saw an increase in disagreements between Republicans and Democrats and a 
decrease in collegiality, while for Van Vechten (2002) there was no noticeable difference 
in the degree of partisanship. 
Regarding composition, one glaringly apparent effect was the increase in the 
number of women legislators and those from ethnic minorities (Clucas 2003;· Basham 
2002; Van Vechten; Weintraub 2002; Petracca 1998; Walters 1997; Price and Neves 
1993a). Van Vechten (2002) also found more women in positions of legislative 
leadership. Goldberg (2003) notes that Hispanics supplanted African-American 
lawmakers, reflecting a change in the demographics of certain legislative districts. The 
bicameral legislature had fewer former legislative staff members among their ranks 
(Walters 1997 and Price �nd Neves 1993a); and in terms of age there were more 
"younger" members in the Assembly and more senior citizens in the Senate after term 
limits (Van Vechten 2002). Further, Proposition 140 was successful at introducing a 
"new breed" of legislator to Sacramento (Petracca 1998). According to Van Vechten 
(2002), term limits brought "new perspectives and experiences" to the office and 
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reflected a "gradual occupational diversity" within the legislative branch, but collectively 
came "from the same socio-economic backgrounds". Focusing on the socio-economic 
background, Goldberg (2003) concluded that the same type of representative comprised 
the legislature. 
California also led the way in instituting training classes for incoming legislators 
(Feustel and Jones 2001). These were intended to enable new legislators to adapt more 
quickly to their jobs, and in tum reduce the initial dependency on staff and lobbyists. 
Still, there are arguments in the case study literature that after term limits the California 
legislative branch of government lost its institutional memory and has become comprised 
of more inexperienced, amateur representatives who were ignorant of the legislative 
process in particular and the workings of government in general (Kousser 2005, 2002; 
Cain and Kousser 2004; Goldberg 2003). As of 1993 after two election cycles under 
term limits, Price and Neves saw no difference in the professionalism of the institution 
(see also Clucas 2003 and Van Vechten 2002). Some later research came to a different 
conclusion on this point as well, finding the legislature to still be a professional body. 
This was due in large part to the fact that after term limits many more local elected 
officials ran for the Assembly, and term limited Assembly members ran for the Senate 
(Clucas 2003; Weintraub 2002; Van Vechten 2003, 2002). 
Research findings conflict over the effect of term limits on legislative 
performance. Basham (2002) stated that the legislature became "more fiscally 
conservative" post term limits, which one would expect since Republican candidates 
benefited most from Proposition 140 (Goldberg 2003). Basham (2002) asserts that 
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legislation moves quicker and the budget gets passed "on time" post term limits. 
However, the more empirical research concluded that the budgetary process was slower 
and more problematic after Proposition 140 (Kousser 2005; Cain and Kousser 2004; 
Clucas 2003; Goldberg 2003 ). Van Vechten (2002) found more "coalition building" 
within the institution even though she saw a decline in partisan cooperation, and noted 
that the legislature as a whole focused more on short term policy. Kousser (2000) noted 
that committees were less active and efficient. 
Another important effect from limiting tenure pertains to the institutional 
leadership. Van Vechten (2002) sees a "de-centralized leadership", Weintraub (2002) 
calls it a "lack of legislative leadership", and Walters ( 1997) writes that the legislative 
"leaders are less powerful" post term limits. Term limits "diffused power in both 
chambers, but in different ways", according to La Raja and Apollonio ( 1999): in the 
Assembly the caucus leaders lost power relative to the other members, while in the senate 
the caucus leaders gained power at the expense of the committee chairs. Chi and 
Leatherby (1998) saw that the Senate gained in power at the expense of the Assembly. 
Regarding power relations with other political actors, there is strong consensus that the 
executive branch as a whole gained power at the expense of the legislature (Kousser 
2005; Weintraub 2002). The legislative branch lost bargaining power with the governor 
over the budget, so the governor gained in power (Cain and Kousser 2004; Walters 
1997). The governor also gained a more powerful position in the state government post 
term limits because of less oversight (Van Vechten 2002). Bureaucrats gained more clout 
as well according to a few studies (Weintraub 2002 and Walters 1997); however Clucas 
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(2003) could not determine any change in the power of the bureaucracy. Another feature 
of Proposition 140, in addition to instituting term limits, was mandating a 38% cut in the 
legislative budget, which led to massive staff reductions (Lewis 1991). Price and Neves 
(1993a) note that the non-partisan technical staff was cut most, leaving primarily the 
"political operatives" on the job. This may very well have contributed to the finding in 
many of the case studies that the legislative staff did not become more powerful after 
term limits. Moreover, staff did not gain in power and influence because along with 
increased member turnover, there was a corresponding high turnover of staff members 
(Cain and Kousser 2004; Clucas 2003; Weintraub 2002). Van Vechten (2002) and 
Goldberg (2003) concluded that the power of the legislative staff increased slightly, 
agreeing with an earlier finding by Chi and Leatherby (1998). 
Finally, on the question of responsiveness and public accountability, Goldberg 
(2003) concluded that term limits resulted in less accountability to the voters; this was 
because the incentive of reelection creates accountability according to "the electoral 
accountability theory". Goldberg (2003) also found that legislators were less responsive 
to their constituents. Basham (2002) in a pro-term limits article argues that legislators 
became more accountable. Van Vechten (2003, 2002) saw that electoral accountability 
remained unchanged for two reasons: first, many legislators have ambitions to run for 
higher office, and second, ' lame-duck' legislators do not engage in opportunistic 
behavior to the extent that the electoral accountability theory suggests. This is because 
elected officials are concerned about their reputations, so they remain "responsible" until 
the end of their tenure (Vechten 2003, 2002). 
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Two sets of research compare the effects of term limits on the state legislatures of 
California and Michigan, both of which have highly professionalized legislatures and 
among the most restrictive term limit statutes. An increase in turnover was a basic 
assumption in these works as well. These research projects concluded that term limits 
had the following effects on electoral competition: voter turnout did not increase and 
campaigns became more expensive because spending soared in the open seat races 
(Sarbaugh-Thompson et al 2004 ). Also, the slight effect of elections becoming closer in 
victory margin was only in open seat races, while the advantages of incumbency 
increased in California and Michigan (Paletta et al 2001 ). Both studies had mixed results 
in both states involving the change in composition. Among the freshmen class were 
more legislators in their twenties, and more senior citizens (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al 
2004). There was a modest increase in the number of minorities (Paletta et al 2001). 
Sarbaugh-Thompson et al (2004) determined that term limits reduced length of tenure, 
which in tum helped the women and ethnic minorities who are Democrats gain seats. 
Term limits did not lead to a new breed of citizen legislators, as more local officials 
entered the state legislatures (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al 2004; Paletta et al 2001 ). 
Further, the incoming representatives shared the same political ambitions as their 
predecessors and had been actively involved in politics in the past (Paletta et al 2001). 
Legislators were found to rely on lobbyists more than before, and 'lame ducks' tended to 
shirk in office unless they intended to run for a different elected office in the future 
(Sarbaugh-Thompson et al 2004). 
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Michigan passed term limits in 1998. This led to a large increase in legislative 
turnover (Doron and Harris 2001 ). More candidates became candidates for elective 
office, but this applied only to the open seat races (Penning 2003). Increased turnover 
also led to elected officials playing a game of 'musical chairs': they seek other offices at 
all levels of government (Penning 2003). Competition in terms of narrowing the victory 
gap increased solely in open seats, but decreased more precipitously when there is an 
incumbent in the race (Orr et al 2001). The same effect was observed regarding 
campaign spending: a rise in spending in open seat races, but a decline where an 
incumbent is involved (Penning 2003). Term limits "altered the incentive structure" for 
the elected official (Orr et al 2001 ); according to Rader et al (2001) the legislative office 
became "de-valued". Members became more reliant on "party cues" post term limits, 
and there has been less cross-party interaction (Rader et al 2001). Penning (2003) 
determined that less time is spent getting to know one's colleagues and more time 
looking for other jobs such as lobbying. For Sarbaugh-Thompson et al (2004), as norms 
of civility declined partisanship increased, leading to more partisan policymaking as well. 
Regarding the composition of the legislature post term limits, there was a slight 
increase in the number of African-American legislators; in large part because the districts 
are small and homogeneous (Penning 2003). Representation for women remained 
unchanged; however, more ex-staffers entered the legislature (Penning 2003). In sum 
there was no new breed of legislator or amateur entering office after term limits took 
effect; the legislature remained comprised of the same types of people in terms of age, 
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occupation, and education (Penning 2003; Rader et al 2001). On the topic of government 
spending, less time was devoted to securing political 'pork' (Penning 2003). 
As with California, leadership was strongly affected by term limitations (Penning 
2003). Committee chairs have less control over the legislative agenda at the expense of 
party leaders and the governor's office (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al 2004, 2002). So the 
power of the committee chairs has declined, while party leadership has grown more 
influential (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al 2004, 2002). Also, as one would assume under 
term limits, rank and file members attain leadership positions in a much shorter span of 
time (Penning 2003). There is widespread agreement that the governor, state agencies, 
and the executive branch as a whole have gained power relative to the legislative branch 
(Sarbaugh-Thompson et al 2004, 2002; Penning 2003; Doron and Harris 2001). Further, 
after term limits regional power relationships have been altered between the 'upper 
peninsula' and the southwestern comer of the state (Penning 2003). Due to the fact that 
staff turnover increased along with member turnover, a few studies determined that 
representatives rely less on staff (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al 2004; Penning 2003). This 
finding was at odds with the earlier conclusions by Rader et al (2001 ), who saw that 
legislators have grown more dependent on staff for both information and guidance in 
decision-making. This effect may have changed over time. Finally, in terms of the 
quality of representation, public accountability, and responsiveness, the literature is 
divided. According to Sarbaugh-Thompson et al (2004), representatives stay more 
closely tied to their districts post term limits, thus acting more as delegates than trustees. 
Penning (2003) determined almost the exact opposite result, that term limits heighten the 
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priority legislators place on the needs of the whole state and their own conscience relative 
to district interests, as J arnes Madison had surmised. 
There are also comparative case studies of Michigan and Ohio, and Michigan and 
Maine. Tothero (2001) focused on attendance and roll call voting in the legislatures of 
Michigan and Ohio. She found that attendance dropped slightly in Ohio and more so in 
Michigan; however, the overall level of voting in both legislatures remained unchanged 
by term limits. Brake (2003) examined Michigan and Maine. His findings included: 
reduced tenure, increased turnover, more women and minority representation, partisan 
shifts, and more diversity in occupational backgrounds. Brake (2003 ) also found that 
term limits created a more chaotic and less deliberative legislation appropriation process 
and weakened state legislative leadership. They also increased the role and influence of 
legislative staff, shifted power within the legislature from the house to the senate, 
increased the budgetary powers of the governor and state agencies, and continued the rise 
of a new breed of legislator entering state legislatures that had begun well before the 
introduction of term limits. 
There are multiple case studies on the effect of term limits in Maine's legislative 
branch. Maine has a citizen legislature, with more pre-existing turnover in membership 
and leadership than most states. Term limits led to an increase in the number of 
voluntary retirements (Moen and Palmer 2003). Maine also has few minorities and 
already had a high percentage of women in the legislature. Based on these demographics 
and regional political culture, term limits had no effect on the number of minorities and 
the number of women representatives actually dropped (Moen and Palmer 2003). The 
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same type of people still run for office (Moen et al 2005), and the party that had the seat 
kept it after the incumbent left office due to term limits (Moen and Palmer 2003). Term 
limits have disrupted Maine's political culture, with more partisan rancor post term limits 
in the legislature and while campaigning for election (Moen et al 2005; Powell and Jones 
2005). 
After term limits took effect more bills were introduced, committees became less 
efficient, and the quality of legislation and leadership suffered (Powell and Jones 2005; 
Moen and Palmer 2003; Michaud 2001 ). Michaud (2001) notes that leadership has been 
hurt the most. The legislature is weakened because it is more chaotic and unstable, and 
has lost power at the expense of all other political actors (Powell and Jones 2005; Moen 
et al 2005; Michaud 2001). Moen and Palmer (2003) determined that the governor has 
gained power based on the number vetoes and overrides. Michaud (2001) noted that the 
legislature is weakened relative to the executive branch because its oversight abilities 
have been diminished, and also concluded that representation suffers under term limits 
because the legislature is less connected with the public, is less responsive, and the 
quality of constituent service declined because the new members did not have the 
contacts with the community that their predecessors possessed. These views were 
corroborated by a later study by Powell and Jones (2005), in which the authors also 
concluded the following: no effect on constituent service, a more noticeable effect on 
legislative leadership in the house than the senate, staff are much more important and 
serve as a "repository of institutional memory", and a noticeable effect in the quality of 
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legislation passed and less inclination to tackle complex issues and engage in long range 
planning. 
There is case study research on the states of Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Florida, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Oregon. Anderson (1995) found that less money 
was entering Arizona's political campaigns post term limits, and the biggest effects were 
on the reduced power of legislative leadership (see also Berman 2005, 2004). Berman 
(2005, 2004) concluded that electoral competition increased in terms of closer races, 
voter choice increased due to more candidates, the staff gained influence, and that as the 
institution became less experienced it also became less effective. In the state of 
Arkansas, Weatherman ( 1996) concluded that power became decentralized, and that more 
ethics and lobby reform bills were passed after term limits. According to Blair and Barth 
(2005), the number of women representatives in Arkansas declined, political parties grew 
more powerful, and the governor gained power relative to the legislature in the budgetary 
process. Contrarily, Greenberg (2005 ) stated that the number of women and minority 
legislators increased, members' backgrounds became more diverse, the voters had more 
choices, and that lawmakers paid more attention to their districts and less to their 
colleagues than before. Lastly, the case study by English and Weberg (2005)  concluded 
the following: dramatically increased turnover, little to no effect on the composition of 
members, a partisan benefit for the Republican Party, a weakening of legislative 
leadership and the legislature in relation to the executive branch, a decline in lobbyist 
influence, local public officials entering the legislature, and new career paths ( what the 
authors coin "a new opportunity structure") for legislators. 
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John Straayer (2003) conducted a case study of term limits in the state of 
Colorado, which is in the middle on the 'professional-citizen legislator' continuum. A 
summation of the findings was "limited consequences". Many new senators had served 
in the house, the number of women and minorities remained basically the same, there was 
no change in members' age or occupation, having more open seats led to more primary 
competition, and there was no change in party control (Straayer 2003). The biggest 
impact was on legislative leadership and party leadership in the legislature; term limited 
Republicans got jobs from the Republican governor, and term limits led to the 
replacement of conservative, independent Democrats with those who more closely follow 
the national party line (Straayer 2003 ). An extensive case study by Straayer and Bowser 
(2005) echoes similar themes. Regarding membership, there has been little change in 
turnover because Colorado has a history of high turnover, and term limits have not had an 
effect in terms of gender, ethnicity, or age among the membership. The effects on 
political parties and the partisan control of the legislature have been negligible; and 
careerism is still rampant as term limited legislators run for other elective office. There 
has been little effect on electoral competition, while as an institution there is evidence of 
a less stable, less settled environment and a corresponding decline in civility between 
members and between members and lobbyists in a reciprocal manner. Otherwise for 
lobbyists, their job had become more difficult so they must work harder, but it paid off 
with an increase in influence post term limits. There is no evidence of a meaningful 
affect on legislative staff. Lastly, legislative leadership was weakened in an institution 
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that suffered from institutional memory loss, and the legislature lost power in relation to 
the governor and the executive branch. 
Schraufnagel (2004) looked at the effects in Florida, concluding: no change in 
demographic composition, electoral competition remained constant, and there was some 
decline in the efficiency of the legislative process. Richardson et al (2004) examined the 
effects of term limits in Missouri's legislature, finding that: legislative leadership suffered 
greatly, staff grew more influential, and the executive branch did not gain in power at the 
expense of the legislature. Partsch et al (2002) studied the unicameral legislature of 
Nebraska, observing that term limits have already changed the political culture and 
legislative behavior in state government, even though term limits do not take effect until 
2007. This change in "climate" has made the legislature less cooperative and more 
competitive; and there have been more uncontested races in 2002 to which term limits are 
blamed, as it is surmised that challengers are waiting for seats to become open (Partsch et 
al 2002). 
One study of legislative elections in Ohio corroborated results from earlier 
analyses in California and Michigan. Huefner (2004) concluded that term limits have 
little effect in breaking "the close connection between financial support and campaigning 
for public office, or to weaken the opportunities for special interests to influence elected 
officials." A more in depth case study by Farmer and Little (2005) derived numerous 
effects of term limits. Turnover increased dramatically, and with more open seats 
campaigns became more costly and more partisan. Party leaders in the legislature 
adapted by becoming more involved with candidate recruitment, fundraising for 
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candidates, and message development. There was no change in partisan control, nor was 
there a change in the gender or average age of the membership. However, there was a 
noticeable increase in the number of minority legislators. The authors cite adaptations to 
the new 'rules of the game' imposed by term limits. There have been shifts in the 
informal lines of authority within a more chaotic legislative environment, and committee 
chairs as formal authority figures have lost influence, status, and power. Due to the loss 
of experience, there was an increased workload for legislators, staff, and lobbyists alike. 
Finally, there was not a loss of power relative to the governor and executive branch, 
which the authors attribute to the effectiveness of training seminars for new members to 
learn committee responsibilities. 
I located two case studies on Oregon's experience with term limits, one written 
shortly after term limits took effect, and another soon after the State Judiciary repealed 
them in 2002. Holt (1996) noted a change in Oregon's political culture and legislative 
behavior: legislators became more "agenda-driven", there were more frequent and 
quicker votes on policy changes, less reliance on the seniority system, and more concern 
about public service. Lednicer (2002) inferred that the effects of term limits contributed 
to their repeal, even though it was the State High Court that invalidated them after the 
repeal effort failed in the legislative branch of government. Term limits created a 
leadership void, brought in new members who were focused on one or only a few issues 
and didn't know or care about other issues, and led to a legislature that failed to resolve 
the school funding crisis and other complex and long term policies such as health care 
(Lednicer 2002). 
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It is important to note that a comprehensive research project on the effects of 
legislative term limits on state governments is nearly complete. This project, "The Joint 
Project on Term Limits" (JPTL), included numerous case studies as well as a cross­
sectional examination of term limits throughout the United States. The case studies used 
in this project were cited in this section of my research. All published in 2005, these 
include case studies in the following states: Arkansas (English and Weberg), Arizona 
(Berman), Colorado (Straayer and Bowser), Maine (Powell and Jones), and Ohio (Farmer 
and Little). The case study of California for this project was conducted by Cain and 
Kousser, and it corroborates the findings from their earlier collaborative work in 2004 for 
the Public Polity Institute of California. Additionally, there were three control cases: 
examinations of changes during the same time frame in select non-term limited 
legislatures (IL, IN, and KA). 
D. Institutional Effects Across States 
In examining the effects of term limits on state governments across the United 
States, there are numerous research articles, conference papers, and books that cite 
statistics and other information from one collaborative source. The JPTL, as stated, is a 
cooperative effort from the National Conference of State Legislatures, The Council of 
State Governments, the State Legislative Leaders Foundation, and a collection of 
academic scholars. "The purpose of this project is to assess the effects of term limits on 
state legislatures and identify successful approaches for dealing with them" (see the 
NCSL Web site). The NCSL published "Coping with Term Limits: A Practical Guide" 
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in August of 2006 and made the document available in November. The complete results 
of the JPTL study are to be published in Kurtz, Cain, and Niemi, eds., Institutional 
Change in American Politics: The Case of Term Limits (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, forthcoming). 
Implementing limitations on the number of terms that state legislators can serve 
reduces the average length of tenure by its very design (Basham 2001a). Term limits are 
also intended to increase turnover, and in this regard have been highly successful (Cooper 
2004; Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2003). There has been a rise in turnover because 
incumbents are denied ballot access to run for reelection after the prescribed number of 
terms has been reached. A more recent study by Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell found that 
term limits reversed a decades-long trend of decreasing turnover in state legislatures and 
led to a big increase in inter-chamber movement by legislators; these results were 
tempered by "the length of the term limit and the opportunity structure in the state" 
(2004). I use the authors' data in the legislative analysis in chapter six, and it is an 
important component of my research. 
Advocates of term limits have argued that elections will become more 
competitive due to increased turnover. However, in the literature on the effects of state 
legislative term limits 'electoral competition' is defined in numerous ways. The term has 
been operationalized to denote an increase in the number of races with challengers, as 
opposed to elections with uncontested legislative seats. According to Rausch (2004), 
"higher levels of competition may only occur when incumbents are prohibited from 
seeking reelection"; he concluded that there is more opposition in races where term limits 
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exist. Other findings from the cross-sectional literature support this conclusion. 
Challengers make strategic decisions to defer running for the state legislature until there 
is an open seat (Frisby 2005). Term limits create more open seats, hence they have 
increased the number of challengers in the total number of elections for the legislature 
(Bucher 1998). Basham (2001a) concurs, seeing a "larger pool of candidates"; and for 
Squire (2000) state legislatures with term limits have fewer incidents of uncontested 
elections. 
Some scholars define electoral competition as closing the margin of victory, in 
other words the races are closer based on the percentage of votes cast for the second place 
candidate. By this standard, term limits have improved electoral competition as well. 
Basham (2001a) observes that the outcomes of both primary and general elections are 
closer. However, from the case study literature the conclusion has been drawn that 
incumbents face less electoral competition, whether it is defined as margin of victory or 
contested races. So these races are less competitive, even though as a whole elections are 
more competitive. The work by Frisby (2005) supports this view. A third way to 
characterize electoral competition is to examine campaign spending. Since incumbents 
have such huge advantages in raising money to run for reelection, some equate leveling 
the monetary playing field with making elections more competitive. 
Bucher ( 1998) incorporates all three definitions of electoral competition­
including "reduced campaign expenditures"-and concludes that term limits do make an 
improvement. In closely related research, studies by Powell (2000) and Steen (2003) 
determined that limiting the terms of state legislatures increases competition-by means 
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of more challengers-in U.S. congressional elections. Also, Schaffner et al (2004) found 
that representatives who are serving their last term before being denied ballot access are 
more likely to have their district lines altered by the legislature than are representatives 
who are eligible for reelection. Looking at the 'big picture', Lopez (2003) argues that 
term limitations do not affect the underlying causes of "the inefficient (anti-competitive) 
conditions in the legislative election market", so campaign finance reform is the 
necessary solution. 
Jennifer Drage Bowser (2003) identifies changes in the institutional "culture" in 
terms of norms of behavior and partisanship (see also Cooper 2004). Term limits are also 
attributed with causing a decline in civility and a lack of respect for the institution: its 
rules of behavior and procedural rules. This coincides with a growing animosity between 
political points of view, usually based on party but sometimes solely on ideology, 
resulting in heightened partisanship (Bowser 2003). This supports an earlier claim by 
Rosenthal (1996) that the normative structure has changed in part due to term limits: the 
state legislature is no longer an end value itself, but rather has become an instrument for 
the pursuit of other values. Moncrief et al (2003) concur when they note that the costs 
and benefits of being a legislator change job expectations, career paths, and behavior 
while serving in the institution. One likely source of the growing acrimony is the 
perception that term limits are merely a partisan tool for displacing one political party's 
majority with the other. Coburn (2003) notes that the Republican leadership in Congress, 
Rep. Dick Armey in particular, discussed jettisoning term limits as an issue soon after 
gaining the majority in the House in 1994. This is further evidenced by seven House 
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Republicans reneging on their term limit pledges to run for reelection in 2006; Zach 
W amp from Tennessee is quoted as saying that the pledge was "a mistake" (USA Today 
04/12/06). So term limits are believed by many-particularly Democrats-to be a 
'machiavellian' tool of conniving politicians rather than deeply held political principles, 
and this effects legislative behavior. 
One of the most common claims made in the early predictive literature on the 
effects of term limits was that they would alter the composition of the legislature, making 
the institution more diverse in gender, ethnicity, and occupational background. The case 
study literature gives some support to this prognostication. However, the results are 
different when examining some, most, or all term limited legislatures in the Unites States. 
Writings by Bucher (1998) and Basham (2001a, 2001b, 2002) assert that there has been 
an increase in these types of legislator: women, ethnic minorities, and individuals from 
more diverse occupations in the private sector. The problem with these claims is that 
they do little systematic testing to verify these conclusions; rather, Bucher and Basham 
quote a few studies and cite selective statistics for support. 
The more empirical work by social scientists, on the other hand, reaches far 
different conclusions. Caress (1999) determined that there is only an increase in women 
representatives when there are a low percentage of women in the legislature before term 
limits; where a large number of women were officeholders the influence is negative. 
Other research saw that women had lost seats in term-limited legislatures prior to the 
2000 elections, though there is some variation across states (Bowser 2003; Carroll and 
Jenkins 2001a, 2001b). More recent research by Carroll and Jenkins (2005) saw a 
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continuance of this trend. Using a different sample and method of calculation, Greenblatt 
(2001) concluded that there are more women legislators than before term limits took 
effect, but that this is equally true in non-term-limited legislatures as well (see also 
Caress and Kunioka 2005). Little et al (2001) found that term limits did provide more 
leadership positions for women. Separately, the cross-sectional literature agrees with the 
findings in the case study literature that there are a higher number of younger legislators 
in term-limited state houses (Bowser 2003). 
Regarding ethnic minorities, there was an increase in all legislatures (Greenblatt 
2001 ). This seemingly points towards other factors besides term limits at work. Caress 
et al (2003) determined that an increase in voting strength due to gains in population, 
coupled with reapportionment, were more important factors than term limits regarding 
gains in ethnic minority representation (see also Bowser 2003). Without examining other 
causal factors in conjunction with term limits, Carroll and Jenkins (2005) found that the 
net seats for minorities went up, but that there was no significant change in the number of 
minority women. The results from the empirical literature concur that there is no 
difference in professional backgrounds between members of term limited and non-term 
limited legislatures; thus there is no new breed of legislator generated by term limitations 
(Cooper 2004; Carey et al 2000, 1998). Government remains in the hands of a 
professional or semi-professional class of aspiring career politicians who leave other 
positions in local and state government to run for the legislature (Cooper 2004; Erler 
2004b). 
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One result of replacing long-serving representatives with newcomers is the 
tradeoff between losing experience and expertise while gaining novel perspectives on 
'getting things done' in state government. Peele et al (2002) argue that term limits 
"undermine expertise and professionalism and create new uncertainties . . .  without any 
proven benefits." Gurwitt (1996) calls it "Greenhorn Government" because legislatures 
are losing seasoned and knowledgeable lawmakers who in many cases are policy experts; 
says Gurwitt, "People are making very important policy decisions with very little 
knowledge of what they are deciding." Browser (2003) examines a half-full glass as well 
as a half-empty one when noting one positive result of term limits; that ineffective long­
serving incumbents are forced out and replaced by legislators bringing "new ideas" to the 
policymaking process (see also Mahtesian 1999). 
These new ideas affect legislative performance, particularly impacting the amount 
of government spending. Focusing solely on the quantity of legislation and not the 
quality, Squire (1998) empirically determined that term limits do not influence 
government efficiency and thus "will not impact a legislature's ability to process its 
work." Basham (2001 a) concluded from citing the literature that careerist politicians 
support "electorally efficient but economically inefficient public policy." This assertion 
was supported by Bucher ( 1998), who argued that term limits leads to legislators that are 
more issue-oriented and are elected to office to achieve certain reforms. So according to 
some pundits and scholars, term-limited legislatures lower taxes (Basham 2001 b; Bucher 
1998; Steelman 1998), decrease the time legislators devote to securing political pork 
(Carey et al 1998), advocate spending cuts, and promote limited government (Basham 
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2001a). However, empirical analyses by Erler (2004a, 2004b) concluded otherwise. 
Term limits lead to lower economic growth, deviation from "socially optimal fiscal 
policy", and an increase in expenditures per capita; however, Erler does support the 
assessment that they lead to a decrease in average tax rates (2004a, 2004b ). This is 
further supported by the political reality: Republicans have gained representation from 
the term limits issue, and the GOP in modern political times has advocated less 
government in size and scope. Under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, 
taxes were cut while spending went up, so Erler' s findings corroborate the Republican 
modus operandi of the past generation: campaign for less government, cut taxes to reward 
supporters, and increase spending to placate the public at large. 
I mentioned previously in this section that term limits have not introduced a new 
type of politician because local officials have altered their career paths by choosing to run 
for legislative seats that come open. The case study literature supports this appraisal. 
Thus term limits have one effect that was intended: they change career paths by forcing 
legislators out after a set tenure. Some individuals leave elected politics for jobs in the 
executive branch or more commonly as lobbyists, while others run for different elected 
offices (Heberlig and Leland 2004). The existence of term limits also alters the 
calculations of many potential candidates (Moncrief et al 2001 ). According to Moffett 
(2004), they affect non-professional legislatures more than those characterized as semi­
professional or professional because term limits deter potential office-seekers from 
running for an office with low pay, little benefits and perks, and short tenure. Francis and 
Kenny (2000) determined that state house members are more likely to run for other 
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offices-particularly open senate seats-and that term limits result in more "risk-prone" 
candidates and those with personal wealth. 
The change in career paths brought about by term limits in turn affects legislative 
leadership. The recruitment patterns for the position of House Speaker has not changed 
noticeably in the non-professionalized legislatures from the established seniority system, 
but in the more professionalized institutions leaders are being chosen based on their 
ability to assist other members electorally through fundraising (Freeland 2004). Limits 
on tenure weaken or eradicate the seniority system of advancement within the institution 
(Basham 2001 b; Bucher 1998). They thus reduce the amount of time it takes to reach 
positions of leadership, again more noticeably in the professionalized legislatures 
(Freeland 2004; Bowser 2003). In turn, leaders serve for a much shorter span of time 
(Bowser 2003). Who attains leadership positions has been altered by term limits as well, 
with more opportunities for women and ethnic minorities to assume these top positions 
(Bratton and Haynie 2002; Little et al 2001 ). Lastly, though explored more in the case 
study literature, it has also been concluded in cross-state analyses that legislative 
leadership is weakened by term limits (Cooper 2004; Bowser 2003 ; Basham 2001 b; 
Bucher 1998). The waning power held by the leadership affects power relations within 
the legislative branch and in relation to outside political actors. Within the legislative 
branch, Apollonio and La Raja (2006) concluded that the "change in contribution levels 
across legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the upper chamber in 
states with term limits." Bowser (2003) derived the same conclusion, but based on a 
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different explanation: term limited house members run for the senate, so knowledge and 
experience has become concentrated in the upper chamber. 
The case study literature as a whole has mixed results and varied opinions on the 
question of whether term limits would enhance or inhibit the power of legislative staff. 
Similarly, the conclusions derived in the cross-sectional research are either inconclusive 
or less than an unmitigated yes or no. Term limits have led to an increase in the number 
of partisan staff hired by the legislature (Berry et al 2002), which conforms to what was 
found from the case study literature. Basham (2001 b) argues that staff is less influential, 
citing the increased staff turnover in a number of states. Weissert and Weissert (2000) 
answer the question of 'will the power of staff be enhanced?' with a "resounding no, not 
necessarily". Carey et al ( 1998) say that "possibly legislative staffers" will gain 
influence under term limits, while other studies conclude that representatives lean more 
on staff for information and decision-making (Bowser 2003; Gurwitt 1996). 
Studies across states conclude that gubernatorial power has increased post term 
limits, congruent with the findings from the case study literature. Mahtesian (1999) 
found the office of the governor to be the chief beneficiary of term limits, as legislatures 
lacked experience and policy expertise. Carey et al (1998) see the loss of influence by 
the legislative leadership as the reason that the governor has more influence relative to 
the legislative branch. Bowser (2003) noted that the 'Joint Project on Term Limits' 
(JPTL) is reporting that governors have gained power at the expense of the legislatures. 
Contrarily, Dometrius and Wright (2005) examined the period of 1998-2004, finding that 
the governor's power relative to the legislative branch decreased; however, when 
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analyzing numerous factors they found that partisan turbulence was the determinant, not 
term limits. Regarding the bureaucracy and state agencies within the executive branch 
Bowser (2003) asserts that legislatures have lost influence, while Basham (2001b) argues 
the opposite. 
One of the characteristics of what has been coined an "institutionalized" 
legislature are boundaries that separate and thus insulate the institution from its 
environment; the environment here referring to such factors as public opinion, economic 
trends, and other factors outside of the institution's control (Freeland 2004; Clucas 2002; 
Polsby 1968). Freeland (2004) differentiates institutionalization from 
professionalization: "where institutionalization pertains to how the legislature operates, 
professionalization describes to the characteristics of the individuals in office." 
Previously cited advocates of term limits posit that one effect will be a more responsive 
legislature, where representatives are more accountable to the public. This claim is 
supported in a study by Clucas (2002), who concluded that term limits produce electoral 
results that reflect a greater sensitivity to broader political and economic trends. This 
strongly implies that term limits are the antithesis of institutionalization in addition to 
professionalization; it may also be interpreted to indicate greater public accountability 
and responsiveness by representatives in term-limited assemblies. When moving from 
elections to public policy, early research by Lascher et al (1996) saw no difference, that 
term limits and other ballot initiatives did not "enhance the extent to which policies 
accord with public opinion." 
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Different conclusions were drawn by Carey et al ( 1998), who determined that a 
behavioral effect of term limits is reduced contact with constituents based on the low 
priority placed on reelection; they also found a marked change in voting patterns by 
legislators in the last term served. Thus term limited legislators engage in unconstrained 
behavior that diverges from the constrained behavior predicated by reelection concerns. 
Though various research projects draw different conclusions, most agree that term limits 
affect legislative representation in some fashion (Webber 2002). "Despite contrary Carey 
et al survey findings", according to Webber (2002), "it seems likely that term limited 
legislators will be more constituent driven." Wright (2004) also had results that conflict 
with the 1998 survey research by Carey et al, in that there was no impact of term limits 
on policy representation. 
Another question pertaining to whether term limits are a detriment or a boon to 
America's representative democracy is in 'voter turnout' . If term limits are a solution to 
voter apathy and a growing resentment towards big government controlled by a political 
class that ignores constituent concerns, like advocates claim, this should be reflected by 
an increase in voter participation post term limitations. However, according to Woods 
(2004 ), voter turnout decreased to a small but noticeable degree in state legislative 
elections where term limits exist: "most often, term limits elections produce a lower 
likelihood of individual turnout relative to those who are not subject to the reform." 
I end this section by giving a comprehensive list of effects as determined by the 
almost completed JPTL (Bowser et al 2006). Regarding composition, term limits have 
not led to a more diverse membership, turnover is only abnormally high during the first 
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legislative session or two after implementation, and there are serious effects in terms of 
legislative experience. Concerning the structure of the Legislature, legislative leadership 
has lost status and power and leadership races are more hotly contested. Committees run 
less efficiently due to inexperienced committee chairs and new members, and their 
influence has decreased. The importance of non-partisan legislative staff has increased, 
but not their influence; whereas partisan staff have gained in influence over lawmakers. 
In terms of relationships within the legislature, civility and collegiality have declined and 
led to a lessened ability to compromise and engage in consensus building. Finally, the 
authors cite as probably the most important effect of term limits the shifting balance of 
power away from the legislature and towards the governor and the executive branch, 
particularly in the budgetary process. Segueing to the next section, the findings of the 
JPTL is that lobbying has become more difficult and that tensions between legislators and 
lobbyists have deepened due to lack of trust. However, given these occurrences they 
found that lobbyists have gained in influence and power. 
E. Effects on Political Parties and Interest Groups 
Another avenue of research is investigating how term limits affect electoral 
outcomes. Do term limits benefit a particular political party? Or, do they benefit the 'out 
of power' party in a given state legislature? This section examines the results derived 
from the literature concerning these questions, as well as focusing on the effect term 
limits have on Political Action Committees (P ACS), interest groups, and lobbying efforts. 
Collectively, these groups support the legislative institution although they were not 
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created by nor mentioned in the Constitution. According to Madisonian theory, at the 
national level there exists a competing balance of interests that results in compromise, 
leading to policy that more truly represents the public interest and the needs of the 
Nation. At the state level, conversely, interest groups exert more direct influence on the 
electoral and public policy processes because one viewpoint or a few interests are more 
likely to dominate a smaller political arena (see also Schattschneider, 1960). 
The initial question concerning political parties is whether term limits affect the 
decision to run for office, in other words candidate recruitment. From the predictive 
literature Fiorina (1994) hypothesized that term limits alter the incentive structure for the 
typical Democratic candidate; Meinke and Hasecke (2003) test this supposition, finding 
support: "the presence of term limit provisions even before they take effect creates an 
environment that is less attractive to Democratic candidates." The rationale is that 
Democrats favor more professionalized legislatures and are more likely to envision a 
career in the institution before they assume office. Republicans enter the legislative body 
with a typically different agenda. Since term limits undermine professionalism by 
reducing tenure, the position loses some of its appeal. This in turn may assist Republican 
candidates if the more electable Democrats decline to run for legislative office; and it 
may constitute one of the reasons that term limits have changed the "partisan coloration" 
in state legislatures by which the GOP has benefited (Goldberg 2003 ; Greenblatt 2002). 
Other research focuses on whether term limits constrain partisan electoral tides. 
Carey et al (2000) contend that a political party that is successful in one election is likely 
to lose legislative seats at the end of the term limit period following that election. Thus 
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term limits seemingly produce more partisan shifts of control because the advantages of 
incumbency have been removed, which gives the minority party a better opportunity to 
regain seats. Clucas (2005) independently tested these conclusions and found no 
evidence to support their findings; what was discovered is that term limits "make election 
outcomes more sensitive to broader political trends generally." In the state of Maine, 
Moen and Palmer (2003) concluded that the party holding the seat kept it after the term 
limited incumbent left. Conversely, in California and Michigan partisan control of the 
legislature switched political parties (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al 2004). 
With regard to party primaries, Pinney et al (2004) saw more candidates but not 
closer election results. This was more evident for Democratic candidates. The authors 
attribute this to a dramatic increase in campaign expenditures in open seat elections; open 
seats increase the likelihood that a wealthy or well-funded candidate is competing against 
others who have little fundraising skills or who divvy up the remaining fundraising 
resources. Winger (2002) focused on independent and minor party candidates, 
concluding that term limits are one of many ballot restrictions that reduce the ability of 
these types of candidates to get on the ballot. Also, when a wealthy independent or minor 
party officeholder is forced out at the end of their prescribed tenure, it is more probable 
that one of the two main parties will win the seat. 
Many of the studies on the effects of state legislative term limits examine how 
power is redistributed. A few studies have determined that party leaders in the legislative 
institution are weakened and lose influence under term limits (Cooper 2004; Basham 
2001 b ). Most often it takes time in a leadership position to accrue the power required for 
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an individual to dominate or heavily influence the legislative process and be able to defy 
the policy preferences of the governor and executive branch. Since leadership positions 
are for only a term or two under most term limit statutes, the churning of the institution's 
leaders severely dampen the ability to accumulate the necessary power to counter the will 
of the chief executive. Overall, political parties have become more powerful in term 
limited legislatures (Blair and Barth 2005; Farmer 2002; Rader et al 200 1 ). Shorter 
tenure means that incumbents cannot develop their own political organization over time. 
This results in candidates who rely more on the party organization for fundraising, getting 
out the vote and other campaign activities; then as officeholders they are dependent on 
the party for information on the issues, and cues on how to vote on bills. 
Proponents of term limits adamantly argued that a rotation of office would break 
the control that the 'special interests' have over the political process. Since the costs of 
running for a legislative seat have soared in recent decades, candidates for elected office 
have grown increasingly dependent upon campaign contributions from interest groups. 
The Federal Election Commission requires corporations, unions, and other organizations 
to form Political Action Committees. These PACs report to the FEC concerning 
contributions to political parties and to individual political campaigns. Gordon and 
Umack (2003) examined corporate PA Cs, and found that term limits do not change the 
incentives governing corporate campaign contributions. Regarding the level of 
contributions, multiple studies indicate that term limits result in an increase in the amount 
of money that interest groups contribute to campaigns. They also increase the amount of 
time lobbyists who represent the various interest groups must invest in order to gain 
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access to incumbents and challengers, with the intention of gaining influence on how 
legislators vote on issues that affect their particular interests (Richardson et al 2004; 
Schraufnagel 2004; Clucas 2003; Bowser 2003; Moen and Palmer 2003; Mahtesian 
1999). 
The rationale given for why the job of lobbyists has gotten more time consuming 
and difficult can be summarized in one word: distrust. Bucher (1998) reports that the 
incoming freshmen legislators after term limits took effect expressed "wariness bordering 
on hostility towards those who seek to influence their vote." This sentiment is expressed 
in various ways in the literature. There is an "initial general mistrust" of lobbyists 
(Bowser 2003), legislators are "less cozy with lobbyists" (Weintraub 2002), and 
according to Mahtesian ( 1999) incoming legislators arrive with "built in suspicion of 
lobbyists and prefer to take their cues from representatives of executive branch agencies." 
Thus term limits inhibit the development of personal relationships between lobbyists and 
legislators (Newmark 2003). This initial distrust in turn affects the amount of influence 
and power that interest groups enjoy. Some studies attribute the distrust of lobbyists as 
the reason that lobbyists have lost influence post term limits (Greenberg 2005; Bucher 
1998). Bowser (2003) concluded that the "results are mixed"; lobbyists' jobs have gotten 
more difficult because of the mistrust displayed by new lawmakers, but ultimately their 
influence has grown due to legislators' lack of expertise. Lobbyists can capitalize from a 
legislators' lack of knowledge by supplying information on pertinent issues as well as 
contributing money to their campaigns. 
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The literature is divided on the question of whether the influence of lobbyists and 
the interest groups they represent has increased, decreased, or remained the same. Moen 
and Palmer (2003) found that lobbyists' power is the same after term limits, but interest 
groups are "more active". Studies by Van Vechten (2002) and Richardson et al (2004) 
agree that interest groups retain the same level of influence. Most research, however, 
concluded that the influence and power of interest groups has grown due to term limits. 
Mooney (2005) found that lobbyists wield more influence in the legislative process in 
term limited legislatures than in those that are non-term limited. Blair and Barth (2005) 
determined that interest groups in Arkansas are more powerful because more former 
lawmakers are becoming lobbyists. Rader et al (2001 )  found that in Michigan interest 
groups have more power because legislators are dependent on them for information and 
guidance in their decision-making (see also Sarbaugh-Thompson et al 2004; Doron and 
Harris 200 1 ). Other studies have also concluded that lobbyists have gained clout 
(Golberg 2003 ; Walters 1 997). 
In sum, what can be ascertained from this body of literature is that there is more 
disagreement than agreement concerning the effects of term limits for the electoral 
system, lawmakers, and the processes of numerous legislative institutions. When 
examining some effects of term limits, the case study literature appears at odds with the 
cross-sectional research. There is also disagreement over exactly who among the general 
public supports term limits. Some agreement does exist that term limits have led to a 
decrease in state government spending, and that power relations between the legislative 
chambers has changed to make the state senates more powerful than the house 
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assemblies. Most studies conclude that term limits have increased turnover in a 
prescribed manner, altered recruitment patterns for potential candidates, have modified 
the political culture in the legislature, and have changed the career paths and choices of 
legislators. One source of clarity comes from the JPTL (2006), the latest and most 
comprehensive examination of the effects of term limits. The authors concurred in most 
of their conclusions. 
The strongest agreement found in the literature pertains to two factors: legislative 
leadership has suffered due to term limits, and they have led to an increase in the 
influence and power of the governor and executive branch over the legislative process at 
the expense of the legislative branch of government. This research project will now shift 
focus and briefly survey all of the state legislatures that have experimented with and cast 
aside term limits, and give an overview of those states that have retained state legislative 
term limits. 
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CHAPTER4 
OVERVIEW OF ALL TERM LIMITED STATE LEGISLATURES 
This chapter contains four sections. I begin by enumerating the states that 
presently have state legislative term limits: who they are, when they took effect, their 
temporal limits on tenure, and a description of the term limit statute or constitutional 
provision. I also explain whether the limitations were the result of a ballot initiative or 
enacted S(?lely by the legislature's actions. Then the chapter focuses on term limit 
activity subsequent to the 'year of impact' by detailing efforts to modify existing 
limitations on tenure, and attempts to enact term limits in states that do not have them. 
Following the analysis of recent term limit activity throughout the various states, I 
chronicle and examine the repeal efforts in states that have these provisions. The chapter 
concludes with the rationale and justification to focus on and scrutinize eight repeal 
efforts in five states, so that trends and patterns can be ascertained that provide a starting 
point in determining the causal factors as to why some repeal efforts are successful and 
others are not. 
Much of the factual and descriptive information contained in this chapter are 
derived from two sources that I cross check and independently verify. They are: State 
Constitutions of the United States (Maddex 2006) and the information on term limits that 
is tracked by Jennifer Drage Bowser at the National Conference of State Legislatures 
Web site, as updated in 2006. 
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A. Who They Are 
Fifteen states presently have term limits for their legislators. Of these fifteen, all 
have the citizen initiative process except for Louisiana, and the initiative was used in all 
of these fourteen states to enact term limits. Every statute and constitutional amendment 
limiting tenure was ratified between the years 1 990 and 2000. The 'year of impact' 
among these fifteen state legislatures ranges from California and Maine in 1 996 to 
Nevada in 20 10. These term limits apply to both chambers of the legislative branch, with 
the exception of Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature. Further, these states can 
be divided into those with consecutive limits (AZ, CO, FL, LA, ME, MT, NE, OH, SD); 
and the others with lifetime limits (AR, CA, MI, MO, NV, OK). Lifetime limits, or bans, 
are much more restrictive than are consecutive limits (Bowser 2006). 
Proposition 140 passed in the state of California in 1 990 with 52 .2% support. 
According to Article II, section 8a of the state constitution, "The initiative is the power of 
the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject 
them." With passage, Proposition 1 40 amended Article IV, section 2a: the senate 
membership is elected to four-year terms, and no senator may serve more than two terms. 
The assembly's  members are elected to two-year terms, and no member of this body may 
serve more than three terms. Thus members of the senate may serve for eight years, while 
members of the assembly may serve for six. The year of impact for California' s term 
limits was in 1 996 for the assembly and 1 998 for the senate. 
In Colorado, Amendment 5 passed in 1990 with 7 1 %  support. To amend the state 
constitution, two-thirds of the members in each house must "recommend to the electors 
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. . .  to vote at the next general election for or against a convention" (Article XIX, section 
1 ). Any revisions or amendments made by the convention must be ratified by a majority 
of the voters. Amendment 5 modified Article V of the state constitution and resulted in 
term limits for each chamber in the general assembly: senators are elected for four-year 
terms and limited to two consecutive terms, while representatives are elected for two-year 
terms and limited to four consecutive terms. So members of both chambers may serve 
for eight years. These limits on tenure took effect in both houses in 1998. 
Oklahoma was first to adopt term limits in 1990. The majority in both houses of 
the legislature agreed to an amendment proposal, which was then referred by the 
secretary of state to the people at the next general election. Over sixty-seven percent 
approved the measure, more than the required 'majority of all the electors voting'. 
Subsequently, the senators who are elected to four-year terms, as well as the members of 
the house of representatives who are elected to two-year terms, are now required by 
Article V, section 17a "to serve no more than 12 years in the Oklahoma State 
Legislature." The year of impact for both chambers was in 2004. 
Voters in Arizona approved Proposition 107 in 1992, with over seventy-four 
percent support for the measure. Initiative petitions require fifteen percent of the 
"qualified electors", according to Article I, part 1, section 1(1). They then must gain 
approval from the majority of voters, followed by the formality of the governor's 
proclamation. Members of both houses serve two-year terms, so upon becoming law 
Proposition 107 amended Article IV, part 2, section 21 , restricting senators and 
representatives from serving "no more than four consecutive terms in that office." As 
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with Colorado, members of both chambers may serve for only eight years. Arizona's 
term limits took effect in 2000. 
Ten percent of legal voters may "propose a Constitutional Amendment by 
initiative petition" in the state of Arkansas. Subsequently, in 1992, Amendment 73 was 
approved by slightly less than sixty percent of the voters. When ratified the amendment 
revised Article IV, section 2(a): no senator may serve more than two terms, and no 
member of the assembly may serve more than three terms. Thus house members are 
limited to six years service, while senators may hold elected office for eight. The year of 
. impact was 1998 for the house and 2000 for the senate. 
Florida voters exceeded the fifteen percent threshold required to amend the state 
constitution, so an initiative petition was filed with the secretary of state and then adopted 
by over seventy-six of the electorate in 1992. This initiative modified the 
disqualifications for ballot access listed in Article VI, section 4 to include Florida 
representatives and senators "if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will 
have served in that office for 8 consecutive years." So senators are limited to two four­
year terms, while the representatives in the house are forced out after four two-year 
terms. The limits on length of tenure took effect for both chambers in 2000. Florida is 
one of the cases studied in chapter five. 
The state constitution of Michigan provides for the initiative process, where the 
people themselves may propose laws and enact or reject laws; it also permits referenda, 
where the people have the power to approve or reject laws enacted by the legislature 
(Article II, section 9). Term limits were approved in 1992 with nearly fifty-nine percent 
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support for Proposal B, amending Article IV. Section 54 states: No person shall be 
elected to the office of state representative more than three times. No person shall be 
elected to the office of state senate more than two times. This limitation on the number of 
times a person shall be elected to office shall apply to terms of office beginning on or 
after January 1, 1993. Thus senators serve four-year terms, limited to eight years of 
service; the members of the house of representatives are elected to two-year terms and 
capped at six years in office. The year of impact was 1998 for the house and 2002 for the 
senate. 
In a 1967 ruling, the Missouri supreme court reasoned that initiative and 
referendum provisions in the state constitution should be liberally construed in favor of 
the people's right to determine all proper questions by free and open elections (Maddex 
2006). In 1992 seventy-five percent of the voters approved Amendment 12, which added 
a term limit provision-section 8-to Article III of the state constitution. Section 8 was 
amended in 2002, the year the term limits took effect. It states: no one shall be elected to 
serve more than eight years total in any one house of the General Assembly nor more 
than sixteen years total in both houses. Senators serve four-year terms and house 
members are elected to two-year terms. 
Montana voters approved Citizen Initiative 64 in 1992 with sixty-seven percent 
approval. This limited legislators under Article IV, Suffrage and Elections, section 8, to 
serving eight years in any sixteen-year period. So Montana has a consecutive term limit 
rather than a lifetime ban. Senators are elected to four-year terms, and house members to 
two-year terms. The year of impact for both houses was in 2000. 
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Direct democracy provisions in the Ohio state constitution provide for referenda 
to propose laws and constitutional amendments to the General Assembly, as well as 
initiatives that reserve power for the people to propose amendments to the constitution 
independent of the General Assembly and to adopt or reject the same at the polls. Issue 3 
passed in 1992 with over sixty-eight percent support, thereby adding section 2 to Article 
II: no person shall hold the office of State Senator for a period of longer than two 
successive terms of four years. No person shall hold the office of State Representative 
for a period longer than four successive terms of two years. These are consecutive 
limitations, and terms are considered consecutive unless there is a break of four years 
(Browser 2005). These term limits took effect in both houses in 2000. 
South Dakota is the last of eight states examined in this research that passed term 
limits in 1992. The year of impact for both houses was in 2000. South Dakota's 
constitution permits expressions of direct democracy, where not more than five percent of 
the qualified electors of the state shall be required to invoke either the initiative or the 
referendum (Article III, section 1 ). Amendment A passed with over sixty-three percent 
approval. The legislature consists of a senate and a house of representatives, members in 
both bodies elected for two-year terms and limited to four consecutive terms in each 
house. In short, all legislators· are limited to serving eight years in a sixteen-year period. 
Legislative term limits were enacted in the state of Maine in 1993, taking effect 
for both houses soon thereafter in 1996. Support was just under sixty-eight percent for the 
term limit statute (S - ME ST T. 21-A, Section 553). It restricts state legislators to four 
consecutive two-year terms in each body. Maine also limits party floor leaders, assistant 
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party floor leaders, the house speaker, and the president of the senate to three consecutive 
two-year terms in office. 
Louisiana is the only state with term limits that does not allow for the citizens 
initiative process. However, any proposed amendment or change to the constitution must 
be ratified by a majority of the electors in order for it to take effect (Article XIII, section 
l a). In 1995 seventy-six percent of the voters approved of the legislature's decision to 
amend Article III, section 4, which outlines legislators' qualifications and terms. Section 
4e limits legislators' terms to three consecutive terms of four years for both houses, 
effective January 8, 1996. 
Question 9 was approved by over seventy percent of the voters in Nevada 
in 1996, implementing lifetime bans for senators and assembly members. Senators are 
elected for four-year terms and assembly members for two-year terms, so all legislators 
are limited to twelve years in office (Article IV, sections 3 and 4). The Nevada 
Legislative Council and Attorney General have ruled that Nevada's term limits cannot be 
applied to those legislators elected in the same year term limits were passed; they first 
apply to persons elected in 1998 (Browser 2005). Thus the year of impact for both 
houses will be in 2010. 
The most recent state to adopt legislative term limits is Nebraska. Initiative 
Measure 415 passed in the year 2000 with fifty-six percent approval. This corrected the 
deficiencies of the 1992 term limit measure passed by Nebraskan voters, which was 
invalidated by the state high court over the issue of the necessary number of valid 
signatures (www.ncsl.org). The state constitution states in its preamble: "a bicameral 
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legislature is a matter more of form than function". Nebraska has a unicameral 
legislature-the only state to structure its legislative branch in this fashion-so term 
limits apply to all legislators in that single body. The provisions with respect to the 
initiative and referendum shall be self-executing, according to Nebraska's constitution 
(Article CIIl-4); therefore a limit of no more than two consecutive terms for state 
legislators ( any person who completes two consecutive legislative terms is not eligible to 
serve unless and until at least four ensuing years have passed) apply to service after 
January 1, 2001, and the first election when legislators will be unable to run due to term 
limits is in 2006. 
B. Term Limit Activity 
The National Council of State Legislatures has a database that tracks all term limit 
activity in the fifty state legislatures from 1999 through 2005, including legislation both 
voted on and pending as of May 2006 (compiled by Jennifer Drage Bowser 2006). This 
secondary data set and primary data lists and text from the various state government Web 
sites are the main sources for the information detailed in this section of Chapter 4. I also 
use additional sources to provide information on legislative term limits, gubernatorial 
ones, and those in local government (Maddex 2006; U.S.T.L. Web site). Thirty-five 
states at present do not have term limitations for state legislators; of this number six had 
term limits but repealed them through either legislative or judicial action. Of the twenty­
nine states that have never had term limits-excluding during the colonial period and the 
first few decades of the republic-nineteen limit the governor to two terms, and ten states 
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do not have limitations on tenure for their elected legislative or executive officials. Also 
of the twenty-nine states that have never had term limits for state officials, eighteen do 
have term limits at the local level-applying to either a metropolitan area, one or more 
. major cities, or one or more heavily populated counties-while eleven states do not have 
term limits for state legislators nor local officials. Four states do not have term limits for 
state or local officials: Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, and Vermont. Of these, Idaho passed 
legislative term limits in 1994 and subsequently repealed them by legislative statute in 
2002. 
Searching for legislative activity from 1999 until the summer of 2006 among the 
twenty-nine states that do not have (and have not had) term limits for legislators, I found 
four instances that pertain to state legislative term limits. In the 1998 statewide elections 
in Alaska, voters narrowly supported a 'term limits pledge for candidates' initiative 
(97TERM) by a margin of 109,613 to 108,73 1. This followed 95BITL, a 1996 ballot 
initiative that supports amending the U.S. Constitution to limit U.S. Senators to two terms 
and U.S. House Members to three terms, and allows for non-incumbent state legislators 
to take a voluntary ' term limit pledge' . 95BITL passed by a 123, 167 to 102,533  margin. 
Those who decline have the following printed next to their names on the ballot: 'declined 
to take pledge to support term limits' . 97TERM required candidates for the Alaska 
Legislature to make a term limits pledge to limit service to eight out of any sixteen-year 
period. The bill would require printing ' signed term limits pledge' next to the pledging 
candidate's  name on the ballot; it would similarly require printing 'broke term limits 
pledge' if a pledging candidate seeks a term exceeding the term limits in the pledge. In 
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March of 2001 a bill, HB189, was introduced in the Alaska Legislature: specifically in 
the Judiciary Committee of the house of representatives. As stated, it is "An Act 
repealing statutory provisions relating to term limits and term limit pledges." On May 2 
the forty-member state house passed the bill by a twenty-four to thirteen vote. It was 
introduced in the twenty-member senate the following day, and was passed on May 7 by 
a 16-3 margin with one abstention recorded. A 'notice of reconsideration' was filed on 
May 7; on May 8 the reconsideration was not taken up, so the bill went to the governor 
and was signed into law on July 20, taking effect September 23, 2001. This legislation 
was not contingent on voter approval. 
The states of Hawaii and New York proposed term limit bills in 2005, and the 
Alabama Legislature contemplated term limits in 2006. Both houses of Hawaii's 
legislature are heavily Democrat. Three Republican senators introduced SB885; the bill 
was introduced and it passed the first reading on 1/26/05, it was referred to JHW/TGO on 
2/1/05, and on 12/2/05 it was carried over to the 2006 Regular Session. It has yet to be 
addressed in 2006. In New York Sandra Lee Wirth, Republican introduced a term limit 
provision in the state senate. The proposal had four co-sponsors in the senate, all 
Republican. Like Hawaii, the state legislature in New York is heavily Democrat in both 
chambers. Senator Wirth died on March 13, 2006 after a two-year struggle with cancer. 
The bill moved from the Government Operations committee to the attorney general for an 
opinion, who referred it to the judiciary. No definitive action was taken, so it was carried 
over until 2006, where it went through the same exact process-from the Government 
Operations committee to the attorney general and onward to the judiciary. On May 22, 
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2006 the bill was no longer active in the current session, meaning the legislature basically 
ignored it to death. 
Alabama followed the example set in Hawaii and New York: members of the 
Republican minority proposed state legislative term limits. House Republican Barton and 
Senate Republican Marsh introduced bills HB349 and SBI05, respectively, in 2006. 
These proposals would have limited senators and house members to three full terms of 
four years per term; this would enable an individual to serve twelve years in the state 
house and twelve years in the senate for a total of twenty-four years service in the 
Legislature of Alabama. Term limits also became an important issue in the 2006 
gubernatorial race. Judge Roy Moore, who was removed from his post as Chief Justice 
of Alabama in November of 2003 for failing tol"emove a display of the Ten 
Commandments from the state courthouse, advocated consecutive term limits for state 
legislators in the Volume I, number 2 edition of his "Return Alabama" newsletter. Moore 
was challenging incumbent Bob Riley in the 2006 Republican Party primary for 
governor. Riley publicly supported legislative term limits in a February 3, 2004 press 
release entitled "The People' s Agenda". In this piece, Riley advocated a term limit 
proposal that later became HB349 and SB 105, and it also noted that Riley self-limited his 
terms when he served in Congress. Both HB349 and SB 105 "failed to receive favorable 
committee reports and are no longer significant", as reported by the Legislature of 
Alabama's website; in other words the term limit proposals died in committee in their 
respective legislative bodies. 
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C. Efforts to Modify or Repeal Term Limits 
Twenty-one states presently have or previously had legislative term limits. This 
section chronicles efforts to modify or repeal term limits in the fifteen states that 
currently have the provision. Repeal efforts have been successful in the states of: 
Massachusetts (1997), Washington (1998), Idaho and Oregon (2002), Utah (2003), and 
Wyoming (2004). Section F in chapter one of this research project detail these 
occurrences with the exception of Massachusetts and Washington. There has been no 
legislative activity in either of those two states to re-institute term limits since the date of 
their repeal (MA repealed in 1997; WA in 1998). I address in more detail the six states 
where repeals were successful in the next section of this chapter. In this segment I focus 
on the activity in the fifteen states that have retained term limits by analyzing efforts to 
modify or repeal these provisions. 
Searching for legislative activity from 1999 until the summer of 2006 among 
thirty-one states-including Massachusetts and Washington-that do not have term 
limits for legislators, I found four instances of attempts to institute state legislative term 
limits. When examining the fifteen states that have legislative term limits-using the 
same criteria and time range-I found one hundred thirty-five instances of attempts to 
either modify or repeal the limitations on tenure (see Appendix D, Tables 1 and 2). This 
number includes bills that were carried over until the following year, and proposed 
measures from 2005 or 2006 that are still pending. The number of bills proposed to 
modify term limits (N=91) more than doubled the number of bills to repeal (N=44). I 
operationalize the term 'modify' to include: first, bills that would increase the term 
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limitations so legislators may serve longer; and second, bills that would change the length 
of term for legislators. Both types of legislation would in effect increase the length of 
tenure for legislators. The former directly alters the term limit statute in place, while the 
latter affects term limits indirectly by lengthening the duration of each term that 
representatives and senators serve. It is apparent that when comparing states, legislatures 
that have term limits are much more active in trying to modify or repeal the statute than 
non-term limited legislatures are at generating term limit bills for consideration. 
Upon closer examination of the efforts at modification or repeal, all forty-four 
legislative attempts to repeal term limits failed in the legislature. Forty-one of the forty­
four repeal bills required voter approval for the statute to become law. The three 
exceptions are in the state of Maine. The 1999 bill LD-100 1 ,  as stated, repeals term 
limits upon passage in the legislature and the governor's signature; it was carried over 
until 2000 where it failed in the legislature. In 2005 bill LD-572 would have done the 
same, and it also failed in the legislature. Three repeal bills in Nebraska, LR-219-CA 
(2004) and LR-5-CA (introduced in 2005 and carried over to 2006), include an 
interesting component that proponents hope will temper the repeal and thereby increase 
the likelihood of passage. This proposed statute would simultaneously repeal term limits 
and implement recall provisions for state legislators as an alternative, and is pending in 
Nebraska's unicameral legislature. The Florida Legislature also introduced unique bills 
pertaining to term limits. There were two proposals in 2001 ,  H769 and S488, intended to 
do double damage to term limits by increasing the number of terms allowed and 
lengthening each term for legislators. Both measures failed. Another common tactic in 
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repeal efforts and attempts to weaken the term limitations imposed on legislators is to re­
word a bill and then re-submit it. Also, a number of bills were carried over until the next 
year for consideration when it appeared that they would fail. Additionally, a number of 
bills that failed did not require voter approval; some of these were re-written to require 
voter approval and then re-submitted. 
Unlike the repeal efforts, which all failed in the legislature, three of the ninety-one 
bills introduced to modify term limits passed that respective chamber (house). I 
examined these attempts to modify term limits. A proposal in Arkansas, HJR-1006, 
would have increased the term limits from two four-year terms for senators and three 
two-year terms for house members to twelve years in each chamber. This proposal 
appeared on the November 2004 ballot, where it failed to pass (Bowser 2006). The 
Florida Legislature passed bill H-1177 in 2005, which proposes a constitutional 
amendment to increase, from eight to twelve, the number of consecutive years state 
legislators may serve in that office before being denied the right to have his or her name 
appear on the ballot for re-election (Bowser 2006). This proposal will appear on the 
ballot in November 2006. The third instance was in Montana. HB-277 passed the 
legislature, becoming 2003 Mont. Laws, Chap. 520. This measure extends term limits for 
legislators for an additional four years; the new limits would be twelve years in any 
twenty-four year period in a chamber, up from the existing eight years in any sixteen-year 
period (Maddex 2006; Bowser 2006). It appeared on the 2004 ballot as measure number 
C-42; it did not receive the necessary voter approval, and therefore did not take effect. 
An anomalous piece of proposed legislation surfaced in the Missouri legislature in 2005. 
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HJR-1 would have shortened the existing term limits, thus further decreasing the length 
of tenure allowed by law. The measure failed. 
Premised on the supposition that the more stringent lifetime term limitations for 
legislators would produce more attempts to alter or repeal the provision than limits on 
serving consecutive terms, I conducted a standard test for two sets of states with 
legislative term limits. From the total population of term-limited states, nine have 
consecutive limits (C-states) while six have lifetime bans (L-states). The purpose is to 
see if the average number of efforts to repeal or modify term limits is significantly higher 
in L-states than in C-states. In order to accomplish this, I performed a TTEST (a, b, c,d), 
where a is the number of repeal efforts for each C-state, b is the column of repeal 
attempts for each L-state, c is 2 (two-tailed test), and d is 3 (two sample unequal variance 
test). The Degrees of Freedom equal 13 (9 + 6 _: 2). My expectations were that L-states · 
deliberate significantly more bills that repeal term limits than do C-states, and that this 
relationship holds true for bills that modify term limit provisions. In the nine C-states 
there were seventy-seven bills proposed (Repeal = 30, Modify = 4 7), and in the six L­
states there were fifty-eight bills that were deliberated (Repeal = 14, Modify = 44). For 
details, see Appendix C. 
The results show a difference, but not one that is a statistically significant 
distribution of t at even the .20 level of significance. The 'Repeal' average is 3 .33 in e­
states and 2.33 in L-states; the 'Modify' average is 5.22 in C-states and 7.33 in L-states, 
and the average number of all bills was 9.67 in C-states to 8.56 in L-states. So states with 
lifetime term limits attempted to modify the term limit provision more frequently than did 
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the states with consecutive limits, but not to a point of statistical significance. 
Conversely, the data shows that states with consecutive term limits attempted to repeal 
term limits more often than did states with lifetime bans; so the relationship goes in the 
opposite direction, but not to a significant degree. Thus there is no significant difference 
in the average number of repeal efforts based on the degree of severity of the term 
limitations. Although analyzing the frequency of attempts to repeal term limits in states 
that have these provisions is only an intermediate step towards the final goal of 
determining why repeal efforts succeed in some states and fail in others, I find these 
results counterintuitive; and they point to the need for a more detailed, in-depth analysis 
of repeal efforts in term-limited states. 
D. Case Selection 
No statistically significant difference exists between states that have consecutive 
term limits and those with a lifetime ban in the average number of repeal efforts or 
attempts to modify term limit laws. This begs further and deeper analysis, which in tum 
points to the need for selecting a sample of states where I can determine causation 
regarding repeal efforts. I surmise that other factors affect causation. In other words, 
there is multiple causation, or as John Stuart Mill put it, plural causation (Ragin 1987). 
So, to ascertain the determinant factors as to why some repeal efforts were successful 
while others failed, analysis using the comparative method is necessary. 
All fifteen states with legislative term limits have endeavored to either modify or 
repeal the provision. This research project is �oncemed with the repeal efforts. Of these 
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fifteen states, only the Colorado legislature has not attempted to repeal term limits. 
Based on the dataset provided by the National Council of State Legislatures, the time 
frame employed in my analysis is from 1999 until June of 2006. The total population of 
states that have attempted to repeal term limits during this period is eighteen. The 
number of states where the repeal efforts ultimately failed is fourteen, while four repeal 
efforts were successful. In order to reduce the scope of this research to manageable 
proportions, I am focusing on eight cases: the total population of four cases that 
successfully repealed term limits between 1999 and mid-2006, and a corresponding 
sample of four cases where the repeal effort failed. Case-oriented methods are primarily 
used to pinpoint patterns of constant association rather than explain variation (Ragin 
1987). In this analysis, however, I examine the known differences among state 
governmental systems in terms of their constitutional design and policy processes in 
order to identify which differences have a causal relationship in the success or failure of 
repeal efforts (see Przeworski and Teune 1970). That, at least, is the goal of this 
research. 
Another factor led me to focus on the eight cases summarized in chapter one. All 
eight cases had term limits in place for at least eight years before the repeal efforts that I 
scrutinize occurred. This is necessary because some of the hypotheses are based on the 
fact that legislative term limits had a negative impact on legislative processes. The key 
question in this research is whether it is the constitutional structure of a state's 
government or the deleterious effects of term limits which are more determinant as to 
whether repeal efforts succeeded or failed. This excludes Massachusetts, who repealed 
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term limits three years after passing the provision. In Massachusetts term limits were not 
in place long enough to affect multiple legislative elections, and no legislators were term 
limited out of office. I also excluded Washington, which repealed term limits in 1998, 
because no legislators were forced from office due to term limits; and also because the 
repeal occurred prior to the time period that the dataset I employ details. 
In conclusion of this chapter, it is necessary to note that while the analysis 
hitherto has been focusing on legislative activity, four of the cases involve the state 
judiciary in the repeal effort. Moreover, in three states the repeal effort moved from one 
branch to the other after a failed attempt, where in the second branch of government the 
subsequent repeal effort succeeded (Idaho, Oregon, Wyoming). Therefore, in focusing 
on eight cases in five states, I include those cases where term limits were on the books for 
a significant length of time-at least seven years-and also constructed the analysis to 
have a similar case design from which I seek to determine key differences that can be a 
shown to have a causal connection to the success or failure of the repeal effort. In two 
cases the judiciary failed to invalidate term limits (Florida and Idaho); in two others the 
judiciary invalidated term limits as unconstitutional (Oregon and Wyoming). Likewise 
for the legislative branch: in two states the repeal attempt failed (Oregon and Wyoming), 
and in two states the legislature repealed the limita,tions on tenure (Idaho and Utah). By 
limiting the comparative case study to these eight instances, I expect to be able to identify 
why term limits were retained or discarded. 
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CHAPTERS 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY: STATE HIGH COURT DECISIONS 
In this segment I analyze four state high court decisions concerning legislative 
term limits, and it consists of five sections. Sections one through four (A-D) detail the 
four court cases: Lehman v. Bradbury (2002) in Oregon, Cathcart v. Meyer (2004) in 
Wyoming, the 1999 Florida decision in Ray v. Mortham, and Rudeen v. Cenarrusa 
(2001) in Idaho. The legislative analysis in chapter six explains the role that interest 
groups, political parties, and idiosyncratic political factors such as 'political culture' 
played in the overall repeal process. Here in this chapter I conclude each case study by 
examining the reactions to the court ruling, and describe and investigate any claims that 
political factors may have influenced the judicial decision. In the final part I test the four 
judicial hypotheses and 'other factors' explicated in chapter one for each case, focusing 
on the explanatory variables previously developed and noted in the 'theory' and 
'methods' sections. These hypotheses concern how the high court judges are elected or 
selected, their party identification-if verifiable-so as to determine their ideology, the 
clarity of wording regarding the term limit statute or provision, and the clarity of the state 
constitution pertaining to the qualifications and disqualifications concerning elective 
office to the state legislature. The chapter concludes by answering the question as to 
whether there are any patterns of explanation regarding the four judicial decisions that 
124 
may be applicable as a generalized hypothesis or hypotheses for future term limit repeal 
decisions in state supreme courts. 
A. Oregon: Term Limits Held Unconstitutional in January of 2002 
The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon consists of seven Justices who are 
directly elected by the voters of Oregon for six-year terms; and all statewide judicial 
positions are non-partisan offices. The Governor has the power to fill vacancies by 
appointment until the next general election (Maddex 2006). Presiding over the Lehman 
v. Bradbury case were Justices Carson, Gillette, Balmer, Durham, Leeson, Riggs, and De 
Muniz. 
Chief Justice Wallace P. Carson came to the high court by appointment. 
Republican Governor Victor Atiyeh made the appointment in July of 1982. Carson was 
elected in the Fall of 1982; and reelected in 1988, 1994, and in 2000. The official Oregon 
Supreme Court website has posted that he will retire in January 2007. Next there is W. 
Michael Gillette. Justice Gillette was also appointed to the supreme court by Republican 
Governor Atiyeh. He has been continually reelected since that time, and his current term 
of office expires in 2010. Justice Thomas A. Balmer initially attained the position of 
supreme court justice by appointment as well. Balmer was selected by Governor John 
Kitzhaber, Democrat, in September of 2001; he was then elected in 2002. Likewise, 
Justice Robert D. Durham was appointed to the high court in January 1994 by 
Democratic Governor Barbara Roberts. Durham has since been elected to the top judicial 
office in 1994, 2000, and most recently in 2006. 
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Justices Susan M. Leeson and R. William Riggs were appointed to the Oregon 
Supreme Court by Governor John Kitzhaber, Democrat, in February and September of 
1998, respectively. Both were subsequently elected the same year, and later both 
resigned: Leeson in 2003, and Riggs effective December 3 1, 2006. Unlike the previous 
judges, Justice Paul J. De Muniz arrived at the high court directly through the election 
process. De Muniz was first elected in 1990, and then reelected in 1996 and again in 
2002. Prior to serving on the Oregon Supreme Court, De Muniz briefly held a position 
on the Oregon Court of Appeals in 1990. Justices of this court are also elected by the 
voters, but De Muniz was appointed to fill a vacancy on the court by Governor Neil 
Goldschmidt, Democrat. 
In brief, the term limit case was Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or 23 1, 37 P. 3d  989 
(2002). In 2001, four plaintiffs challenged the validity of the 1992 term limits initiative. 
The Oregon Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over the case on appeal, whereby the 
judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. The term limits initiative was ruled 
unconstitutional in a unanimous decision. 
In detail, Oregon voters passed the initiative known as 'Measure 3 '  in November 
of 1992 with 69 .5% support for the ballot proposal. Measure 3 added to Article II of the 
Oregon Constitution sections 19 and 20. Section 19 set limits on the-length of tenure for 
state legislators and particular executive branch offices, while section 20 limited the 
tenure for members of Congress representing the State of Oregon. The decision in 
US. TL. v. Thornton (1995) invalidated section 20. In the attempt to invalidate section 
19, four plaintiffs in 2001-two former state representatives and two voters, one from 
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each of the former representatives' districts-brought an action under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act, and ORS 246.910(1). In it they challenged the validity of 
Ballot Measure 3 (1992), commonly known as 'the Term Limits Initiative'. The 
plaintiffs' argued that Measure 3 contained two or more constitutional amendments 
that-according to Article XVII, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution-should have been 
voted on separately. The case went before Judge Richard D. Barber, Sr. of the Marion 
County Circuit Court, who ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. 
After the trial court declared Measure 3 invalid, defendant and interveners 
appealed to the Supreme Court under Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 145, section 3(5). The 
defendant was Oregon Secretary of State Bill Bradbury, and the interveners were the 
chief petitioner for Measure 3 and two organizations that supported it. Regarding the 
provisions of Measure 3, see Appendix E. In their decision, the Supreme Court noted the 
original arguments of the defendant and interveners. According to the Secretary of State 
as the defendant, the claim of the plaintiffs who were representatives was precluded 
because Measure 3 had already been challenged in Federal Court. Conversely, the claim 
of the plaintiffs who were voters was barred by the "doctrine of laches" because the 
challenging claim was brought forth "nine years after the passage of Measure 3, during 
which time the people of the State of Oregon had come to rely on the validity of that 
measure" (Lehman v. Bradbury, 2002). The interveners argued that the doctrine of }aches 
barred the challenge of all four plaintiffs. On appeal the defendant and interveners made 
similar arguments, contending that too much time had elapsed since the passage of 
Measure 3 for the challenge to be heard by any state court. 
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The decision in the Lehman v. Bradbury case began with a blanket statement by 
the Court that the legal rationale for the US. TL. v. Thornton decision "plays no role in 
our analysis concerning whether its presence in Measure 3 causes that measure to 
violate" the Oregon State Constitution. There is next an assertion by the Court that the 
trial court lacked authority to decline this case on discretionary grounds, thus repudiating 
an additional contention by the defendant that the trial court should not have assumed 
jurisdiction over the challenge. They next turned to the merits. The contention made by 
the plaintiffs was that Measure 3 violated the Oregon Constitution because the voters 
were voting for multiple constitutional changes packaged in a single voter initiative. The 
Court referred to an important precedent: Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 959 P. 2d 49 
(1998). In the Armatta decision, it was determined that constitutional amendments 
proposed by either the initiative or by the legislature denote "a particular constitutional 
change," id. at 266-267, and, thus, must be rendered to the voters in a manner that 
permits the voters to "express their will in one vote as to only one constitutional change," 
id. at 269. 
The deliberations made by the Court in Lehman v. Bradbury focused on two 
specific questions. First, whether Measure 3 amended the constitution in a way that 
violated the ' separate-vote requirement'; and second, did Measure 3 make two or more 
changes to the constitution that were substantive and not closely related? In answering 
the first question, the Court detailed the sections of the Oregon Constitution affected by 
the passage of Measure 3 ,  which added sections 19 and 20 to Article II. It was 
determined that section 19 of Article II altered sections 4 and 8 of Article IV concerning 
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qualifications for state legislators and their terms of office. Further, it made similar 
changes pertaining to executive branch officials-the Governor, Secretary of State, and 
State Treasurer-in Article V, section 1 and Article VI, section 1. Additionally, section 
20 of Article II added term limits for the Oregon delegation to Congress. Based on these 
determinations, the court concluded that Measure 3 violated the 'separate-vote 
requirement' for a proposed constitutional amendment. 
The second question concerned whether these substantive changes violated the 
'closely-related test' . The Court decided that in the context of the Oregon Constitution, 
Article II, section 20 clearly lacks a close relation to the substantive changes effected by 
Article II, section 19; in part because section 20 adds a limitation on the eligibility to an 
office-representatives to the federal government-whose eligibility is not otherwise 
addressed in the Oregon Constitution. So Measure 3 was found to have violated the 
'closely-related test' .  The Court concluded that because Measure 3 was not adopted in 
compliance with the requirements of Article XVII, section 1 that it is void in its entirety 
and the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. 
The political situation at the time of this ruling was one where an increasing 
number of legislators were being term-limited out of office, as Oregon is the only case to 
have repealed term limits after they took effect. In fact, thirteen representatives and 
twelve senators would have been prevented from getting on the ballot in 2002 (Statesman 
Journal 7/24/01 ). This would have a particularly strong effect on the senate, which had 
been relatively unscathed by term limits. As I explain in chapter six, the Oregon 
Legislature's action in 2001 to repeal term limits was to pass HB2674, which had three 
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components. First, it allowed candidates to file for legislative office in early May (the 
moment HB2674 became law) rather than in mid September. Next, it allowed 
incumbents whose candidacy was invalidated by term limits to sue in the state court 
system; and third it moved any such judicial appeal along a 'fast track' to reach the 
Oregon Supreme Court in as prompt a manner as possible. According to Oregon's Public 
Broadcasting Network, it was a "lawsuit pursued by the state legislature" who "did not 
want to put it on the ballot themselves and opted to have the court do their dirty work" 
(National Initiative News Feb. 22, 2002, www.ni4d.org). 
Reactions to the ruling were ones of relief and acclaim for the ruling by 
lawmakers and other supporters of a repeal, while term limit supporters felt that 
lawmakers 'passed the buck' to the judicial branch-bypassing the people-and 
invalidated a highly popular measure on a technicality. "This kind of action makes voters 
lose respect for the institution," said Bill Sizemore, executive director of Oregon 
Taxpayers United. "The court has fabricated this decision out of cloth, but they have 
made it" (Statesman Journal 1/12/02). Rep. Lane Shetterly, R-Dallas, was pleased with 
the decision and grateful that they will "bring back some experienced legislators next 
session". Regarding his view of term limits, Shetterly said: "When I met with my 
surgeon Thursday, I did not mind that he had a lot of experience in cutting people open," 
(Statesman Journal 1/12/02). Senate President Gene Derfler, R-Salem, had been on 
record on numerous occasions accusing courts of substituting their judgment for the 
Legislature's whenjudges overturn laws. In noting this proclivity he said: "But I do not 
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object to term limits going away. I think term limits have been devastating to the state" 
(Statesman Journal 1/12/02). Sen. Derfler retired in 2002. 
In conclusion, I did not find any evidence or serious charges that political factors 
affected this decision by the Oregon Supreme Court. Critics did charge that the 
components of the initiative were 'closely related', unlike the court's binding opinion. I 
further explain this in chapter six. Looking at the big picture, there was a strong feeling 
among advocates of direct democracy that "a questionable ruling . . .  may trigger legal 
challenges to dozens of initiatives dating back much of the last century" (as cited in 'No 
Uncertain Terms', U.S.T.L. Newsletter, December, 2001 from the Oregonian 
Newspaper). 
B. Wyoming: Term Limits Held Unconstitutional in May of 2004 
The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming consists of five Justices appointed 
by the governor from a list prepared by a judicial nominating committee, and after the 
first year they stand for election for eight-year terms (Maddex 2006). These are retention 
elections, as opposed to elections between competing candidates. In retention elections, 
citizens vote either 'yes' or ' no' to the question of whether to retain the judicial 
incumbent who is on the ballot. Presiding over the Cathcart v Meyer (2004) case were 
Justices Hill, Voight, Kite, Golden, and Lehman. 
Justice William U. Hill was appointed by Republican Governor Jim Geringer in 
1988; Hill was elected and retained in the Fall of 2000. Judge Hill was Chief Justice 
from 2002 until July of 2006, thus during the Cathcart v Meyer case. Next is Barton R. 
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Voight, who was also appointed by Republican Governor Jim Geringer. Voight came to 
the Court in 2001, was retained in an election in 2002, and became the Chief Justice as of 
July 2006. Marilyn S. Kite was the third and final justice selected by Governor Jim 
Geringer, Republican. The first woman to serve on the Wyoming Supreme Court, Justice 
Kite was appointed to fill a vacancy in 2000 and retained in 2002; her term expired in 
2004. The remaining two justices were appointed by Jim Gerringer's predecessor as 
governor, Democrat Mike Sullivan. Justice Michael Golden was appointed in 1988, and 
then retained in the elections of 1990 and 1998. Justice Larry L. Lehman was appointed 
by Governor Sullivan (D) in 1994 and retained by election in 1996. His term ended in 
2004, and Judge Larry Lehman died afterwards in 2004. 
In brief, the term limit case was Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY49, 88 P. 3d 1050 
(Case numbers: 04-32, 04-33, 04-34). In January, 2004 four persons collectively called 
the appellants filed a complaint in district court seeking a declaration that Wyoming's 
term limit law was unconstitutional. The secretary of state raised nine affirmative 
defenses in answering the complaint. The district court summarily rejected all of the 
affirmative defenses in order to get the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court in a timely 
manner, id. at 9. So the case went before the Supreme Court from the district court via 
W.R.A.P. 11  certified questions and W.R.C.P. 54(b) certification of an order rejecting 
affirmative defenses. After addressing the affirmative defenses as they were presented in 
the appeals, the Court unanimously affirmed the district court's rejection of the 
affirmative defenses and found the term limit statute unconstitutional. 
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In detail, Wyoming voters passed 'Initiative 2' in 1992 with 77.2% support; the 
measure limited the number of terms of office that could be served by various specified 
elected federal and state officials. The pertinent part of Initiative 2, after being amended 
by the legislature in 1995 to conform with the US. TL. v. Thornton (1995) decision, can 
be found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103 (LexisNexis, 2003), id. at 4. On January 7, 2004 
two Laramie County state legislators and two Laramie County residents filed as 
appellants a complaint with Judge Nicholas G. Kalokathis of the Laramie County District 
Court seeking a ruling that invalidated the term limit statute as unconstitutional. 
Secretary of State Joseph B. Meyer answered the complaint by asserting the 
constitutionality of the statute and by claiming nine affirmative defenses: standing, 
laches, estoppel, waiver, adequate remedy at law (repeal), no justiciable controversy 
(political question), two statute of limitations contentions, and the Wyoming 
Constitution's  reservation to the people of the right to reform, alter, or abolish 
government in any manner as they choose, id. at 2. 
On February 13, 2004, the district court allowed a Wyoming citizen and the U.S. 
Term Limits Foundation to intervene as party defendants. On the same day the district 
court entered the order to reject the affirmative defenses. On February 20, 2004, the 
district court recorded its Revised Order Certifying Questions; three days afterwards the 
Wyoming Supreme Court wrote numerous orders and notices. The Court agreed to 
answer the certified questions, ordered a consolidation of related appeals, and began 
scheduling the oral argument. However, the Supreme Court found problems with the 
certification process in dealing with the 'laches' and 'statutes of limitations' affirmative 
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defenses, and consequently agreed to address the affirmative defenses as they were 
presented in the appeals. 
The deliberations made by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Cathcart v. Meyer 
(2004) focused on the certified questions submitted by the district court. The four 
certified questions are as follows (from id. at 1 ): 
1. Is the term limit law for state elected officials (Wyo. 
2. 
3 .  
Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103), whether adopted by initiative or 
legislative action, constitutional and enforceable, given the 
qualifications enumerated in Article 6, §§ 2 and 15; Article 
3 ,  § 2; and Article 4, § §  2 and 1 1  of the Wyoming 
Constitution? 
Does the term limit law (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103) 
violate the appellants' right to vote, given the provisions of 
Article 6, § 2 of the Wyoming Constitution? 
Do the reserved powers of the people under the 
Wyoming Constitution include the right to alter the 
government by initiative or by statute with regard to the 
time period any one person can hold any particular state 
office? 
4. Is this action barred by the doctrine of !aches or by a 
statute of limitations? 
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The Court decision in this case first focuses on a discussion of the procedural and 
technical affirmative defenses; it then examines the constitutionality of term limits for 
elected state officials, which comprise the final three affirmative defenses. Regarding the 
affirmative defenses that concern technicalities and procedural issues, the Court ruled as 
follows: first, the appellants had 'standing' to bring this action due to its public 
significance. Second, 'laches' were rejected because the court saw "no cause-and-effect 
relationship between the action of the appellants in filing the action at the time that they 
did, and any harm other potential candidates may have suffered from their own decisions 
not to seek re-election," id. at 17. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's 
rejection of waiver as an affirmative defense; however they declined to address the 
'estoppel' argument, and declined to make any ruling on the injunctive aspects of this 
case (adequate remedy at law, or repeal). Lastly, the Court stated that all of the elements 
of a 'justiciable controversy' (political rights question) exist in the case, id. at 28 ; and that 
an application of a 'statute of limitations' to bar this action would not serve the statute's 
identified purpose, id. at 36. The court held the view that when there is a question as to 
whether a law infringes essential constitutional rights, a less restrictive application of a 
statute of limitations is best. Further, in this case the court decided to conceptualize the 
statute of limitations relative to.when term limits would have an impact on the appellants, 
rather than from when Initiative 2 was passed by the voters of Wyoming. 
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality issues by first declaring that 
the constitutionality of a statute may only be questioned by a party whose rights are 
infringed. The appellants included state legislators, and also voters who only specified an 
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alleged inability to vote for the legislators of their choosing. Due to this determination, 
the Court limited the scope of its decision in Cathcart v. Meyer (2004) to those 
constitutional provisions involving legislative qualifications. Term limits for specified 
elected executive branch officials remained constitutional and lawful. 
Two overarching principles guided the Wyoming Supreme Court in deciding this 
case, as articulated in sections 39 and 40 of Cathcart v. Meyer (2004). Their self­
described fundamental purpose was to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Wyoming 
State Constitution; and in order to accomplish this rule of action every statement in the 
constitution must be interpreted in light of the entire document rather than as a series of 
sequestered pronouncements (see Management Council, 953 P. 2d at 845; Geringer, 10 
P. 3d at 520), id. at 40. When clarifying the right of the people to 'alter, reform, or 
abolish' the government, the Court determined that the people cannot do by way of the 
initiative what the legislature cannot do by legislation, id. at 44. In other words, the 
initiative does not amend the constitution; it merely is the equivalent of a legislative 
statute. Constitutional Amendments must be proposed and passed by both chambers of 
the legislature, after which it must then be passed by a majority of the voters. Thus laws, 
whether passed by initiative or legislative statute, cannot violate constitutional provisions. 
This led the court to assert that an initiative may not enact any law expressly or 
inferentially prohibited by the constitution, id. at 44, 45. 
The Court then turned to determine whether the constitution is ambiguous in 
regard to legislative qualifications. The Justices assert in section 47 of the Cathcart 
decision that "the precise question is whether the constitutional qualifications are 
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unambiguously meant to be exclusive." They answer to the affirmative, that Article 1, 
section 3 states exclusively "that the laws of this state affecting the political rights and 
privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or any 
circumstances or condition whatsoever other than individual incompetency, or 
unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction," id. at 47. And 
according to the court, Article 6, section 1 clearly identifies 'holding office' as one of 
those political rights and privileges. 
The Court next cited other state high court decisions concerning qualifications for 
elected office such as the Oregon case of Lehman v. Bradbury (2002) id. at 51, as well as 
the U.S. Supreme Court's Thornton decision. The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded: 
"the general rule, and the better-reasoned rule, is that constitutionally prescribed 
qualifications for holding a constitutional office are exclusive," id. at 58. The Court 
followed this legal rationale with the observation that an original provision in the 
Wyoming Constitution set a 'consecutive term limit' for the office of State Treasurer. 
Therefore, the Court reasoned, the framers clearly knew what term limits were, and chose 
not to use the necessary language to establish term limits in the constitution. This was 
cited as further evidence that the qualifications written in the constitution were explicit. 
The conclusion of the Court, found in sections 59 to 61, states that the term limit 
law "violates the unambiguous and exclusionary provisions of the Wyoming Constitution 
concerning eligibility requirements for membership in the state legislature." Here are the 
Court's conclusions. 
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160 We answer the certified questions as follows: 
1 .  The term limit law (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5- 1 03), as it applies to 
candidates for the state legislature, whether adopted by initiative or legislative action, is 
unconstitutional and unenforceable because it violates Wyo. Const. art. 1 ,  § 3, and art. 3 ,  
§§  2 and 52(g). 
2 .  We decline to address the question of whether the term limit law also 
violates the appellant electors' right to vote under Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 2 .  
3 .  The reserved powers of the people under the Wyoming Constitution do 
not include the right to alter the government by initiative or by statute with regard to the 
time period any one person can hold a state legislative office. 
4. We decline to address the affirmative defenses of !aches and the statutes of 
limitations as certified questions, but have answered them as part of the appeals in this 
matter. 
161 Remanded to the district court for entry of an order consistent herewith. 
As one would expect, term limit supporters railed against the Court's ruling, while 
lawmakers, such as Rep. Rodney "Pete" Anderson, "were pretty tickled with the 
decision" (Tribune-Eagle 5/5/04). Paul Jacob of U.S .T.L. was cynical of the judicial 
process and critical of the decision. "In 1 992 77 percent of the people of Wyoming voted 
to impose term limits on their elected representatives. But the career politicians have 
refused to accept this verdict. They have fought the will of the people every step of the 
way. They are showing the world that the will of the people simply doesn't matter to the 
government of Wyoming. The elites and the insider powerbrokers dictate everything and 
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the public be damned" (Torrington Telegram 2/20/04). Jacob continued, calling the court 
action "a coup ... by a few career politicians", and believed "the whole reason for this 
action is a last ditch attempt by a handful of greedy, power-mad politicians to hold onto 
power" (Torrington Telegram 2/20/04). 
Regarding the popularity of the term limit initiative, Rep. Becket Hinckley, R­
Cheyenne, stated about the decision: "As legislators, we know that 12 years ago 77 
percent of folks at least wanted (term limits). Just because the method or procedure has 
been deemed unconstitutional doesn't mean the very core of the idea doesn't stand" 
(Torrington Telegram 5/7/04). However, the popularity of the measure had no bearing 
on the Court's decision. Justice Barton Voigt wrote in the ruling: "The fact that 77 
percent of the voters favored a particular measure does not make that measure 
constitutional. Either we live under a constitutional government or we do not" (Tribune­
Eagle 5/5/04). 
Opponents to the ruling found it more than convenient that the Court acted in a 
manner swift enough to allow incumbent legislators to campaign unimpeded by the 
statute. Attorney Harriet Hageman, daughter of a long-serving state representative, 
argued for the plaintiffs and later thanked the court for expediting the case to avoid an 
interruption to the election cycle (Tribune-Eagle 3/25/04). I found no evidence that 
political factors affected the ruling, but there may be a question as to how effective. term 
limits were defended by Secretary of State Joseph Meyer. Meyer had promised a 
vigorous defense of the law with the help of Attorney General Pat Crank, but Meyer was 
on record saying that term limit legislation as the "most undemocratic action ever to be 
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taken in the leading democratic nation in the world" (Star-Tribune 1/8/04). Also, after 
making his arguments supporting the term limit law before the Wyoming Supreme Court, 
Meyer criticized term limits while the Court was still deliberating the case. "I don't think 
term limits make any sense whatsoever. You' re getting rid of someone with 12 years of 
experience and replacing them with someone who can't find the bathroom" (Tribune­
Eagle 4/3/04 ). Despite Meyer's contempt towards a measure that he had to legally 
defend, I found no evidence that Secretary of State Meyer engaged in any behavior that 
brought into question the quality of his defense of term limits before the high court. 
C. Florida: Upheld Term Limits in September of 1999 
The Supreme Court of the State of Florida consists of seven Justices, each of 
whom are appointed for a six-year term by the governor from nominees submitted by a 
judicial nominating committee; thereafter, the justices must qualify for retention by a 
vote of the electors (Maddex 2006). Presiding over the Ray v. Mort ham ( 1999) case were 
Chief Justice Harding and Associate Justices Shaw, Wells, Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, and 
Quince. 
Retired Justice Major B. Harding was appointed by Florida Governor Lawton 
Chiles, Democrat, in 1991, retained on the court by Florida voters in 1998, and served a� 
Chief Justice from July of 1998 until June of 2000. Harding was Chief Justice when the 
court deliberated and ruled on the Ray v. Mort ham case in September of 1999. Retired 
Justice Leander J. Shaw, Jr. was appointed to the Supreme Court by Governor Bob 
Graham, Democrat, was retained on the court by the voters of Florida in multiple 
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elections, and served as Chief Justice from 1990 to 1992. The five remaining Associate 
Justices were all appointed to the high court by Democratic Governor Lawton Chiles. 
Justices Charles T. Wells and Harry Lee Anstead joined the Supreme Court in 1994; both 
judges were retained on the Court by Florida voters in 1996 and again in 2002. The 
remaining three Justices-Barbara J. Pariente, Peggy A. Quince, and the current Chief 
Justice R. Fred Lewis-were initially retained in the 2000 election and all three received 
voter approval in 2006 for another six year term. 
In brief, the term limit case was Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d (1999). The trial 
court denied voters' request for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to have a 
citizen's initiative amendment invalidated as unconstitutional. The appellants filed an 
Appeal of Judgment [of Circuit Court, in and for Leon County, P. Kevin Davey, Judge, 
Case No. 98-1024; Certified by the District Court of Appeal, First District, Case No. 98-
4705]. The First District Court of Appeal invoked the 'pass-through' jurisdiction of the 
Florida Supreme Court. The Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction and ruled unanimously 
in favor of the appellees, thus upholding the trial court's decision regarding the 
constitutionality and legality of term limits for elected state officials. 
In detail, the voters of Florida in 1992 filed an initiative petition with the 
Secretary of State and then passed an eight year term limit constitutional amendment­
the "Limited Political Terms in Certain Offices Initiative", or what was commonly 
known as "Eight is Enough"-with 76.8% of the vote. In 1999 five appellants, who were 
registered voters in the state senate districts of Senators Thomas, Kirkpatrick, and 
Hargrett, appealed to the First District Court of Appeal. They did so in response to the 
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trial court's order granting final summary judgment which denied the appellants' 
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief that sought to prevent enforcement of 
Article VI, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution (Ray v. Mort ham, 1999). This 
segment of the Constitution limits the number of consecutive terms that candidates for 
the following state offices can appear on the ballot: (1) Florida representative, (2) Florida 
senator, (3 ) Florida Lieutenant governor, (4) any office of the Florida cabinet, (5) U.S. 
Representative from Florida, and (6) U.S. Senator from Florida (see Appendix E). The 
First District Court of Appeal invoked the Supreme Court's 'pass-through' jurisdiction 
for issues of great public importance requiring immediate resolution by the Court. By 
this route the legal dispute over term limits came before the Florida Supreme Court. 
In the Court's ruling on the Ray v. Mortham (1999) case, the Justices relied 
almost exclusively on an earlier opinion, the 'Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-­
Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices'� 592 So. 2d 225, 226 (Fla. 1991) 
(hereinafter 'Limited Political Terms' ). Florida has a constitutional requirement that all 
citizens' initiative petitions must be submitted to the Supreme Court for an Opinion on its 
compliance with the 'single-subject requirement' . The Court interpreted this requirement 
as meaning that the component parts of a proposed amendment must be according to a 
dominant plan or scheme (Ray v. Mortham, 1999). So, in order to meet this level of 
scrutiny, the initiative petition requested that the Florida Constitution be amended to the 
extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States. The initiative also contained a 
'severability clause', whereby if any part of the measure was held to be invalid for any 
reason, then the remaining portion of the measure would be severed from the void portion 
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and applied to the fullest extent possible (Ray v. Mortham, 1999). Also in their 1991 
Opinion, the Court reviewed the ballot title and summary for the proposed amendment to 
ensure that it complied with the statutory ballot summary requirements. 
The 1995 US. TL. v. Thornton decision invalidated sections 4(b )5 and 4(b )6. 
Based on this, the appellants contended that the entire term limits amendment be 
invalidated, arguing that the secretary of state need show that the voters would have 
approved the amendment without the unconstitutional provisions. The appellants 
maintained that by this applied logic the term limits amendment could not survive a 
"severability analysis" (Ray v. Mortham, 1999). The appellants additionally relied on the 
Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Duggan v. Beermann, 544 N.W. 2d 68 (Neb. 
1996), where the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the valid portions of 
Nebraska's term limits amendments relating to state legislators could not be severed from 
the invalid portions relating to federal legislators, so that all the provisions must fail. The 
Court found the Duggan decision distinct from the one in Florida based on the facts of the 
case, and because Nebraska does not have a mandated pre-ballot judicial review 
procedure such as Florida law prescribes. Further, the Justices ruled that the type of 
severability analysis argued for by the appellants is "nothing more than conjecture and 
speculation" (Ray v. Mortham, 1999; Florida Times-Union 9/5/99). 
The Court ruled that the analysis insisted on by the appellants "would be the 
antithesis of the purpose underlying severability", and disagreed with the appellants' 
contention that compliance with the 'single-subject' requirement mandates that the entire 
amendment be stricken (Ray v. Mortham, 1999). According to the Court, the proponents 
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anticipated the possibility of the aJl?.endment being 'severed' , and took measures to save 
the remainder if certain parts were invalidated. In sum, the Court found that the portions 
of the amendment were functionally independent. This line of legal reasoning comports 
with that of the Arkansas Supreme Court (see US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W. 2d 
349 (Ark. 1994). The term limits amendment thus passed the Court's severability 
analysis, meaning that it satisfied the 'single-subject' constitutional requirement. The 
court also concluded that the amendment withstood scrutiny under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and found it unnecessary to 
revisit their earlier Opinion stated in Limited Political Terms ( 1991 ), as had been 
requested in an amici arguing for the appellants. Thus the citizens' initiative amending 
the Florida Constitution to include term limits for state legislators ( et al) was 
unanimously upheld as constitutional, although Justice Lewis concurred in result only. 
Many legal experts opined that absent any proof of outright election fraud 
regarding the initiative, the Florida Supreme Court had little option but to uphold the 
term limit measure (The Christian Science Monitor 9/2/99). In the same article legal 
analysts further added that it would have been extremely difficult for a majority of the 
court to justify overturning a citizen initiative approved by a 3-to-1 margin of voters. So 
apparently, voter preference was an important component in the Florida court's decision. 
A lawyer representing three of the legislators in the court challenge said that no appeal 
was planned. Speaking of the court, Attorney Bob Boyd said: "They spoke. It's over" 
(Polk County Democrat 9/6/99). 
144 
D. Idaho: Upheld Term Limits in December of 2001 
The Idaho State Supreme Court consists of five Justices who are directly elected 
by the voters of Idaho for six-year terms staggered by lot for two, four, and six years. All 
statewide judicial positions are non-partisan offices. The method of filling interim 
vacancies is by gubernatorial appointment through a nominating commission (Maddex 
2006). Presiding over the term limit case Rudeen v. Cenarrusa (2001) were Justices 
Trout, Schroeder, Walters, Eismann, and Kidwell. 
Although Idaho Supreme Court Justices are directly elected by the voters, four of 
the five justices were initially appointed and later elected to the Supreme Court (very 
similar to Oregon in this regard). Chief Justice Linda Copple Trout was appointed by 
Governor Cecil Andrus, Democrat. The first woman on the Court, Trout was elected in 
1996 and 2002. Two Justices were initially appointed by Republican Governor Phil 
Blatt: Gerald F. Schroeder, the current Chief Justice, and Jesse R. Walters. Schroeder 
was elected in 1996 and 2002; Walters was elected in 1998 and retired in 2003. Justice 
Daniel T. Eismann was elected to the Supreme Court in 2000 and began serving in 
January of2001; however, Eismann had been appointed to the district court in 1995 by 
Governor Phil Blatt, Republican. Lastly, Justice Wayne L. Kidwell was elected to the 
court in 1998, and retired in December of 2004. Kidwell served in all three branches of 
the Idaho State Government, being elected to the state senate as a Republican and serving 
as attorney general as well. Justice Kidwell was named to 'Idaho's Top 50 Conservative 
List in 2003', awarded by the advocacy group 'Idahoans For Tax Reform' 
(www.idtaxreform.com/PressReleases/Top50Conserv2003.htm). 
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In brief, the case was Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 Idaho 560: 38 P. 3d 598, 
November 2001 Term. In 2000, a complaint was filed in district court by multiple 
county, city, and school district officials that sought to prevent the application of the 1994 
term limits initiative and declare the amended sections of the Idaho Code to be in 
violation of the Idaho and United States Constitutions. After the district court sided with 
the plaintiff-respondents, multiple defendants and interveners appealed the district court's 
order granting summary judgment. The appeal moved directly from the district court to 
the Supreme Court, who unanimously overruled the district judge and upheld term limits 
for most elected state and local officials. 
In detail, 'Proposition 2'-"The Idaho Term Limits Act of 1994"-was approved 
by 59% of ldaho voters in November of 1994. The Term Limits Act added three new 
sections to the Idaho Code: I .C. §§ 34-907, 50-478, and 33-443. The specific mechanism 
of instituting term limitations was a ballot access restriction. Legislators who had served 
eight years were ineligible to have his or her name placed upon the primary or general 
election ballot. This also means that voters could still elect whoever they chose, but that 
they would have to write-in that person since incumbent officeholders with eight years of 
experience in the legislature were prohibited to have their names on the ballot. On 
January 24, 2000 a complaint was lodged with the sixth judicial district by multiple 
county, city, and school district officials to enjoin the application of the 1994 initiative 
and to declare Idaho Code §§  34-907(e)(f), 33-443, and 50-478 to be in violation of the 
Idaho and U.S. Constitutions (Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 2001). Sixth District Judge N. 
Randy Smith ruled that limitations on the length of elected service were unconstitutional 
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as applied to city, county, and school district offices; as those were the offices specified 
in the complaint. 
A petition for intervention was granted allowing multiple respondents to 
intervene, and the appeal was extended to cover the constitutionality of the residual 
provisions of the Term Limits Act that applied to state legislators and state elected 
officials. Secretary of State Pete T. Cenarrusa, as defendant, and 'Citizens For Term 
Limits (CFTL)' as a defendant-intervener appealed the district court's granting summary 
judgment. Subsequently, another intervener filed a motion for writ of prohibition. The 
Supreme Court issued an Order that deferred the decision on the writ until after the oral 
argument (Rudeen v. Cenarrus, 2001 ). 
Chief Justice Linda Copple Trout wrote the decision (The Idaho Statesman 
12/14/01 ). The Court began its decision by asserting that its role is not to pass judgment 
on the wisdom of the statutes in question, but rather to only make a legal determination as 
to whether they are unconstitutional. The Opinion then focused on four points of 
contention. First is whether the limitation on ballot access violate the voting rights of the 
qualified electors of Idaho, or secondly the suffrage rights of elected officeholders. The 
Court answered 'no' to both questions. They asserted that in part two of § 34-907 and § 
50-4 78 the limitation for ballot access did not prohibit voters from casting a ballot for the 
candidate of their choice, even a multi-term incumbent (Rudeen v. Cenarrus, 2001). 
Further, the Justices declared 'suffrage' does not include holding office. According to 
the court, "while the right of suffrage might be broader than simply the right to vote, it is 
not so broad that it encompasses the right to hold office" (NCSL website). 
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Thus the Supreme Court found that that the district court erred in averring that the term 
limit statutes violated the Idaho Constitution because Judge Smith incorrectly determined 
that the right of suffrage included the right to access the ballot and the right to hold public 
office (Rudeen v. Cenarrus, 2001 ). So in her opinion, Justice Trout found that limiting 
terms of office did not infringe on the specific constitutional suffrage guarantees of a 
secret ballot, qualification of voters, disqualification of voters and officeholders, 
residency, recall, and non-partisan selection of voters (The Idaho Statesman 12/14/01). 
Third, based on the minutes of the Idaho Constitutional Convention of 1889, the 
plaintiff-respondents alleged that th� framers' intent was to limit the power of the 
legislature to impose limitations on qualified candidates. The Court denied this claim, 
finding that the framers' intent was to grant relatively broad powers to impose limitations 
on the qualifications to hold elected office. Finally, the plaintiff-respondents contended 
that the majority of state cases affirm that the equal protection guarantees of the Idaho 
and United States Constitution are substantially equal. Based on this claim, the Idaho 
Supreme Court should affirm the U.S. TL. v. Thornton (1995) decision articulated by 
Justice Stevens that holds an expansive view of voter choice. In other words, term limits 
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 
therefore violate the equal protection provisions in the Idaho Constitution. 
This claim was also refuted by the Idaho Supreme Court, who cited Hellar v. 
Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho P.2d 539 (1984): "The Idaho Constitution stands on its own . . .  we 
interpret a separate and in many respects independent constitution." So while the United 
States and Idaho Constitutions are substantially equivalent, "this does not say it is 
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equivalent in ultimate result" (Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 537 P.2d 635 (1975). 
Therefore, because the Court deemed that the statutes in question did not violate the 
Idaho Constitution or the United States Constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed 
the Sixth District Court's ruling and validated the term limit initiative. 
Term limit supporters praised the ruling, while lawmakers expressed mixed 
reactions. "Obviously, I 'm disappointed," said Ada County Commissioner Roger 
Simmons. "There's nothing I can do about it. I 'm figuring it's a done deal" (The Idaho 
Statesman 12/14/01 ). Though affected by term limits, Attorney General Al Lance 
voiced his support for the decision: "This case was fundamentally about the rights of the 
people to shape their own government" (The Idaho Statesman 12/14/01). The prospect of 
term limits opened up opportunities for some lawmakers. Boise Councilwoman Paula 
F omey had been eyeing Simmons' commission seat and said that the decision "would 
make me more likely" to run for that office in the upcoming Republican primary. An 
ominous statement was released by the national term limit advocacy group, U.S.T.L., in 
reaction to the court decision. "Everyone knows that politicians don't like term limits," 
said U.S.T.L. executive director Stacie Rumenap. "This ruling means that if legislators 
want to overrule Idaho voters, they won't be able to hide behind the Courts-the people 
of ldaho will be watching if legislators decide to attack their law" (U.S.T.L. press release, 
12/13/01 ). Two months later the Idaho legislature did exactly that, as I explain in chapter 
six. 
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E. Hypotheses Testing and Findings 
This final section of the chapter analyzes the afore described court cases through 
the lenses of the hypotheses and other possible causal factors constructed in chapter one, 
searching for commonalities in the decision-making process by the various state high 
courts. State supreme courts are composed of individual justices who make a decision in 
the aggregate as a collective entity. All four states tendered unanimous rulings 
concerning the constitutionality of term limits for state legislators. Therefore this 
analysis does not need to address factors pertaining to internal divisions and splits within 
each high court stemming from ideology or partisanship, though ideology and 
partisanship may be relevant variables concerning the high courts decision-making 
process at the aggregate level. 
In sum, the Oregon and Wyoming high courts ruled state legislative term limits 
unconstitutional, while those in Florida and Idaho upheld the constitutionality of limiting 
legislative tenure. All four states have the initiative process and used this mechanism of 
direct democracy to institute term limits for state legislators. Citizen initiatives created 
term limit statutory laws in the states of Wyoming and Idaho, whereas in Oregon and 
Florida the initiative was used to amend the constitution. There is no pattern of causal 
effect regarding the success or failure of repeal efforts in the four judicial decisions 
examined based on whether the term limit provision is a constitutional amendment or 
statutory law, and only the Wyoming Court included the distinction as an ancillary 
component in its argument that invalidated term limits. 
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One surmised causal factor specified that the degree of public support for term 
limits may have an influence on the high courts' decisions: the greater the public support 
that exists, the less likely the courts would rule the measure unconstitutional. While no 
directly comparable public opinion polls exist to gauge the popularity of term limits in 
the four states, this potential causal factor can be determined, however, by comparing the 
level of support by voters for the various term limit initiatives on the ballot (OR 69.5%, 
WY 77.2%, FL 76.8%, and ID 59%). The findings do not support the view that the 
degree of public support for term limits as evidenced by the voters had a direct bearing on 
the high courts' decisions. The state with the highest level of public support­
Wyoming-ruled term limits unconstitutional, while the state with the comparatively 
lowest public support (Idaho) upheld term limits as lawful. 
Regarding regional emulation or a copycat phenomenon as a causal factor, an 
impressionistic examination supports this contention. While state legislative term limits 
exist in all regions of the United States, they are much more common in the W estem half 
of the country than in the Eastern half, and term limits are most prevalent in the Mountain 
West region. Oregon, Idaho, and Wyoming, which were analyzed in this research 
project, are contiguous geographically. Oregon borders Washington, and that state also 
successfully repealed state legislative term limits. The adoption of term limits can also 
be seen as a copycat phenomenon. All the states that passed term limit provisions did so 
between the years 1990 (4 states) and 1995 (LA), and 11 of the 21 states that limited 
legislative tenure passed the provision in 1992. Nebraska passed a term limit provision in 
1 992; it was invalidated by the state high court, so another term limit amendment was 
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initiated and ratified in 2000. Concerning the four cases examined, Idaho passed term 
limits in 1994 and the other three states passed them in 1992. Also, the four repeal cases 
examined were between 1999 and 2004, in a chronological order where the date of 
impact for term limits coincided with the temporal order in which the high courts made 
their decisions. 
The analysis in chapter four determined that there is no significant difference in 
the average number of repeal efforts based on the degree of severity of the term 
limitations. When making the comparison of the four repeal cases examined here in 
chapter five, the results are also mixed as to whether the success of the repeal effort is 
related to the severity of the term limitations. Florida has consecutive term limits; 
legislators can serve a total of 24 years in both chambers of Wyoming's legislature, 16 
years total in Idaho's. legislature, and 14 years total in Oregon's. The state with 
consecutive term limits, Florida ( eight year term limits for both chambers and a two year 
'break in service' ), upheld term limits as constitutional. The state with the second least 
restrictive term limits, Wyoming (eligible to serve in each chamber for 12 years in a 24 
year period, afterwards a lifetime ban), which invalidated term limits. The third least 
restrictive limitation was in Idaho ( eligible to serve 8 years in a 15 year period in both 
chambers, afterwards a lifetime ban), which upheld term limits. The most restrictive term 
limitations were in Oregon ( six years in the house and eight years in the senate, 
afterwards a lifetime ban), which ruled the amendment unconstitutional. Also, Lopez and 
Jewell (2004) devised a "Stringency of Term Limit" model which categorizes states as 
'strong', 'moderate' , and 'weak' based on the following factors: house term limits and 
152 
wait period, and senate term limits and wait period. This model classifies states with 
lifetime bans-a perpetual waiting period, so to speak-as strong term limits; states with 
waiting periods of five or more years as moderate term limit provisions, and wait periods 
of one term as weak term limit measures. Their rankings corroborate my determinations 
regarding term limit severity: Lopez and Jewell rank Florida's term limits as 'weak', the 
provisions in Wyoming and Idaho as 'moderate', and the term limit strictures in Oregon 
as 'strong'. 
JHl: States that have some form of voter accountability over their state high court 
judges-elected high court judges or 'retention ballots' (i.e. the Missouri Plan)-are 
less likely to invalidate term limits than states that appoint those judges. 
All four states have a corresponding degree of voter accountability over the 
composition of their supreme c.ourts. Florida and Wyoming structure it so the governor 
appoints the justices, after which they are on the ballot in retention elections. Oregon and 
Idaho directly elect their justices in non-partisan competitive elections; however, in both 
states every high court justice with the exception of two (one in OR and one in ID) was 
initially appointed by the governor to fill a vacancy on the high court before they stood 
for election. Further, the Justice in Oregon had previously been appointed to a lower 
court by the governor; and the lone Idaho judge who came first to the high court by 
election had previously been a Republican state legislator and thus known to the voters. 
Political practice has apparently become a custom and tradition in certain states that 
constitutionally allow for the direct election of state supreme court justices. If a justice 
wants to retire, that individual resigns in the final year of their term instead of serving it 
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in full. In this manner the governor gets to appoint new justices, and those justices get to 
run for the positions they hold as incumbents rather than challenging for an open seat. 
Thus in all four cases the governor makes the initial appointment to the bench, after 
which _the high court justices are validated by the voters at the polls. 
I assert that the four cases, in fact, place judges on the high courts in the same 
manner, regardless as to whether the state constitution allows for the direct election of the 
justices. Even if there is a meaningful distinction in the manner in which judges come to 
sit on these high courts, the results are mixed and do not support JHl. Oregon directly 
elects its justices, and the court repealed the term limit amendment. Idaho directly elects 
its justices, and the court upheld term limits as lawful. Florida's governor appoints the 
justices, and the court upheld term limitations for state legislators; Wyoming's governor 
appoints the justices, and the court repealed the term limit statute. 
JH2: The more conservative the high court, the less likely they are to invalidate 
term limits. 
The fact that almost every judge in all four states was appointed initially to the 
high court---or in 1 out of 24 instances was appointed to a lower court-indicate their 
basic ideological positions based on the partisan affiliation of the governor who 
appointed them to the state judiciary. Additionally, I repeat, the lone Idaho judge who 
came first to the high court by election had previously been a Republican state legislator. 
I here use party identification as a proxy for ideology due to the limitations in the legal 
studies literature for ascertaining a judge's ideology. Pursuing the circuitous logic, 'a 
judge is conservative because he or she makes conservative rulings', becomes 
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tautological and subjective. Due to these limitations, I am assuming that Republican 
governors will appoint judges who are ideologically more conservative than judges 
appointed by governors from the Democratic Party. As previously stated, term limit 
support has been associated with the national Republican Party in its platforms in 1988, 
1992, and 1996, as well as the "Contract with America" (Gillespie and Schellhas 1994). 
Hence, by proxy, conservative judges are hypothesized to view term limits more 
favorably and be less likely to invalidate them; and since each of these rulings were 
unanimous, it needs to be determined which political party's gubernatorial appointments 
constitute the majority in the four high courts. 
Referring to the case descriptions, Oregon and Florida have state supreme court 
justices (N=7) appointed predominantly by Democratic governors (OR 5-2, FL 7-0). 
Oregon's Court repealed the term limit amendment, while Florida's amendment was 
upheld. Wyoming and Idaho have state supreme court justices (N=5) appointed 
predominantly by Republican governors, or judges who can be classified as Republican 
(WY 3-2, ID 4-1). Wyoming's high court ruled that the term limit statute was 
unconstitutional, whereas Idaho's Court upheld the term limit amendment. So the results 
are mixed concerning JH2. There is no indication from the small number of existing 
cases that the legal decision-making regarding the legality of term limits was determined 
or influenced by ideological considerations based on partisanship. 
JH3: The less clear the wording is in the term limits measure, the more likely that a 
state high court ruled it unconstitutional. 
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I test this hypothesis from the words used by the high courts in their decisions, 
explaining their legal reasoning as to why state legislative term limits are constitutional 
or unconstitutional. The Wyoming and Idaho cases do not address the wording of the 
term limit provisions. The Wyoming case basically reaffirmed the U.S. Supreme Court's 
Thornton decision that qualifications for legislative office are complete and explicit in the 
Wyoming State Constitution, while the Idaho Court's ruling hinged on the state 
constitutional framers' intent to grant the state government relatively broad powers to 
impose limitations on the qualifications to hold elected office. These two high courts 
addressed the same legal issue, but came to contrary conclusions. 
The state supreme courts of Oregon and Florida, however, do center on the issue 
of the exact wording of the constitutional amendments to enact term limitations. In the 
Oregon case term limits were ruled unconstitutional because the provision was worded in 
a vague and unclear manner with the effect being that the amendment created multiple 
constitutional changes. The Court ruled that packaging term limits for Oregon's 
congressional delegation in the same amendment which limited the terms of state 
officials in the legislative and executive branches left voters with the possibility of 
favoring term limits for one set of officials but not the other. Further, the Court made 
inferences that having term limits for many statewide executive offices in the same 
amendment that enacts term limits for state legislators also possibly violated the 
'separate-vote requirement' in Article XVII. The Oregon Court refrained from citing this 
in its conclusions. However, the tone of the ruling suggests that even if sections 19 and 
20 of Article II had been created by separate amendments--one for federal offices and 
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one for state offices-Measure 3 would still violate Article XVII, section 1 of Oregon's 
Constitution, because the Court strictly interpreted that passage to mean that the electors 
must vote for only one constitutional change in a proposed amendment. 
The crux of the case in Florida also revolved around the exact wording of the 
citizen initiative to enact term limits. This Court, however, was required by state law to 
give an Opinion on all proposed initiatives to amend the state constitution in order to 
avoid the type of situation that later developed in Oregon with the Lehman v. Bradbury 
(2002) case. The 1991 Opinion was favorable to the amendment. The Florida Supreme 
Court in its decision in Ray v. Mortham (1999) based its ruling on the 1991 Opinion and 
refused to revisit it; also the Florida Court approached this legal case from a different 
perspective as did the Oregon Court. As would also be crucial in its Opinion in Gore v. 
Harris (2000), the Florida Supreme Court articulated its responsibility to best decipher 
'the will of the Florida voters' in its ruling. Placing this notion as its highest priority gave 
the Florida Court a different outlook on term limits from that of the Oregon Court, as 
evidenced by the Florida Court specifically recognizing the high level of support given 
by the voters for the 'Limited Political Terms in Certain Offices Initiative' (76.8%). The 
Oregon Court never referenced the 69.5 % support that Oregonians gave to 'Measure 3' 
as being germane to the constitutionality of the term limit amendment. 
The Florida term limit amendment also differs from that in Oregon by its 
inclusion of a 'severability clause'. This clearly stated that if any portion of the 
amendment was later to be found to violate the United States Constitution, then the 
remaining segments of the provision would be enforced as fully and completely as 
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possible. Thus the clarity of the wording of the initiative was instrumental in the Florida 
Supreme Court's upholding the term limit amendment as constitutional, while conversely 
the Oregon Court ruled the initiative unconstitutional because the provision made 
multiple constitutional changes that were determined to confuse voters. Thus it was 
because of the initiative's lack of conciseness and clarity. Based on the two relevant 
cases-Oregon and Florida-JH3 is supported. 
JH4: The less clear the state's constitution is concerning adding qualifications for 
legislative office, the more likely that a state high court ruled the term limit law 
unconstitutional. 
Whereas the legal debate over the Oregon and Florida term limit initiatives 
pertained to the wording of the initiatives and the clarity of what the electors were voting 
for, the legal arguments used in the Wyoming and Idaho cases centered on the question of 
suffrage rights and equal protection provisions in their respective state constitutions, as 
well as those in the U.S. Constitution's First and Fourteenth Amendments in the Idaho 
case. Like the previous hypothesis, I test this from the words used by the high courts in 
their decisions, explaining their legal reasoning as to why state legislative term limits are 
constitutional or unconstitutional. 
As stated, the Cathcart v. Meyer (2004) case in Wyoming found agreement with 
the U.S. Supreme Court's Thornton decision that qualifications for legislative office are 
complete and explicit. The Wyoming Supreme Court cited the legal principles put forth 
in US. TL. v. Thornton (1995) as a guiding precedent in its decision to strike down the 
term limits statutory initiative as being in violation of the qualifications clauses in the 
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state constitution. Interestingly enough, the Wyoming Court also cited the Lehman case 
in Oregon as a precedent as well, even though the Oregon Court summarily rejected the 
legal reasoning in the Thornton decision as having any bearing on the decision in Lehman 
v. Bradbury (2002). The Wyoming Court concurred with the Oregon Court's ruling that 
the voters were unable to vote separately on independent issues, and cited it as partially 
relevant to the case in Wyoming. 
My rationale for constructing JH4 as I did are that judges are more likely to reject 
a constraining statute like term limits unless the state constitution is favorable to the 
people amending the qualifications for legislative office; and that if all other issues are 
equal, the state high court will follow the precedent and legal rationale put forth by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the Thornton case. In other words, if the state constitution is 
silent on adding qualifications for eligibility to hold state legislative office (as is the U.S. 
Constitution), then state high courts will follow legal precedent, namely the Thornton 
decision. 
The Wyoming decision supports this hypothesis, however in a somewhat 
convoluted fashion. The Court ruled that since the Wyoming State Constitution is silent 
as to whether the voters could add qualifications for potential and incumbent legislators, 
then the framers clearly meant that the voters could not do so by statutory initiative; and 
thus the term limit statute is unconstitutional. To rephrase, by lacking clarity about 
whether the voters can add qualifications, the state constitution clearly sides with the 
view that qualifications for legislative office are complete. Moreover, since the original 
Wyoming State Constitution did include consecutive term limits for the State Treasurer, 
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the Court saw this as further evidence that the intent of the framers was to prohibit 
additional qualifications by statute. The Wyoming Court's ruling also stated that the 
initiative process was used in this instance to make statutory law, not amend the state 
constitution. The Court explained that the interpretations of constitutional provisions 
have supremacy over statutory law, and this was the crux of their decision. 
When constitutions are silent on a contested provision, the courts have more 
freedom to interpret the point of contention as they so choose. Precedent serves as a 
constraint on this impulse, but precedents are often overturned in light of new facts or 
changing values and social standards. The circuit court in Idaho made a ruling regarding 
term limits similar to the Wyoming Supreme Court's later decision. The lower court held 
the position that the term limits statute violated the Idaho Constitution because the 
suffrage rights of officeholders were violated. The Wyoming Court's conclusion was 
identical in this regard. However, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the lower court 
decision; its ruling hinged on the state constitutional framers' intent to grant the state 
government relatively broad powers to impose limitations on the qualifications to hold 
elected office. 
The difference in the two rulings is due to constitutional variance. Article VI, 
section 4 of the Idaho Constitution begins with the words, "Legislature may prescribe 
additional qualifications", and citizen initiatives have the same legal standing as 
legislatively passed statutes. Conversely, the Wyoming Constitution at Article I, section 
3 states that the political rights of a qualified officeholder cannot be 'affected' "without 
distinction of race, color, sex, or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than 
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individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent 
jurisdiction." Without the constitution explicitly addressing the question as to whether 
additional qualifications may be imposed, the Wyoming Court interpreted this passage to 
mean that those hitherto qualified to serve in the legislature may not be 'disqualified' 
except for the reasons stated. 
Thus the social contract between the people and government of the State of Idaho 
expressly grants the electors and the elected representatives the power to require 
additional qualifications for legislative office; whereas the constitutional arrangement 
implemented between the citizens and the peoples' deputies of the State of Wyoming 
prohibits the disqualification for legislators, except under specifically prescribed 
conditions. So there is support for JH4 based on the two pertinent cases: the clarity of a 
state's constitution concerning qualifications for legislative office shows a directional 
causal relationship to that state high court's ruling on the constitutionality of state 
legislative term limits. The Wyoming Court stated that the constitution was silent on the 
question of adding qualifications, and those Justices invalidated the term limit statute. 
The Idaho Court maintained that the constitution spelled out quite specifically that 
additional qualifications can be imposed, so the term limit statute was upheld as lawful. 
In conclusion, though I based my hypotheses on solid theoretical principles I have 
mixed conclusions. The manner by which a state's high court is constituted, whether by 
appointment or election, has no bearing on high court decisions concerning term limit 
repeals. This may be due to the fact that in states that are supposed to directly elect their 
Justices, gubernatorial appointments to fill vacancies is the mechanism by which almost 
161 
all judges first come to sit on the high court. Thus there is no meaningful difference 
between appointed and elected Justices, due to the political practices in Oregon and 
Idaho. Likewise, ideology apparently has no role in this decision-making process either. 
Florida's Court was packed with Justices who were Democratic appointments, and 
Idaho's Court was predominantly Republican appointed. Yet both upheld term limits. 
Oregon's Court, mostly appointed by Democratic governors, invalidated term limits; and 
Wyoming's Court, with a slim majority of Justices appointed by a Republican governor, 
followed suit and even cited the Oregon case amongst its legal arguments. There is 
utility in disproving causal relationships as well as deriving conclusions that support my 
proposed hypotheses. Two hypotheses were supported by the data: JH3, 'the less clear 
the wording is in the term limits measure, the more likely that a state high court ruled it 
unconstitutional'; and JH4, 'the less clear the state's constitution is concerning adding 
qualifications for legislative office, the more likely that a state high court ruled the term 
limit law unconstitutional' . In the next chapter one of the many questions to answer is 
whether the differences between judicial and legislative decision-making culminates in 
different causal relationships. 
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CHAPTER6 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY: STATE LEGISLATURES 
At this stage of the research project I analyze four attempts by state legislatures to 
repeal term limits, and it includes five sections. Sections one through four detail four 
legislative actions: Idaho HB425 (2002), Utah SB240 (2003), Wyoming HB 157 (2003), 
and Oregon SJR24 (2001 ). All four of these bills were intended to repeal term limits for 
state legislators. The analysis will also examine Oregon's HB2674 (2001), which upon 
passage gave lawmakers affected by term limits the right of appeal to the state court 
system. I examine the idiosyncratic factors impacting the four repeal cases by focusing 
on interest group activity, the words and deeds of the state Republican and Democrat 
parties (where applicable), and other political factors particular to each state legislature 
and political system in question. 
I also include an adaptation of Daniel Elazar's (1966) typology of political culture 
devised by Morgan and Watson (1991), which further refined Charles Johnson's (1986) 
operationalization of Elazar's concepts. Political culture has been shown to be related to 
attitudes towards corruption in government (Welch and Peters 1980) and to political 
reform efforts (Ritt 1974). Elazar's typology classifies the political culture in the 
American states into three categories: ' individualistic', 'moralistic', and 'traditionalistic'. 
The individualistic culture portrays the political system as a marketplace, in which 
individuals and groups advance their self-interests through political action. James 
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Madison meets Adam Smith, so to speak. The moralistic culture views government in a 
more positive manner: government is a vital force in the search for the good life and 
meeting the common good. The traditionalistic culture allows for an active role for 
government, but mainly as guardians of the old social order; political affairs thus remain 
in the hands of established political elites who claim the rights to govern through family 
ties or social position (Morgan and Watson 1991; Elazar 1966). While I hope to identify 
variables that may be generalized as causal factors across states, I realize that the 
explanations may lie in factors that are unique to an individual state, and not applicable to 
other cases. 
In the concluding section I test the six legislative hypotheses and 'other factors' 
explicated in the first chapter for each case, focusing on the explanatory variables 
previously developed and noted in the 'theory' and 'methods' sections. These 
hypotheses include the initiative process, whether the measure is an amendment or a 
statute, legislative pay and compensation, size of legislative staff, the turnover rate before 
the introduction of term limits, the partisan composition of the various state legislatures, 
and the level of voter support for the term limits initiative. I end the chapter by 
answering the question as to whether there are any patterns of explanation regarding the 
four legislative cases that may be applicable as a generalized hypothesis or hypotheses in 
order to predict future term limit repeal actions in state legislatures. 
In order to test my hypotheses, I incorporate multiple empirical measures to aid in 
the analysis. These include: a gauge for term limit stringency explained in chapter five 
(Lopez and Jewell 2004), a state policy liberalism index (Gray and Hanson 2002), and 
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various measures of turnover in state legislatures (Moncrief et al 2004, 2003). Most data 
used in this chapter comes primarily from the National Council of State Legislatures 
(NCSL) Web site supervised by Jennifer Drage Bowser, and the Book of the States 
published by the Council of State Governments. 
A. Idaho: Repealed in February of 2002 
'Proposition 2'-"The Idaho Term Limits Act of 1994"-was approved by 59% 
of Idaho voters in November of 1994. This legislative statute added three new sections to 
the Idaho Code: LC. §§  34-907, 50-478, and 33-443. The specific mechanism of 
instituting term limitations was a ballot access restriction that would impact both 
legislative chambers in 2004. Legislators were ineligible to have his or her name placed 
upon the primary or general election ballot for the state office which they had previously 
held during eight or more of the previous fifteen years. This limitation of ballot access 
allowed for term-limited legislators to be write-in candidates, but did not allow for them 
to be ballot eligible in the other legislative chamber. So a state representative who had 
served eight or more of the previous fifteen years could not run for the state senate or for 
re-election, except as a write-in candidate. According to the model of Lopez and Jewell 
(2004) detailed in chapter five, Idaho was categorized as having term limits with a 
moderate degree of stringency. Bowser for the NCSL contrarily stated that if taken 
effect, they "were among the most restrictive in the nation" (2002). 
The sentiments of Idaho voters concerning term limits were clearly discernible 
and un-mistakenly identifiable. They had affirmed term limits via referendum in 1994, 
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1996, 1998, and 2000 (Greenberg 2005; Basham 2003). This attitude was not shared by 
many Idahoan lawmakers, however. In addition to the unsuccessful 2001 court challenge 
to the statute, there were numerous attempts by the legislature to repeal term limits. The 
most recent efforts were HBl 14 in 1999, HB633 in 2000, and HB425 in 2002 
(www.ncsl.org). In brief, on January 14, 2002 House Bill 425 was introduced in the 
'State Affairs' Committee by State House Speaker Bruce Newcomb and Representative 
Frank Brunel, both Republicans. Speaker Newcomb was also the floor sponsor. After its 
third reading on 1/24 before the floor of the house, it passed by a 50-20-0 vote. The 
floor sponsor for the bill in the state senate was President Pro Tern Robert Geddes, 
Republican. The bill passed the senate by a 27-8 vote. The next day, January 31, the bill 
was vetoed by Governor Kempthorne (R) citing "the people's will" and his desire "that 
the people of ldaho continue to have a voice in the matter" (Idaho State 'House Journal' 
2002). On February 1, the house voted 50-20 and the senate 26-8-1 to override the 
governor's veto; it became session law effective on that date. 
In a more detailed examination of the idiosyncratic factors impacting the repeal of 
term limits for state and county officials-including state legislators-I focus on activity 
by interest groups, political parties, and explore any potential causal factors unique to 
Idaho's political system. Idaho is an atypical state with an "unusual political matrix" that 
has been characterized as "rugged individualism": it is a relatively new state (43rd state 
admitted in 1890) with rugged terrain and a fairly small population that is divided into 
many sparsely populated counties and the metropolitan area of Boise (Hoffman and 
Bowser 2002). Pertaining to the political culture, Morgan and Watson ( 1991) compared 
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political culture in the American states as of 1980 to Johnson's indices for 1906-1936. In 
the mid 1930's there were seventeen states with a moralistic political culture. In 1980 
there were two-Idaho and Utah-states that also happen to be the only ones to have 
overturned term limits by legislative statute. The other fifteen states had migrated over 
time to an individualistic culture, which is the American norm (Morgan and Watson 
1991). 
An article in the June 1997 'State Legislatures' journal interviewed state 
legislators concerning their views on term limits (Hansen 1997). Joyce McRoberts, 
former state senate majority leader and then current regional director for the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare, voiced a foreboding sentiment regarding term limits. 
"In Idaho where every year we pass significant water laws that are critical to keeping our 
own water in our own state, we are losing two legislators who are national experts in 
water law because of term limits. We will never have their institutional knowledge 
again" (Hansen 1997). Though she was speaking of when the limitations would take 
effect in 2004 and assumed that those two lawmakers would be continually re-elected 
until that time, this interview displayed the fear among public officials that term limits 
would rob the Idaho legislature of experienced and highly valuable policy experts. It also 
showed that elected legislators do look at the long-term institutional effects of public 
policy; though it is difficult to determine whether in this case it was due to self-interest 
and peer-interest Gob security), or the best interests of the state of ldaho. In defense of 
the latter, this attitude fits with a moralistic political culture. State government has a 
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mission and a purpose, so experience-hence incumbent policy experts-are needed to 
achieve these goals. 
At the time of the repeal, neither Federal nor Idaho State Law required 
disclosure by interest groups who actively campaigned for or against ballot initiatives to 
disclose their lists of contributors. Therefore it is unclear exactly how many interest 
groups were supporting the term limit "front" groups that sponsored ads pertaining to the 
repeal. This charge particularly concerned two of the main groups who favored retaining 
term limits: 'Citizens for Term Limits' and U.S.T.L. . U.S.T.L. provided the majority of 
funding to the Idaho-based Citizens for Term Limits, but it could not be verified where 
U.S.T.L. received its money (Idaho Falls Post Register, 10/11/2002). From what can be 
ascertained, three groups led the fight to retain term limits: the national group U.S.T.L., 
the Wisconsin-based 'Americans for Term Limits', and the in-state Citizens for Term 
Limits (Hoffman 2002). 
The list of groups and organizations that supported the repeal were more 
numerous and formidable, and this is speculated and hypothesized to be one of multiple 
causal factors as to why the repeal was successfully veto-proof in the legislature. The 
principal "front" group was 'Idahoans for Voter Rights', reportedly financed by three 
local government associations: 'Idaho Association of Counties', 'The Association of 
Idaho Cities', and 'Idaho School Boards Associations' (Basham 2003; Idaho Falls Post 
Register, 10/1 1/2002). In addition to the associational organizations from local 
governments, the largest business and agricultural lobbies favored the repeal of term 
limits. These were the 'Idaho Association of Commerce', the 'Idaho Farm Bureau 
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Federation', and the 'Idaho Association of Commerce and Industry' (Greenberg 2005; 
Basham 2003). Finally, there was a group called 'Idahoans Against Term Limits'. 
The Idaho state government website-specifically the Office of the Secretary of 
State website-posted 'arguments for' and 'arguments against' the term limit referendum 
prior to the 2000 elections (www.idsos.state.id.us). In sum the referendum asked: 
"should we vote 'yes' to keep term limits, or 'no' to reject term limits?" Citizens for 
Term Limits argued for retaining term limits for state and local officials, while the group 
Idahoans Against Term Limits argued for a 'no' vote on term limits. Both groups laid 
out five main arguments. The group wanting citizens to vote 'yes' for term limits 
claimed that term limits decrease the influence of special interest lobbyists, they increase 
citizen participation in government, they return power to the people, they do not infringe 
on voter choice because lawmakers can run write-in campaigns, and lastly term limits 
would not take effect in Idaho until 2004, so they should at least be given a chance in 
order to ascertain their effects. To sum up their viewpoint, Citizens for Term Limits 
argued that multi-term or experienced lawmakers control and dominate the legislative 
process, doing the bidding of powerful special interests at the expense of the public 
interest. They also contended that term limits increase voter choice in terms of candidate 
pools, and ultimately ensure greater fiscal responsibility. 
Idahoans Against Term Limits argued that term limits sound good to some, but in 
fact hurt Idaho. First, term limits lead to a loss of voter control over who represents 
them. Second, there is a loss of skills and experience, and this lack of experience by 
elected officials will lead to more influence and power for unelected political actors such 
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as bureaucrats and lobbyists. Third is the much used cliche: 'we already have term 
limits, we call it the ballot box'. Fourth is the claim that term limits were ratified by 
Idahoans in 1994 in order to term-limit members of Congress; and since that portion of 
the ballot initiative had been nullified by the U.S. Supreme Court, the remainder is far 
less popular with voters. Finally, they contended that term limits hit local governments 
the hardest, based on the assertion that in Idaho it has been difficult to recruit qualified 
candidates for local elected office. In sum, the group arguing for a 'no' vote cited many 
"losses" with term limits and correspondingly little to no actual benefits. They also cited 
statistics that show a high degree of turnover already existing at the local level of 
government, though they failed to mention that 'retirement' constituted an overwhelming 
majority of this legislative turnover. 
Another notable aspect to the repeal in Idaho, in addition to the role of various 
interest groups and associational organizations, was the part played by political parties. 
In particular this means the Republican Party, as they have controlled all three branches 
of government in Idaho since the early 1990s. At the time of the repeal, Republicans 
controlled 89 percent of the legislative seats, which was the largest GOP majority in the 
country (Basham 2003). From 1988 through at least 1996, term limits were almost 
exclusively a Republican issue at the national level. The Idaho Republican Party als� 
supported term limits initially, despite the predominance of elected offices that they 
controlled. The state party's support was based on the contention that term limits were 
the best way to end the careers of liberal Democrats in Congress; and claiming credit for 
a popular measure such as term limits would insure their continued dominance in state 
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government (Basham 2003; Smith 2003; Idaho Mountain Express and the Associated 
Press, Feb. 5-12, 2002). The Idaho Republican Party split over term limits in 1993 while 
trying to pass a law to limit tenure, and by 2000 party officials began calling for a repeal 
of the term limit law that had been passed by a Citizen Initiative in 1994. Their position 
was that local offices should not have been included in the term limits measure (Basham 
2003; Smith 2003; Hoffman and Bowser 2002; Idaho Mountain Express and the 
Associated Press, Feb. 5-12, 2002). 
In 1993, while various term limit proposals were being debated in the Idaho 
legislature, Governor Kempthorne was then a freshman U.S. Senator who pledged his 
support for term limits. He publicly complained that his vote was continually canceled 
by long-time incumbent Ted Kennedy (Idaho Mountain Express and the Associated 
Press, Feb. 5-12, 2002). Shortly after Idaho followed the path taken by 12 other states 
and passed term limits, support among Republicans began to wane. Then Governor Blatt 
(R), who was originally a term limit supporter, said shortly after the measure's passage 
into law that it was "probably a mistake" (Idaho Mountain Express and the Associated 
Press, Feb. 5-12, 2002). This attitude was reflected in the actions of the Republican 
leadership in the state legislature beginning in the late 1990s, who worked "behind closed 
doors" to "convince many of its members of the merits of overturning the ban" and 
"expected . . .  Republican legislators . . .  to toe the party line and support the revocation of 
term limits" (Smith 2003). Republican leaders in the Idaho State House and Senate first 
tried to invalidate the term limit provision by mounting a legal challenge to the initiative, 
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however the primarily Republican-appointed Idaho Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the initiative (Franklin 2002). 
The repeal effort then quickly moved to the legislature, beginning in the house. 
The repeal bill HB425 passed in both chambers by a veto-proof majority, pushed along 
by Republican House Speaker Newcomb and President Pro Tern Geddes (R) in the Idaho 
Senate. Governor Kempthorne vetoed the measure on January 3 1 ,  2002. Kempthorne 
wrote in his veto message: "In a republic, the people cannot be disenfranchised from 
establishing rules when they deem it necessary. That principle is reinforced in the Idaho 
State Constitution, which declares that 'all political power is inherent in the people"' 
(Hoffman and Bowser 2002). The veto was overridden by almost the exact same margin 
as it had passed initially, minus one aye vote in the senate that became an abstention. 
Initially, the governor was hailed for his action; and even earned a brief New York Times 
article entitled: "Idaho: Governor Supports Term Limits" (Hoffman and Bowser 2002; 
NYT 1/17/2002). However, Kempthorne expended no political capital to try to prevent 
the repeal, took none of a wide range of options available to him to delay and affect the 
override vote, and had publicly questioned whether term limits were even a good idea 
while simultaneously upholding 'the will of the people' with his veto (Associated Press 
2/1 /02; Franklin 2002; Hoffman and Bowser 2002). According to Hoffman (2002), "it 
took lawmakers less than three hours Friday to eliminate term limits", thus immediately 
freeing hundreds of public officials to begin their re-election campaigns in the spring. 
The division within the GOP over the term limit repeal has been characterized as 
a difference in ideology between "the far Right" in the Republican Party who supported 
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term limits, and those deemed more moderate who opposed term limits and pressed for 
the repeal (Franklin 2002). No attempt was made to show solidarity within the 
Republican ranks at the annual state party convention in June 2002. At this meeting a 
neutral position was rejected in favor of supporting the repeal, and thus supporting the 
majority of Republican legislators who had voted to remove term limitations (Basham 
2003). Democrat Party leaders saw the GOP's move to overturn a widely popular 
measure as a golden opportunity to make political 'hay': Democrat "party officials 
quickly announced they planned to use the veto override as a campaign issue against 
Republican incumbents in the 2002 election" (Smith 2003). The vote on HB425 fell 
primarily along partisan lines. Among Republicans, the vote for the repeal was 48-13 in 
the house and 26-5-1 in the senate; whereas for the Democrats it was 7-2 against HB425 
in the house, and 3-0 against the repeal in the senate (Hoffman 2002). 
I hypothesize nine factors that have contributed to the successful repeal of term 
limits in Idaho. They are: the claim of voter misinformation; maintaining legislative 
power relative to the executive branch; the powerful array of interest groups that 
supported the repeal; a legislative power grab; partisanship; safe legislative districts 
versus competitive districts; geographic heterogeneity; the differences between 
( sub )urban districts and rural districts; and the potential effects of term limits on local 
governments, particularly in the rural counties. 
First, one of the Republican talking-point rationales for the repeal was that outside 
groups like U.S.T.L. came uninvited into their state and misinformed the voters of ldaho 
with a "slick media campaign" about the merits of term limits (Bowser 2002; Franklin 
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2002; Idaho Mountain Express and the Associated Press, Feb. 5- 12, 2002; Russell 2002). 
House Speaker Bruce Newcomb was quoted as saying: "If I truly thought that this was a 
grass roots movement that came from the people of Idaho, I wouldn't be here. But I don't 
believe it is. I think it was something that was brought to us by outside interests" 
(Franklin 2002). One of the few Democrats who supported the repeal, Rep. Charles 
Cuddy, said: "How can someone who's from the Potomac know what's best for the city 
council in Orofino, Idaho?" (Hoffman 2002: Idaho Mountain Express and the Associated 
Press, Feb. 5- 12, 2002; Russell 2002). The term limits movement is "poison and filth 
from back East", according to Republican Senate Majority Leader James Risch, who 
claimed that a term limits supporter attempted to bribe him (Hoffman and Bowser 2002; 
Franklin 2002). 
Second, most scholars who study state legislative term limits agree that term 
limits result in weakened legislatures and legislators, relative to other political actors such 
as bureaucrats, lobbyists, and the governor. Boise State political scientist Gary Moncrief 
was quoted as saying: "There are those who wish to weaken the influence of the 
Legislature and will take heart in these results. I am not among them" (Russell 2002). 
Speaker Newcomb also asserted that legislative power and the integrity of the institution 
were undermined by term limits. "Are we a body of equal standing with the executive 
branch or are we a lesser body? Really, what it comes down to is the sanctity of the 
legislative branch of government" (Hoffman 2002; Hoffman and Bowser 2002). The 
third factor refers to the powerful groups that supported the ban. An alliance was built 
between associational organizations from local governments such as the Idaho 
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Association of Counties, the Association of Idaho Cities, and Idaho School Boards 
Associations along with the largest business and agricultural lobbies in the state such as 
the Idaho Association of Commerce, the Idaho Farm Bureau Federation, and the Idaho 
Association of Commerce and Industry. So basically, the political and business elite in 
Idaho pushed for concerted action in the form of the term limit repeal, and were opposed 
by a few citizen-advocacy groups who relied on much of their funding from out of state. 
The next five factors were included in Daniel Smith's case study analysis of the 
Idaho repeal from the April 2003 volume of PS: Political Science and Politics. The 
fourth determinant variable concerns a "legislative power grab" based on self-interest, 
according to Smith (2003 ). Legislators with more seniority supported the veto override 
more so than junior members, as they would be subject to term limitations sooner. Fifth 
is partisanship. As I have explained, Republican leaders and the Republican legislative 
majority wrote, supported, and passed HB425 . The sixth factor is based on how safe or 
competitive the district is for the incumbent lawmaker. "There was considerable talk in 
Boise leading up to the override that legislators from safe districts would be more likely 
to support House Bill 425 than legislators from competitive districts," according to 
Daniel Smith (2003 ). Seventh, state policy preferences are geographically 
heterogeneous, meaning that in some districts the citizens supported a repeal of term 
limits. Their representatives would thus be more likely to support the repeal (Smith 
2003). According to Rep. Mary Lou Sheperd, D-Prichard, "I listen to my constituents"; 
Sheperd's constituents reportedly responded to her office favoring the repeal by a 104-28 
margin. 
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I believe the final two factors to be the most important to the success of the 
repeal. The eighth determinant variable is the difference between the urban and suburban 
districts that favored term limits and correspondingly were more likely to oppose the 
repeal, and the rural districts that supported the repeal and had a less favorable view of 
term limits. Freshman Republican legislator Eulalie Langford stated: "This is not a vote 
about term limits. It's a vote about rural Idaho" (Smith 2003). In rural Idaho, voters were 
more likely to know their representative in a more direct manner due to the social bonds 
that differ there from those in the urban and suburban areas. Rural voters were thus more 
likely to identify their lawmakers as one of 'us' rather than one of 'them'. This sentiment 
directly undercuts the rationale for having term limits, which states that politicians are a 
distinct, separate group of people who are out of touch with ordinary people and whose 
interests do not coincide with the public interest. 
The final factor is closely related to the rural-urban dichotomy. In my perusal of 
newspapers, magazines, and interview pieces, the most commonly held theme favoring 
the repeal came from one of the Republican talking points defending their votes: local 
officials were never supposed to be included in the initiative. It was widely perceived 
that term limits would particularly deprive rural communities of experienced lawmakers 
at the local level of government, because it is a "struggle to fill offices" (Basham 2003; 
Smith 2003; Idaho Mountain Express and the Associated Press, Feb. 5-12, 2002; 
Hoffman 2002). Representative Doug Jones R-Filer best articulated this sentiment. 
"This is not about us. The urgency is about those people at other levels of government 
who do not have the privilege of more time. We will lose numbers of school board people 
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who will not be able to run again at the next election" (Hoffman 2002). Says Cathy 
Zaccardi, Blaine County school board clerk: "It's tough to try to find somebody to run" 
for the nonpaying trustee position (Idaho Mountain Express and the Associated Press, 
Feb. 5-12, 2002). Conversely, some in the legislature saw this as a diversionary tactic by 
political leaders in the state capitol, appearing altruistic while in actuality pursuing their 
own self interest. Boise Representative David Callister (R) said: "We've hidden behind 
the skirts of local officials for 10 years" (Hoffman 2002). 
In concluding this section, I believe that Idaho's political culture lent support to 
the repeal movement at the expense of the pro-term limit forces. Labeling term limits in 
Idaho as something foreign, instigated by outsiders, has been an effective strategy in 
American politics to thwart institutional reforms. Local political, business, and even 
(white) religious leaders held and asserted the view that the civil rights movement was 
brought to Birmingham, Alabama by outsiders; and that African-Americans in Alabama 
were content with the status quo and segregation. Idaho's moralistic political culture 
allows for an activist government overriding popular sentiment 'for the public good', 
regardless of its corresponding conservatism and the self-held belief in Idahoans 'rugged 
individualism'. A GOP talking point was successful as well. Many people throughout 
Idaho were genuinely concerned about the quality of local governments after term limits 
would take effect. Term limit supporters claim that this sentiment was exploited in the 
media campaign waged by those backing the repeal bill (Basham 2003 ). For example, 
Grant Loebs, Twin Falls County prosecutor, spoke to the House State Affairs Committee 
in favor of House Bill 425, predicting that term limits would cripple criminal 
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prosecutions. "The inexperienced rookie prosecutors forced on us by term limits will be 
hopelessly outgunned in the courtroom. Criminals will go free; crimes will go 
unpunished" (Russell 2002). A statewide voter referendum in November 2002 supported 
the repeal with less than 51 % of the vote, and it was claimed that the pro-repeal alliance 
sent out pamphlets with statements like this: "if someone kidnapped your daughter, 
would you want the most experienced sheriff at the crime scene-or someone just out of 
the academy with no experience?" (Basham 2003). By scaring the voters about possible 
horrendous repercussions from term limits, the repeal supporters convinced a razor thin 
majority of Idahoan voters to play it safe with the 'devil that you know' (career 
politicians), rather than the threat of governmental breakdown at the county and town 
level. 
B. U tab : Repealed in March of 2003 
Utah's 'term limit timeline' began when the state legislature passed the Utah 
Term Limitation Act of 1994 (House Bill 305) in March of 1994 and Governor Leavitt 
signed the bill; term limits took effect on May 2 (Salt Lake Tribune, 9/2/94, A30). This 
1994 legislative act affected the following sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Chapter 264: 20A-10-101, 20A-10-102, 20A-10-201, and 20A-10-301. According to the 
statute, a state senator may not seek reelection or be elected to an office if, by the end of 
the state senator's current term, the state senator will have served, or but for resignation 
would have served, 12 or more consecutive years. The identical 12 year consecutive 
limit applies to state representatives as well. Calculating the term limits established by 
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this statute began on January 1, 1995, so the year of impact would have been 2007. Thus 
Utah legislators could serve for 12 years in either chamber (six 2-year house terms and 
three 4-year senate terms), and after a one term break in service be elected to the same 
legislative seat. Due to the relatively long tenure allowed by this provision and the one 
term break, Utah's term limits law resides in the 'weak' category according to the 
"Stringency of Term Limit" model (Lopez and Jewell 2004). 
There were numerous attempts by the legislature to repeal term limits, the most 
recent efforts being HB144 in 1997, HB105 in 1999, HB43 in 2001, and SB240 in 2002 
(www.ncsl.org; Salt Lake Tribune 2/9/97, AAl ). State Senator Curtis Bramble (R), 
Chairman of the Revenue and Taxation Committee, presented SB240 to said senate 
committee on February 18, 2003. According to the committee's minutes, Sandy Peck of 
the League of Women Voters spoke in favor of the bill. A motion proceeded to pass 
SB240 out of committee with a favorable recommendation. This motion passed 5-1-2, 
and it subsequently passed the senate by a 17-12 vote. On 2/26, the House Judiciary 
Standing Committee passed the bill out favorably by an 11-1-1 vote, followed by the 
house floor voting for the term limit repeal 40-34 (The Daily Herald 3/6/03). 
Republican Governor Michael Leavitt signed the bill into law on March 17, 2003. 
In a more detailed examination of the idiosyncratic factors impacting the repeal of 
term limits for state officials in Utah, I focus on activity by interest groups, political 
parties, and explore any potential causal factors unique to Utah's political system. I 
found that in the case of Utah, the role of the major newspapers was an important factor 
in the repeal' s success. On the other hand, advocacy groups took a more secondary role 
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in the public debate in Utah, compared to Idaho. Like Idaho, Utah has a moralistic 
political culture, based on the model by Morgan and Watson ( 1991) that utilizes Daniel 
Elazar' s conceptual framework. They are the only two states in the country that had this 
type of political culture as of 1980; and to repeat, a moralistic culture views government 
in a more positive manner, so government is a vital and important force whose mission is 
meeting the common good. Utah and Idaho are also the only two states to have 
successfully repealed term limits by legislative statute, and I find these similarities more 
than coincidental. 
What this seemingly means regarding the role of state government in these two 
states is that lawmakers have assumed a certain pre-defined role. Their positions of 
leadership allow them, and their duties require them, to be trustee legislators and do what 
they consider to be the common good. Among policies that promote the general welfare, 
term limits were adopted (1994) and then later rejected (2003) by the Utah legislature. A 
basic assessment of the term limit experiment in Utah is that lawmakers' view of the 
common good noticeably changed as the time approached for term limits to 'kick in' and 
kick them out of office. Interestingly, the main rationale they used to defend their actions 
was that the repeal was done for the good of the people. I find this to be taking the moral 
high ground and defending an unpopular view with a righteous fervor. "Should we go 
against the voice of the people?" sponsor of the repeal Sen. Bramble was quoted as 
saying. "Well, the voice of the people is what's being protected here - the voice of the 
people at the ballot box" (Salt Lake Tribune, 2/26/03, A8). The repeal bill's house 
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sponsor, Rep. Neal Hansen, D-Ogden, voiced a similar sentiment: "By having term 
limits, we are limiting the voice of the people" (The Daily Herald 3/6/03). 
Utah is similar to Idaho in that it more recently achieved statehood ( 45th state 
admitted in 1896), lightly populated, and has a population that consists of numerous 
sparsely populated rural counties and a metropolitan area (Salt Lake City and the closely 
surrounding counties). Roughly half of Utah's population is in this metropolitan area, 
and the state urban and suburban populations are increasing at the expense of the rural 
areas. Some lawmakers fear that Utah is becoming two separate communities, one 
urban/suburban and the other rural. From the 'Minutes of the Redistricting Committee' 
on May 30, 2001, Congressman Chris Cannon, Third District, suggested that the 
committee have urban/rural mixed districts. He indicated that Salt Lake County is too 
large to leave as just one district and suggested that mixing these communities would be a 
benefit to the state so that representatives could have a broad outlook and interest for 
those that they may represent. He stated that Utah has grown dramatically and has not 
been able to maintain coherence with the state's identity. He indicated that creating 
urban/rural mixed districts would be a small step toward a more coherent view of Utah if 
all congressional representatives are representing mixed areas. So like Idaho, Utah has a 
significant urban-rural divide in terms of lifestyle and identity. 
Utah differs from Idaho concerning the role of interest groups in the term limit 
repeal process. The repeal effort in Utah did not publicly focus on a few umbrella groups 
that favored repealing term limits versus a few pro-term limit groups that opposed the 
measure, as it did in Idaho. U.S. Term Limits played a noticeable role, and there were 
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two other in-state advocacy groups that supported term limits. These were 'Utah Term 
Limits' and 'Utahans For Legislative Reform'. Those opposing term limits, and thus 
favoring the repeal bill SB240, did not form a 'front' group to counter interest group with 
interest group. The Utah League of Women Voters supported the repeal, but the 
organization was not publicly perceived as a 'narrow special interest'. This allowed 
those who supported SB240 to portray term limits supporters as belonging to the special 
interests, invariably a harmful label in American politics. Regarding a much earlier 
repeal bill in 1997, Rep. John Arrington, D-Ogden, announced on the house floor during 
the bill's debate: "Those of you who listen to special-interest groups vote 'no' [against 
the repeal]. If you think for yourself, vote 'yes"' (Salt Lake Tribune, 2/21/97, A l ). 
An important factor in the Utah case regarding the repeal was the role of the 
major newspapers. The editorial staff of the Daily Herald in Provo, and the two major 
newspapers in Salt Lake City (Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News), were uniformly 
supportive of repealing term limits. Provo is the second largest city in Utah, after Salt 
Lake City. According to newspaper brokers, 'Dirks, Van Essen & Murray' who 
specializes in newspaper mergers and acquisitions, the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret 
News formed the nation's first joint operating agreement (JOA) with two Sunday 
newspapers in 1952. JOA's allow publishers of competing papers to merge their business 
operations if one paper is failing. Arguably JOA's produce the single-paper monopolies 
they were intended to prevent. According to the jointly-owned newspapers' 2006 figures, 
the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News combine for 62% of all daily and Sunday 
circulation in the state of Utah. 
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I find this to be an important factor, that the media leaders in Utah advocated a 
repeal of term limits. I located an editorial from the Salt Lake Tribune's Sunday, 
February 9, 1997 newspaper (page AAl )  that said of the term limits law: "it can now be 
repealed". The editors' arguments were as follows: the voters' right to freely vote is 
infringed, experienced lawmakers are vitally necessary, turnover is already high, and also 
that term limits do not fit the changing nature of American federalism. Many would 
question this last rationale. According to the editor, "In this era of devolution of power 
from federal to the state level, the state legislative and executive branches will face 
greater responsibilities. That puts a premium on experienced officials who offer the savvy 
and institutional memory that freshmen can't" (Salt Lake Tribune, 2/9/97, AA 1 ). 
Again in 1999, the Tribune's editor supported HB 105, a repeal measure. In this 
instance, the newspaper editor focused on the charge that "legislators were forced into 
passing the term-limits law by untenable circumstance-namely, the danger that a ballot 
initiative, scheduled to go before voters in the fall of 1994, threatened to plunge Utah's 
election system into a messy morass" (Salt Lake Tribune 2/16/99, A8). Later in this 
chapter, when testing LHl, I explain in some detail why Utah's 'Initiative A' failed in 
1994. For now, it suffices to say that Initiative A was a much more stringent term limit 
proposal, but the complex citizen initiative also had a fatal loophole that excluded 98% of 
incumbent state legislators from term limits, and also included a costly runoff election 
provision similar to how Louisiana conducts its elections. 
Another Salt Lake Tribune editorial came out in January of 2000, and the editor 
urged lawmakers to repeal the term limit statute "if they don't like the idea of being 
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turned out of office" (Salt Lake Tribune, 1/9/2000, AAl ). The reasoning in this piece 
was that the term limit debate is more about restrictions on voters, more so than 
restrictions on the politicians. "It is a greater democratic infringement that the law limits 
the voters' right to select than it pinches legislators' right to serve (Salt Lake Tribune, 
1/9/2000, AAl). I located editorials in February and March of 2003 in the Deseret News 
and the Daily Herald that supported the repeal of term limits. The editor of the Deseret 
News echoed the views of their sister-newspaper the Tribune. Term limits "rob the state 
of its most experienced minds", will introduce "nutty ideas from freshmen lawmakers", 
and "empower the state's full-time bureaucrats" (Deseret News 2/9/03). The next day's 
newspaper included an editorial piece entitled: "Repeal the Term Limits Law", in which 
the editor called on legislators with "political daring" to repeal term limitations, even if 
they would be committing "political suicide" (Deseret News 2/10/03). The piece also 
makes the argument that it is other voters-"outsiders"-who want to "restrict how we 
vote", and this is a "bad rationale for public policy" (Deseret News 2/10/03). 
Finally, Provo's Daily Herald defended the legislative repeal as a "sensible bill", 
criticizing term limits for arbitrarily forcing good people out of government, eroding 
institutional memory, empowering "smooth-talking" lobbyists, and arguing that term 
limits "suggest the voters are not smart enough to know who they want to represent 
them" (The Daily Herald 3/20/2003). In addition, I found one argument by the editor 
puzzling: there are already "far too many races with no opposition to an incumbent. So 
even if the voters ' throw the bums out' they are faced with no alternative" (Deseret News 
2/10/03). So based on the wide range of reasons and arguments that the newspapers 
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presented to the voters year after year and session after legislative session to repeal the 
limitations, along with the power that the print media has in state and local elections, the 
news media played an important role in the success of the term limit repeal. 
Turning to the role of the Republican and Democrat political parties, Utah 
resembles Idaho in its partisan composition. When Utah repealed term limits in March of 
2003, the partisan breakdown was a 56-19 Republican majority in the house, and a 22-7 
majority in the senate. Legislators overwhelmingly voted to repeal the term limits law in 
a bi-partisan fashion (Deseret News 4/14/06). The top Republican in the senate and then 
top Democrat in the house introduced and pushed for passage of the repeal statute. 
Hence the state Democrat Party did not and possibly could not use term limits as an issue 
against the Republican majority. Based on my content analysis of documents and 
articles, I believe that - this points to 'who benefits' from repealing term limits. In the 
immediate sense, the answer is long-serving incumbents in leadership positions. It 
appears that Democrat leaders wanted to retain their jobs just as much as the Republican 
leadership did, as 5 out of 7 Democrats voted for SB240 in the Senate. "Democratic 
patriarch" Mike Dmitrich was singled out by name as a powerful politician facing 
statutory ouster in a few years, along with Republicans Hillyard and Blackham (Salt Lake 
Tribune 2/26/03). 
To summarize to this point, I have described eight factors that explain the votes 
by Utah legislators to repeal the popular term limits measure: 
1. Term limits are un-democratic 
2. Special interests benefit from term l�mits 
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3 .  The uniform support for the repeal by the major newspapers 
4. The statute pre-empted a complex, poorly-worded Citizen Initiative; so it 
wasn't passed on its own merits 
5. Legislative turnover is high without term limits 
6. Term limits rob the legislature of necessary experience 
7. Term limits empower the full-time bureaucrats, and 
8. Legislative leaders in both political parties led the repeal effort 
In addition to state legislative leaders, there is another political leader in Utah politics 
who arguably had a stake in the repeal, Republican Governor Michael Leavitt. SB240 
also repealed gubernatorial term limits, and the governor did not veto the bill. The 
governor's spokeswoman said during the legislative session that Leavitt had "no strong 
feelings" about the legislature limiting its own terms (Deseret News 2/25/03). I saw no 
comments from the governor's  office about the legislature limiting gubernatorial terms. 
Finally, I found speculation in a 1997 Salt Lake Tribune pro-repeal editorial that Orrin 
Hatch had something to do with the passing of the 1994 term limits statute in Utah. 
Some have charged the Republicans with crafting a term limits law primarily to defuse 
term limits as an issue in U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch's re-election campaign (Salt Lake 
Tribune 2/9/97). Interestingly, in the same editorial the author points to Hatch's 
continual re-election as a reason that Utahans do not want or need term limits. 
One final factor pertaining to partisanship: even supporters of the repeal in the 
media observed that during the 2003 legislative session the "current batch of lawmakers 
seem to be operating with a unique cockiness" that may be "a natural consequence of 
186 
one-party domination" (Salt Lake Tribune 2/9/03). The editorial concluded about this 
"newfound arrogance: Republican lawmakers do indeed seem to be feeling their oats" 
(Salt Lake Tribune 2/9/03). I found two articles in the Deseret News (4/14/06, 12/22/06) 
that surmise that the term limit repeal was a move to keep the Republican Party's "iron­
clad two-thirds majorities in both houses"; and also that the repeal was passed to avoid 
"an impact on GOP House leadership, forcing out two of its most powerful people." 
The 'arrogant' attitude or mindset among legislative leaders, primarily the 
Republicans in power, came at a time when term limits would soon take effect, thus 
facilitating two additional variables in how the repeal succeeded. If one views the repeal 
as one ongoing process that began in 1997 and continued until it succeeded, then it is 
apparent that lawmakers' attitudes towards the constitutionality and utility of term limits 
took a noticeable change of direction as the 'year of impact' for term limits approached. 
An examination of lawmakers' public quotes over time showed a reduced 'fear of 
voter backlash' , a sentiment which seemingly killed many of the earlier repeal attempts. 
Rep. David Ure, R-Kamas, said in 1997 about the repeal bill: "We are damned if we do, 
and damned if we don't" (Salt Lake Tribune 2/21/97). In 2001 Ure testified in 
committee, saying: "I voted in favor of term limits. It was the worst vote I have taken in 
the lifetime of my legislative tenure. Institutional memory is probably the greatest asset 
we have. They have the knowledge to tell us where to go" (Salt Lake Tribune 1/19/01). 
Ure was a vocal proponent of the SB240 in 2003, saying that the community should value 
the experience of 16- or 18-year incumbents (Deseret News 3/6/03). Dre's first statement 
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points to the fact that voters may possibly feel outrage and take it out at the ballot box, 
but consecutive term limits will most definitely end one's career-at least for one term. 
In 1997 the attitude displayed by legislators was more cautious and more 
concerned about public opinion. "We always have to be sensitive to what the public 
perceptions are", stated Senate President Lane Beattie, "We will ask that we have some 
community involvement and discussion . . .  and take out the obvious concerns of self 
serving motives" (Salt Lake Tribune 2/26/97). Apparently there was real fear by 
lawmakers that the voters would perceive a repeal as a self-serving action. Utah GOP 
Congressman Merrill Cook objected publicly to the 1997 repeal bill introduced and 
passed in the house: "I see it as a cynical move on the part of the House and I certainly 
hope the Senate does not act similarly" (Salt Lake Tribune 2/26/97). The senate did not 
act in a similar fashion, in fact, as the repeal bill was not debated in that chamber. In 
2001, obeying the will of the people remained a prime concern. The sponsor of the 1994 
term limit law, former House speaker Rob Parrish, lamented the effects of losing 
experienced lawmakers but added: "People believe we should have turnover in our 
legislature. I bet they still believe that" (Salt Lake Tribune 1/19/01 ). 
A Salt Lake Tribune reporter attended the annual National Council of State 
Legislatures conference in 2000, noting: "None of the nearly 30 Utah legislators 
attending the annual NCSL convention in Chicago sat it on the term-limits discussion" 
(Salt Lake Tribune 7/19/2000). Senate President Al Mansell, R-Sandy was quoted as 
saying in 2001 that there was no stomach for a term limits repeal move that year (Salt 
Lake Tribune 2/16/01 ). Sen. Mansell continued: "It puts us in a bad light to repeal a law 
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that was so heavily supported by the public when it initially passed. It would be wrong 
for us to move forward" (No Uncertain Terms, U.S.T.L. Newsletter, Feb. 2001). With 
term limits due to take effect in 2006, the legislature adopted a different attitude in the 
2003 legislative session, fearing the reality and finality of term limits over the possibility 
of voter reprisals. 
I conclude this section by addressing two additional causal factors which I find to 
be important, and then frame the term limit repeal within a larger trend or pattern that is 
emerging in Utah state politics. First, numerous editorials in the three largest newspapers 
in the state argued against term limits by citing statistics that show a high degree of 
legislative turnover without limitations on tenure. The editorials all conclude from this 
that term limits are unnecessary (The Daily Herald 3/20/03; Deseret News 2/10/03; Salt 
Lake Tribune 1/9/2000, 2/16/99, 2/9/97). Two post-repeal articles challenged this claim, 
asserting that the retention rate in the house for 2006 was 93.75 percent, if one excludes 
retirements (Deseret News 4/14/06, 12/22/06). This counterargument contends that 
almost all legislative turnover results from retirements and legislators running for higher 
office, rather than from voter rejection. The other factor was more prominent in the 
Idaho repeal, but Utah Sen. Dmitrich was quoted in the press as saying: "Term limits hurt 
small, rural counties. We should let the people enact their own term limits at the ballot 
box, not take that right away from them" (Salt Lake Tribune 1/3 1/01). Besides this single 
reference, I found no further mention of this factor in the Utah repeal from any other 
source in and out of the state legislature, and it does not appear to be an important 
determinant to the repeal' s success. 
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Finally, repealing a popular measure such as term limits points toward a larger 
trend emerging in Utah politics. In addition to the repeal, the 2003 "Legislature passed a 
bill that makes it harder for citizen groups to get initiatives on the ballot" (The Daily 
Herald 3/6/03). Bart Grant, head of Utah Term Limits, said that the result of the two 
measures will be incumbents being perpetually re-elected until they retire or die. In 
committee testimony he said: "Taken hand in hand the two actions will mean legislators 
will be elected time and again" (Deseret News 2/25/03). I see that this possibly points to 
the moralistic political culture in Utah. Moralistic political cultures endure a tension 
between finding new, innovative policies while at the same time valuing expertise and 
experience in order for government to effectively meet the common good. I see this 
tension in Utah' s experiment with term limitations. 
As with Idaho, the lawmakers' mood changed as the year of impact for term 
limits approached. Since the measure never removed any lawmakers, the list of potential 
causal factors for the successful repeals in both Utah and Idaho are limited to the 
following: the effects of term limits on the political process, the constitutionality of term 
limits concerning the rights and liberties of both voters and potential officeholders, and 
citing the negative effects of term limits in other states where they have taken effect. I 
find it an odd incongruence that two states that are so conservative on national security, 
economic and social issues also have state governments that have endowed themselves 
with a less than limited role. Apparently certain aspects of social conservatism allow for 
an active and interventionist government, so long as government leaders are perceived to 
share the same values as the citizenry, and use its power for a 'moral' goal. This would 
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explain how Utah legislators felt that it was good public policy to limit the power of the 
voting public to make laws. 
C. Wyoming: Failed Repeal in March of 2003 
In November of 1992 Wyoming voters passed 'Initiative 2' with 77.2% support; 
the measure limited the number of terms of office that could be served by certain state 
officials. The initiative originally set term limits of three terms in the House (no more 
than 6 years in a 12 year period) and three terms in the senate (no more than 12 years in a 
24-year period). In 1995, the Legislature amended term limits to equalize years of 
service, thus allowing members of the house to serve 12 years (The Wyoming LAP Book, 
2003-2004 Biennium ESPC; U.S.T.L. Press Release, 2/3/2003). Based on this alteration, 
Wyoming Statute § 22-5-103 disqualifies any legislator or potential legislator who, "by 
the end of the current term of office, will have served 12 or more years in any 24 year 
period as a state representative", with the same '12 or more years in any 24 year period' 
also applicable to state senators. The law also instructs the secretary of state or any other 
authorized official to refuse to certify the name of any person as the nominee or candidate 
for the legislative office who violates this stricture. The year of impact for term limits in 
both chambers would have been the 2004 elections and the 2005 legislative session, as 
any time served as a state senator or representative prior to January 1, 1993, would not be 
counted for purposes of this term limitation. The effects on institutional membership 
were that aspiring legislators could serve continuously for an indefinite period of time in 
the state legislature by rotating from one chamber to the other following twelve years of 
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incumbency. Wyoming's term limit provision was classified as 'moderate' according to 
the "Stringency of Term Limit" model (Lopez and Jewell 2004), due to the 12 year break 
in service before a legislator may run again for the same legislative seat or chamber. 
During the period of 1999-2003, the Wyoming legislature attempted to repeal the 
term limit statute in 2002 and 2003 with house bills 177 and 157, respectively 
(www.ncsl.org). The bill scrutinized in this analysis, HB 157, was co-sponsored by five 
house members and three members of the senate. All five sponsors in the house were 
Republican, while sponsorship in the senate was split between one Republican and two 
Democrats. The bill was received for introduction, introduced, and referred to house 
committee 'OT-Corporations, Elections, and Political Subdivisions-on January 20, 
2003 . There it was debated on 1/27, and continued on 1/30 at which time the Committee 
killed the bill by a 7-2 vote. On March 6, HB 157 was listed as "indefinitely postponed" 
(2003 General Session Journal Digest, Wyoming Legislature website). There were two 
later attempts to revisit term limits in the 2003 session, according to the minutes of two 
committee meetings. Both of these meetings were joint committees: the Wyoming 
Legislature Committee Meeting Summary of Proceedings Joint Revenue Interim 
Committee (9/24), and the Wyoming Legislature Committee Meeting Summary of 
Proceedings Joint Corporations, Elections, and Political Subdivisions Interim Committee 
(10/27). In a bicameral manner, Representative Peck (R) who was Cochairman of the 
former committee, and Senator Meier (R) who was Cochairman of the latter, attempted to 
revive legislation to repeal legislative term limits. Rep. Peck stated in the minutes a 
desire to review term limits. Sen. Meier was recorded as discussing a proposed bill 
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dealing with term limits and asked that the bill be drafted for their next meeting; the· 
committee voted 6-6 to pursue the matter, so the affirmative motion failed on the tie vote. 
The attempts to repeal term limits by the legislature thus failed in Wyoming in 
2003; repeal efforts in this state moved to the judicial branch and the state court system in 
2004. I believe that having this option available is the first factor as to why the repeal 
effort failed in the legislature. Legislative action to rescind limitations on tenure was not 
an 'end game' situation. In 2002 Secretary of State Joe Meyer asked State Attorney 
General Hoke MacMillan for an opinion on the term limit statute. MacMillan's opinion 
stated: " . . . this office believes the constitutionality of the law will be difficult to 
defend . . .  " (Wyoming Tribune-Eagle 1/8/04; see also The Casper Star-Tribune 11/2/03). 
So in beginning my analysis of the Wyoming repeal case, it is important to note that the 
legislature had an 'out': they could appeal to the state judiciary for relief, and had been 
advised that the prospects were good that a judicial appeal would succeed. 
In examining other idiosyncratic factors which led to the repeal' s failure, I look at 
the role of interest groups, the main political parties, and other factors derived from a 
content analysis of documents and news articles, including public statements by the 
relevant actors in the process. Wyoming is similar to Idaho and Utah in that it is a newer 
state, joining the Union in 1890 (44th state). Wyoming is the least populated state in the 
Union (population -509,000), although the population increased by 9% from 1990 to 
2000. In relation to most states, Wyoming lacks ethnic diversity (96% white), although 
this makes it similar to Idaho and Utah. Most Wyomingites live in small towns. The 
largest city, Cheyenne, has a population of just over fifty-five thousand people; and vast 
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distances commonly separate towns and population centers from one another. Wyoming 
has always had a strong reliance on natural resources, so it has been subject to extreme 
economic booms and busts. In the 1 970s and 80s it was coal production, as the state's 
abundant coal supply became an important fuel for power generation. From 1985 to the 
late 1990s, Wyoming suffered another economic bust, recovering only with the 
resurgence of natural gas prices and increased interest in coal bed methane production. 
I do not find sharp differences between 'urban' and 'rural' Wyoming voters 
regarding their political orientation, as the entire state reflects a more rural disposition 
and a common political identity. The political culture in Wyoming has been classified as 
'individualistic', remaining categorically unaltered since the state's founding (Morgan 
and Watson 1991). In this regard Wyoming is distinct from Idaho, Utah, and Oregon. 
Politics in states with an individualistic political culture is utilitarian," meaning that · 
individuals and groups advance their self-interests through political action. In the 1 990s 
political action in Wyoming followed the paths taken by citizens in many other states 
with the passage of 'Initiative 2', the term limits statute. Based on the characteristics 
indicative of an individualistic political culture, I hypothesize legislators to exhibit 
behavior that fits more closely with the delegate theory of representation rather than the 
trustee form of representation which is reflected in the moralistic political cultures of 
Idaho and Utah. This would result in the legislature deferring to the will of the people 
rather than overruling their wishes. Political culture based on Elazar' s Typology can thus 
be hypothesized as a second causal factor for the failed repeal. One of the seven 
committee members who voted against the bill, Rep. Del McOrnie (R), said, "I can't see 
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how I can sit in here and overturn a vote of more than 7 5 percent for term limits 
regardless of my personal feelings" (The Casper Star-Tribune 1/11/04; U.S.T.L. Press 
Release 2/3/03). 
The role played by interest groups in Wyoming's term limit repeal process was 
more substantial than that in the Utah repeal, but group activity in Wyoming was much 
less prominent than in the Idaho case. I see the politics surrounding the repeal attempts 
as the main cause as to why prominent 'umbrella' groups did not lead the battle to repeal 
term limits. As in Utah, a serious charge was laid against the national term limit 
advocacy group U.S.T.L. ; namely, that term limits were not a grassroots Wyoming 
project but were bankrolled by U.S.T.L. in Washington D.C. (The Casper Star-Tribune 
11/2/03). Sen. Rich Cathcart, a legislator who filed the subsequent lawsuit to invalidate 
term limits, was cited as saying that the term limits initiative passed because it was well 
financed by out-of-state money. "There was zero money spent against the initiative. I 
guess the power of advertising prevailed here." Cathcart continued: "It's amazing the 
number of people I talk to today who voted for term limits who say now that was really 
dumb. There's quite a number of people who have reconsidered that" (Wyoming 
Tribune-Eagle 5/5/04). 
So those pressing for a repeal shied away from using front groups. The effect was 
that this process publicly centered on individual citizens rather than interest groups. Two 
legislators and two of their constituents filed the lawsuit against the term limit statute in 
late 2003, though one of the 'citizens' had previously worked as a lobbyist in the 
legislature (Wyoming Tribune-Eagle 5/5/04). This citizen, Keith Kennedy, was quoted 
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as saying: "Were we to let term limits take effect, we risk losing some of our most 
valuable institutional memory, we risk losing some of our most effective legislators, and 
we risk losing our representative form of government" (Wyoming Tribune-Eagle 1 /8/04). 
Also, individuals representing themselves and not larger interest groups were 
brought before the 'Corporations, Elections, and Political Subdivisions' House 
Committee in 2002 and 2003 to speak out against term limits (The Casper Star-Tribune 
1 2/7 /03 ). Marguerite Herman of the League of Women Voters spoke as a concerned 
citizen-and not as a mouthpiece for the L WV-before the house committee in favor of a 
repeal (The Casper Star-Tribune 1 1 /2/03). A number of term limit opponents attended 
the news conference announcing the anti-term limit lawsuit after HB 1 57 failed and the 
legislative session ended. Among them were Jim Magagna, the executive director of the 
Wyoming Stock Growers Association, who was speaking for himself since the group had 
not taken a position on term limits (The Casper Star-Tribune 1/8/04). In the same news 
article, Magagna noted that it was important for the agricultural community to be able to 
educate legislators on complex issues; and that this is made much more difficult when 
dealing with legislators who have only been in office for a short period of time. Listed in 
the subsequent Cathcart v. Meyer decision (2004) are U.S.T.L. as an 
Intervenor/Defendant, and a group called 'Wyoming Term Limits' which filed an amicus 
curiae appeal. Dennis Brossman, a former chairman of the Wyoming Libertarian Party 
from Lander, was noted in the statewide media as a proponent of term limitations (The 
Casper Star-Tribune 1 /8/04). 
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In sum, I found that the news media stayed basically neutral in its messages 
pertaining to term limits, and cited the views of regular citizens in its reporting on the 
pros and cons of term limitations and the repeal efforts. An exception was on January 8, 
2004 when two major newspapers quoted two psychologists, Chris Winter and Mary Jo 
Atherton. They supported the lawsuit on behalf of themselves and the Wyoming 
Psychological Association. Dr. Winter said she was a convert to the anti-term limits 
movement: "I voted for term limits. I believed a lot of awful stereotypes about 
legislators." But when she brought a bill before the legislature in late 2003, she said: "I 
found a bunch of dedicated, hardworking public servants" (Wyoming Tribune-Eagle 
1/8/04). Fellow psychologist Dr. Atherton said that term limits would cost the state 
legislative experience and institutional memory (The Casper Star-Tribune 1 /8/04 ). 
I found one op-ed piece that takes a different view of who the ' special interests' 
are, and ties those powerful interests to the state Republican Party (The Casper Star­
Tribune 12/7/03). The author begins by pointing out that some special interests endorse 
incumbents based on how the incumbent treats interest groups, regardless of overall 
policy preferences and ideology. In other words, incumbents who favor loose or non­
existent public control over ' campaign finance' receive support from special interests 
based solely on this ' special-interest stance'. The author next contend.s, "Wyoming is 
ruled by" the "ranchislators", meaning groups such as the Wyoming Stock Growers 
Association, along with "special-interest elite Republicans" (The Casper Star-Tribune 
12/7/03). It is further charged that the repeal effort was led by Republicans and does not 
enjoy the support of both political parties. According to House Majority Floor Leader 
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Randall Luthi, R-Freedom, "politically one party cannot do it alone, and I don't think 
there's enough political will to challenge it politically" (The Casper Star-Tribune 
12/7/03; 11/2/03). 
So the third factor is partisanship, as no Democrats supported the house bill. 
The Wyoming Legislature in 2002-2003 had a 2 to 1 Republican majority (20-10) in the 
state house, and a 3 to 1 GOP advantage (45-15) in the senate. HB157 was introduced in 
the state house by all Republican members. There was bipartisan sponsorship in the 
senate, split between one Republican and two Democrats. However, HB157 was rejected 
by a 7-2 vote in the house committee. The partisan composition of the 'Corporations, 
Elections, and Political Subdivisions' Committee was 7 Republicans and 2 Democrats. 
Both Democrats voted against the repeal measure, while the bill's only two affirmative 
votes were by Republicans. Twenty-one year veteran lawmaker and bill sponsor Rep. 
Jim Hageman (R) was reportedly ' steamed' over the rejection of the bill and predicted the 
next step would be a lawsuit (The Casper Star-Tribune 12/7/03 ; 11/2/03). When asked 
whether he was disappointed with the bill's demise, Hageman stated: "Damn right I am. I 
thought it was the most important bill this session" (U.S.T.L. Press Release 2/3/03). 
Given Rep. Hageman's prediction of a lawsuit, it is hardly a coincidence that the main 
lawyer arguing for the plaintiffs in the subsequent lawsuit was the legislator's daughter, 
Harriet Hageman of Cheyenne (The Casper Star-Tribune 1/8/04). 
In this case study of Wyoming, I have identified three factors that possibly 
contributed to the failure of the term limit repeal bill. First, legislators had recourse to 
appeal to the state court system by challenging the constitutionality of the term limit 
198 
provision, and believed that the courts would invalidate the statute. They could therefore 
'pass the buck'. Second, Wyoming's ' individualistic' political culture based on Elazar's 
conceptual typology indicates that its political leaders are more likely to defer to the 
expressed will of the people than are those in states with a 'moralistic' or 'traditionalistic' 
culture. So they would apparently be less willing to pass statutes that contradict public 
preferences. In my view, the combination of these two factors makes a strong rationale 
for moving the appeal to the branch of government most removed from public opinion. 
Third is partisanship. Besides the fact that two Democrats were co-sponsors of the bill in 
the senate, there was no Democrat support for HB I 57. Based on news articles and public 
statements, Republicans were afraid to move alone on the bill and become associated 
with seemingly self-serving legislation that was immensely unpopular with voters. 
Contrarily, I failed to discover an association between geographic location and 
support for HBI 57: no urban-rural differences or regional distinctions. Likewise with 
legislative leaders; a floor vote may have revealed a different dynamic at work, but there 
was no connection between how one voted on HB I 57 with how long a member had 
served in the house. In this unsuccessful repeal effort, however, many of the same 
rationales used in Idaho and Utah were put forth by lawmakers who supported the repeal 
bill. By asserting that term limit financing and support came from 'out-of-state', 
legislators could claim that Wyoming voters were duped by outside agitators who do not 
know what is in the best interest of Wyomingites. This turns the concept of the public 
interest on its head. Next, there were ample calls in the media by lawmakers to protect 
the rights of the voters. In other words, term limits limit voter choice and by extension 
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the political power of the voters. Third, the claim was made that the citizen initiative was 
a package deal to term limit members of Congress; and after the U.S. Supreme Court 
invalidated those sections of the measure in 1995 the remaining portions were less 
unpopular and/or should also be struck down as illegal. 
Fourth, opponents of term limits who supported the repeal cited evidence that 
there have been "disastrous results" in states like California and Colorado, where term 
limits have taken effect (Wyoming Tribune-Eagle 1/8/04). Fifth is a rationale debated in 
the news media in two editorials of the Casper Star-Tribune (12/7/03 and 11/2/03). One 
op-ed piece argued that term limits do not work well "in a small state like Wyoming 
where the part-time citizen legislators spend only 60 days over two years in session" and 
legislators with only 60 days experience are not "seasoned enough to chair a committee". 
An editorial three weeks later disputed this claim, not by pointing out that term limits do 
not take effect until someone has served twelve years, but by disputing what the term 
'citizen legislator' actually means. The editorial on 12/3/03 asserted that a citizen 
legislature is "one that follows the will of the people over the special interests when 
lawmaking or spending money." The final rationale used to push for a repeal are in the 
words of Tim Stubson, who along with Harriet Hageman argued before the Wyoming 
Supreme Court against term limits: "It is about maintaining the constitutional integrity of 
Wyoming's Constitution and to insure that the rights protected by the constitution aren't 
infringed upon absent an amendment to the constitution" (The Casper Star-Tribune 
1/8/04). It was this contention that led to the lawsuit which ultimately overturned the 
Wyoming term limit statute as unconstitutional. 
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D. Oregon: Failed Repeal in April of 2001 
Oregon voters passed the initiative known as 'Measure 3' in November of 1992 
with 69 .5% support for the ballot proposal. Measure 3 added to Article II of the Oregon 
Constitution sections 19 and 20. Section 19 set limits on the length of tenure for state 
legislators and particular executive branch offices. It states: No person shall serve more 
than six years in the Oregon House of Representatives, eight years in the Oregon Senate, 
and twelve years in the Oregon Legislative Assembly in his or her lifetime. In other 
words, 12 years of total legislative tenure is permissible under the provision; however, no 
more than 6 of those 12 years may be served in the house, and no more than 8 of those 12 
years may be in the senate. The term limitation is a lifetime ban after those conditions 
are met. Due to the lifetime ban, Oregon is categorized as having a 'strong' term limits 
provision (Lopez and Jewell 2004). 
Limitations on tenure began to impact the house and senate in 1998. Unique 
among the four repeal cases analyzed in this chapter (and among all successful term limit 
repeals), term limits in Oregon took effect and removed tenured lawmakers from 
legislative office. In the state house of 60 members, there were 22 legislators term 
limited out of office in 1998 and 17 in 2000. In the senate comprised of 30 members, 2 
members were term limited out of office in 1998, and 5 in 2000 (www.ncsl.org). So with 
term limits already having an effect, this research examines the repeal efforts in the 2001 
legislative session. 
There were previous repeal efforts that had failed in Oregon, most recently two 
bills (HJRl 1 and HJR30) in 1999. Since the Oregon legislature only convenes in odd 
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years (biennial sessions), the next opportunity to repeal the term limit amendment began 
when the legislature reconvened on the second Monday in January, 2001. Alone among 
the term limit-related legislation proposed in the opening month of the legislative session, 
SJR24 would have repealed term limits. In order to accomplish this goal, the legislature 
would have to amend the Oregon Constitution. SJR24 was introduced by Cliff Trow, the 
most senior Democrat in the senate, on February 12, 2001. The measure was referred to 
the Senate Committee on Rules and Redistricting on 2/13, and on 2/20 the committee 
recommended that the proposal be adopted with amendments. 
After the final reading on 4/24, the Oregon Senate passed SJR24 by a vote of 16-
13-1. On 4/25 it was read in the house, referred to the Speaker's desk, and then referred 
to the House Committee on Rules, Redistricting, and Public Affairs. A work session was 
held by the committee on 6/22. On 6/27 the legislative docket states the_ following 
activity: "Possible reconsideration and work session cancelled" (Oregon State Legislature 
Web site, 'Bills and Laws' section 2006). The repeal bill was addressed in a second work 
session that was held on 7/3; a July 4 work session was cancelled. The repeal bill 
remained in the house committee when the legislature adjourned for the year on July 7, 
2001. So the repeal effort failed, and as in the case of Wyoming, the repeal efforts in 
Oregon moved to the judicial branch and the state court system the following year. The 
court case was expedited by the passage of HB267 4 in the Oregon Legislature (April 
2001), where the provision's amendments of ORS 249.037 and 249.722 created five new 
sections. Section 3 allows any candidate whose nominating petition or declaration of 
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candidacy is rejected by the Secretary of State to file an action to challenge the 
constitutionality of section 19, Article II of the Oregon Constitution. 
In a more detailed examination of the idiosyncratic factors impacting the repeal of 
term limits for state legislators and various statewide officeholders, I focus on activity by 
interest groups, political parties, and explore any potential causal factors unique to 
Oregon's political system. Oregon is a state that is divided in half by the Cascade 
Mountains: divided in lifestyle, ideology, and party affiliation. Early in the state's 
history, cattlemen ran their stock on the open ranges of eastern Oregon and sheepherders 
competed with them for this pasturage. East of the Cascades remains to this day rural in 
composition and conservative in outlook; it is to the west of the mountain ranges and 
along the seaboard where Oregon's major cities lie. The population in this section of the 
state is more progressive ideologically, while being mostly urban and suburban in 
composition. Oregon's politics in the past century went through progressive and 
conservative phases, which may explain its political culture. From 1906-1936, Oregon 
was categorized as having a moralistic culture; as of 1980 it had moved to an 
individualistic one (Morgan and Watson 1991 ). All of this translates into Eastern Oregon 
being predominantly Republican in party affiliation, while the remainder of the state for 
the most part elects Democrats to state and local offices. 
Interest group activity pertaining to the term limits initiative and repeal efforts 
was heavier in Oregon than in Utah and Wyoming, and is comparable to the role played 
by organized groups in the Idaho case. U.S.T.L. led the efforts to institute and later retain 
term limits. Other groups supporting term limits were: 'Oregon Taxpayers United', 
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'Oregonians for Fair Term Limits', 'Americans for Limited Government', and the 
'Cascade Policy Institute'. Some groups favored modifications to Oregon's most 
stringent term limitations in the country, while other groups such as U.S.T.L. took a hard 
line stance on the issue. An umbrella group representing a coalition of various interests 
led the effort in opposing term limits and supporting a repeal. I found one reference to it 
as 'Oregonians for Voter Rights', but it later called itself 'Oregonians for Voter Choice' 
(Statesman Journal 1/12/02, 2/14/00). This front's group strategy was to label the pro­
term limit groups as being controlled and bankrolled by U.S.T.L., "an Illinois-based 
special interest group" (Oregonians for Voter Choice website, 
www.Eliminatelllinoisinfluence.com; Portland Tribune 1/25/02). 
As for themselves, on their web site they claim to be a broad-based coalition of 
civic, community, business, labor and consumer groups, including: League of Women 
Voters of Oregon, fire fighters, teachers, family farmers, small businesses across the 
state, Oregon Alliance of Senior & Health Services, Oregon Health Care Association, 
labor groups [repeated], Oregon Medical Associations, and many others. I found an 
occurrence in Oregon similar to something that transpired in the Idaho repeal process: 
House Speaker Lynn Snodgrass (R) accused a term limit lobbyist from U.S.T.L. of trying 
to bribe her (The Oregonian 7 /17 /99). Also, the Oregon Center fo� Public Policy publicly 
criticized term limits for creating problems that undermined effective governance, while 
failing to solve "the powerful influence of money in politics" (Portland Tribune 5/29/01 ). 
Finally, Oregon's newspapers reflected a diverse range of viewpoints about term limits 
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and their repeal; so I did not find the news media to have taken a stance or function like 
an organized interest with an agenda concerning the outcome of the repeal bill. 
The politics of term limits has an ironic twist in the case of Oregon. Voter's 
acceptance of term limits coincided with the shifting of power to the Republican side of 
the aisle: in 1990 the GOP took control of the state house, Republicans made gains in 
both chambers in 1992, and then captured the majority in the senate in 1994. When the 
1992 voter-approved term limit law began taking effect in 1998 and 1999, one op-ed 
piece characterized the situation as one where "we witness Republicans being hoisted by 
their own petard" (Statesman Journal 5/10/99). The result was that veteran lawmakers in 
positions of legislative leadership tentatively supported doing 'something' about the strict 
term limit law, but failed to agree on whether to repeal or modify it; and if to modify it, 
then how? SJR24 passed the senate but failed to make it out of committee in the house; 
earlier bills met a similar fate. In one other instance, there was a proposal in 2001 to 
create positions called "senator emeritus" and "representative emeritus" as advisors to the 
legislature. However, "Republican leaders, worried that the proposal would convince 
voters there was no need to retool the term limit law, allowed the idea to die in 
committee" (Lenicer, Hoffman, and Bowser 2002). In sum, there was bipartisan support 
for repealing term limits, but lawmakers did their best to not make any 'noise' about term 
limits that would get the attention of voters. Despite an array of proposals to alter or 
abolish term limits introduced at the beginning of the 2001 Legislative Session, political 
scientist Bill Lunch concluded that the legislature lacked the political will to agree on and 
pass a repeal: "Repeal of term limits is not on the horizon yet" (Statesman Journal 
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1/7/01 ). Of those who would have been serving their final terms, there were seven 
Democrat senators and six Republican, and five Democrat representatives and seven 
Republican. Based on this, neither political party stood to make partisan gains of any 
significance by keeping term limits or repealing them. 
The arguments made in Oregon that supported a repeal of term limits were 
basically the same as those explained in the previous three cases. However, one crucial 
difference was that in the case of Oregon, legislators had begun being term-limited out of 
office; hence the effects of term limits on the legislative institution and on public policy 
could be ascertained and used in the debate over the utility of 'lifetime-ban term­
limitations'. So the rationales used for repealing term limits on one hand included the 
same old speculative charges-'term limits make voters lazy and uninformed' (Oregon 
Center of Public Policy 'Centerpoints',. May 2001 ; Statesman Journal 5/2/01 ), · 'term 
limits were pushed on Oregonians by unscrupulous outsiders who confused the 
electorate' (Statesman Journal 7/25/06, 4/12/01), and the charge used to justify a court 
challenge that term limits are 'unconstitutional' (Statesman Journal 5/2/01). However, 
there were also criticisms concerning the efficacy of term limits, based on the Oregonian 
experience with the measure. These criticisms of the effects of term limits can be broadly 
summarized as: 'inexperience', 'partisan bickering', 'citizen legislature', 'institutional 
chaos', 'lobbyists and staff gain power', 'term limits make campaigns more expensive', 
and 'term limits create more uncontested elections'. 
Rep. Mark Simmons, a Republican from the northeast comer of the state, stated: 
"Term limits, as structured currently in Oregon, are one of the cruelest jokes that voters 
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ever played on them [legislators]. You have people moving into positions before they are 
ready" (Statesman Journal 2/13/00). Democrat Rep. Kitty Pierce from Eugene 
concurred: " . . .  I think we lose a lot. You don' t have anybody who's been around very 
long that can tell you how you got where you are. And you get somebody who is in their 
third session, they don't have any reason to do anything except what they want to do, 
because they're going to be gone" (Statesman Journal 2/6/99). Ed Patterson, president of 
the capitol club and lobbyist for the Oregon Association of Hospitals and Health Systems, 
noted the effects of inexperience on the Oregon Legislature: "We have seen how the lack 
of institutional memory affects the ability of the Legislature to make decisions" 
(Statesman Journal 5/29/01 ). In all, the 1999 Legislative Session was characterized as 
"dysfunctional", with term limits being the culprit; the solution is "Oregon needs veteran 
legislators" to avoid producing "fast-food policy" (Portland Tribune 1 /25/02; Statesman 
Journal 2/15/00). 
Against a cacophony of voices citing inexperience as a dire situation facing the 
Oregon Legislature, I did find a counterargument in the media that contended: " . . .  though 
the rookies lack direct experience in a legislative body, many are veteran policy-makers 
and politicians" that include former mayors, lobbyists, and a few members who had 
switched legislative chambers (Statesman Journal 1/10/99). So some question remained 
as to what these veteran lawmakers were experienced at that others cannot comprehend 
or accomplish. As a possible answer, I discovered a public exclamation in support of the 
repeal efforts from Rep. Carl Wilson R-Grants Pass, saying what many outside the 
legislative profession would deem as an arrogant sense of entitlement. "I don't expect 
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the voters to understand", Grants said. "But as you know, we are privy to things that they 
are not. This hallowed place [the legislature] is where we are, and we know it best" (Cato 
Policy Report May/June 2002). 
The fact that term limits prescribe turnover in membership leading to a mass 
influx of rookies who are inexperienced in legislative processes is also seen as the main 
cause for other adverse effects. House Speaker Lynn Snodgrass was criticized for 
ineffective leadership and creating a partisan legislative environment, but the blame was 
placed more on term limits than on any personal shortcomings she may have had. 
According to Dave Moss, Associated Oregon Industries lobbyist, Snodgrass was pushed 
into leadership too soon and made her followers unruly: "She'd only been in two sessions 
before this. After four sessions it would have been much easier for her" (Statesman 
Journal 2/1 3/00); so due to a lack of political "seasoning", inexperienced legislators 
engaged in "partisan bickering" (Oregon Public Broadcasting News 10/3/06). An 
editorial in the Portland Tribune (9/ 19/06) against a new term limit initiative in 2006 
concluded: "We tried that once [term limits] . The end result was a more partisan, less 
informed, and less effective Legislature. Oregon is just now emerging from that 
unhealthy period. Let's not go back there again." Lastly, political scientist George Peery 
was quoted as saying: "Speakership battles have been contentious and far more partisan" 
in California, Oregon, and other term-limited states (Statesman Journal 2/14/00). 
Inexperience was also to blame for the Oregon Legislature's unstable institutional 
environment. "With all due respect, there's a lot of chaos over at the House because 
everyone is new," said Sen. Verne Duncan R-Milwaukie (Statesman Journal 1/7/0 1). 
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According to veteran Salem lobbyist Mark Nelson, "I saw what a disaster term limits 
have been and will be again. It throws out bad people, and it throws out good people. 
We're just getting over the term limits hangover" (The Oregonian 9/18/06). U.S. 
Representative Earl Blumenauer (D), a former state representative, commented about 
term limits: "It has turned our Legislature into a big bus station. Most people are on their 
way someplace else, but few want to stay to make a difference" (Statesman Journal 
4/19/01 ). So in all, politicians, lobbyists, and other Capitol insiders routinely blamed the 
1992 term limits initiative for sowing chaos and dissension in the Legislature and 
degrading the laws it produces. "It only gets worse" if something isn't done, lamented 
Rep. Ben Westlund R-Bend (Statesman Journal 2/15/00). 
Another complaint about the term limit law was that it was a remedy more fitting 
for 'professionalized' state legislatures than ones characterized by practitioners and 
scholars as ' citizen legislatures'. In Oregon, lawmakers only meet every other year, and 
they spend about 18 months actually legislating (Lenicer, Hoffman, and Bowser 2002). 
House Majority Whip Mark Simmons, R-Elgin, said that restrictive lifetime bans might 
work in states with a full time legislature but not in Oregon. "The one-size-fits-all 
approach doesn' t  fit Oregon", he said (The Oregonian 7/17/99). Even Mark Petracca, 
who writes and lectures in support of term limits, noted that in states with part-time 
citizen legislators, "the real question is whether term limits were even necessary" 
(Statesman Journal 2/14/00). Observations were also made that "the chum of 
inexperienced lawmakers" created by term limits led to an increase in the "influence of 
lobbyists and state agency staff', whom the new legislators must depend on for most of 
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their education on issues (Portland Tribune 9/19/06; Oregon Center of Public Policy 
Centerpoints, May 2001 ). 
The final criticisms concerning the effects of term limits on the Oregon political 
system pertained to elections. It was noted that general election spending in house races 
was up 36 percent in the 2000 elections from 1998 spending levels; further, 92 percent of 
the candidates who outspent their opponents won (Portland Tribune 9/19/06; Oregon 
Center of Public Policy Centerpoints, May 2001 ). So term limits seemingly failed to rein 
in the influence of money on the electoral process. Also, term limits opened more seats, 
but did not attract more candidates. Addressing this problem, political scientist Jim 
Moore stated: "Does it mean there's a small universe of people who would ever run for 
office, and we're seeing how small that universe is?" (Statesman Journal 3/8/00). I failed 
to find any counterarguments to these charges in the news media and official documents. 
The literature on the effects of term limits strongly suggests that potential candidates will 
sit out an election cycle or two and wait until powerful incumbents are forced to leave the 
legislature. Thus more contested races would involve open seats, and in general, 
elections for open legislative seats involve higher spending. 
Regarding why the repeal bill SJR24 failed in the house after passing in the 
senate, I see circumstances that were very similar to the situation in Wyoming, where the 
repeal bill also failed in the legislature. In the Oregon and Wyoming cases, both 
legislatures were given ' cues' that led them in a path-dependent manner towards 
appealing to the state courts. Thus the first causal factor was a lack of political will to 
repeal a term limit measure that had enjoyed 70 percent support among Oregon voters 
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(Statesman Journal 4/12/01, 1/7/01 ). SJR24 failed because it did not have enough 
support in the house. This begs the question: 'who pushed for the repeal'? Term limit 
supporter Rep. Bill Witt R-Cedar Mill, in an editorial published in the Portland Tribune 
(8/17/01), stated that he was "amazed at the keen interest most legislators, especially 
those serving their last term, have in trying to alter the term limits put in place by Oregon 
voters. While most legislators camouflage their efforts in order to not expose themselves 
to voter anger, there has consistently been a deep-seated desire to loosen or repeal the 
current limits." Witt also quoted an unnamed colleague who spoke on the house floor in 
2001, announcing: "We just know more than voters" (Portland Tribune 8/17/01 ). So, 
while lawmakers believe that term limits are bad policy and bad for their job security, 
they lacked the political will to repeal the stricture. "People were concerned with their 
own self-survival," stated Portland pollster Tim Hibbitts. "It would have been hard not to 
look self-serving" (Lenicer, Hoffman, and Bowser 2002). 
As in the Wyoming case, legislative action to rescind limitations on tenure was 
not an 'end game' situation for the affected Oregonian officials. In 2001, lawmakers 
came up with an alternative way to remove term limits. A judge had recently ruled that a 
property rights measure voters passed in 2000 was unconstitutional because it violated a 
requirement that amendments be voted on separately, in other words the measure 
contained two distinct and separate proposals (Lenicer, Hoffman, and Bowser 2002). 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court had tossed out section 20 in Article II of the Oregon 
Constitution for limiting the terms of U.S. congressmen, a case could be made that the 
term limit measure violated the separate amendment requirement. Hence HB2674, which 
211 
created five new sections in the Oregonian Constitution. Section 3 allows any candidate 
whose nominating petition or declaration of candidacy is rejected by the Secretary of 
State to file an action to challenge the constitutionality of section 19, Article II. HB2674 
passed on May 3, 2001, and would also enable a legislator to file immediately for 
candidacy for the May 2002 primary instead of waiting until September 13 as had been 
the previous date for declaring candidacy. Finally, the bill would put any lawsuit on the 
fast track through the court system to the Oregon Supreme Court (Lenicer, Hoffman, and 
Bowser 2002; The Oregonian 1/15/02; Portland Tribune 1/25/02; Statesman Journal 
5/4/01; Cascade Policy Institute, Policy Perspective No. 1018 08/2001; 'No Uncertain 
Terms' U.S.T.L. newsletter, June 2001). 
There was public hostility in response to the passing of this bill into law. One 
editorial phrased the political maneuver as such: "Rather than put the question of term 
limits to another vote, they decided to take their constituents to court !"  (Portland Tribune 
1/25/02). Another op-ed piece, this one in the Oregonian (1/15/02), criticized the basis 
for the lawsuit: "There was no mind-numbing multiplicity of 'separate subjects' on the 
1992 term limits initiative. The initiative was not about term-limits-plus-zoning. Or term­
limits-plus-property-taxes. Or term-limits-plus-potholes or term-limits-plus-macrame. 
The measure was about term limits." For many, the legislature took a back-door strategy 
to defeat term limits that bypassed the people's will, and it didn' t "sit right' to many 
voters (Lenicer, Hoffman, and Bowser 2002). 
In concluding this section, I see the actions by the Oregon Legislature to be very 
similar to those in Wyoming. Legislators believed that it was probable that the state 
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courts would invalidate the 1992 initiative due to a technicality for which there was a 
recently established precedent. Lawmakers could thus protect themselves from any 
potential voter backlash by 'passing the buck' on the term limits question to the branch of 
government most removed from public opinion, the judiciary. 
E. Hypotheses Testing 
This final section of the chapter analyzes the previously described legislative 
actions through the lenses of the hypotheses and other possible causal factors constructed 
in chapter one, searching for commonalities in the decision-making process by the 
various state legislatures. For the four cases examined, the state legislatures in Idaho and 
Utah repealed the term limit provisions, while the repeal legislation in Wyoming and 
Oregon failed. Upon examination of the data late in the research process, I found that a 
few of my hypothetical suppositions needed to be restructured. So in this portion of the 
analysis I will address any problems with my initial hypotheses as I scrutinize each 
theoretical presumption, and then re-direct my hypothesis testing to reflect the necessary 
changes. The first legislative hypothesis constructed in chapter one pertains to the 
existence of the citizen initiative as a causal factor. 
LHl: States that adopted term limits by ballot initiatives are less likely to repeal 
term limits than states that adopted them through legislative statute. 
As noted in the fourth section of chapter one, Scott and Bell ( 1999) concluded 
that the presence of the ballot initiative was the only significant factor as to whether or 
not a state adopted term limits. When examining this factor in repealing term limit laws, 
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there simply are not enough cases to determine the veracity of this supposition. Utah is 
the only state among the four cases that instituted term limits by legislative statute as 
opposed to the citizen initiative. In fact, of the twenty-one states that instituted term 
limits, only Utah and Louisiana did so by legislative statute rather than by the citizen 
initiative (www.ncsl.org). Utah's legislature later rescinded term limits by legislative 
statute on the last day of the 2003 legislative session, whereas Louisiana still has the 
restrictions. The reasons as to why Utah's legislature passed term limits on itself are 
debatable. As I previously mentioned, there was speculation that the legislature passed 
the measure in March of 1994 to pre-empt the citizens from voting for more stringent 
term limits in November (see www.ncsl.org.). Term limits under 'Initiative A' on the 
1994 statewide ballot would have capped service in the state legislature to 8 years, with a 
lifetime ban afterwards. So this argument is logical: the Utah legislature passed what was 
among the most relaxed legislative term limit measures in the nation, while 'Initiative A' 
would have been the single most severe term limitations among state governments (see 
www.ncsl.org, 'Consecutive vs. Lifetime Limits' 2006; Lopez and Jewell 2004). One of 
the arguments prevalent in the media against the initiative was that Utah already had term 
limits (Salt Lake Tribune 9/2/94, A30). 
Upon examination of 'Initiative A', however, another factor disputes this 
possibility; namely, the initiative measure failed by a 64.8% to 35.2% margin (Salt Lake 
Tribune 10/11/94, Al ). There are numerous explanations as to why this occurred. First, 
the initiative had an unpopular and purportedly expensive add-on provision that was 
totally unrelated to term limits; it would require runoff elections when no candidate 
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receives a majority of the votes (as in Louisiana). Second, "a fatal loophole" was 
discovered in the initiative only weeks before election day; it would have exempted all 
but l of the 29 incumbent state senators and all but 1 of the 75 current state house 
members from the term limit amendment (Salt Lake Tribune 10/11/94, A 1; 10/13/94, A 1; 
and 11/10/94 Al 6). Discovery of this loophole led to the hasty formation of statewide 
term limit groups who opposed the initiative, such as 'Utahns For Responsible Term 
Limits'. Hence, the reason for the defeat of the term limit initiative may be partially 
explained by noting that term limit groups were divided into opposing camps and fighting 
among themselves over the initiative. Further, as of the end of 1994, this was the first 
term limit ballot initiative that faced serious, organized, and well-funded opposition. My 
overall assessment is substantiated by the fact that a survey conducted by Valley 
Research of Salt Lake City (1,000 adults over a four day period in August-September 
1994, with a 4 percent margin of error) showed overwhelming support for a term limit 
constitutional amendment for state and federal officeholders, and nearly three in five 
Utahns said they favored a change to the existing state term limit statute to further limit 
the number of times that an elected official could run for reelection (Salt Lake Tribune 
9/4/94 Al ). Thus it would be logical to infer that the reason why Utah 'bucked' the 
national trend and voted down term limits were as follows: interest group opposition to 
the initiative (including some term limit groups), the unpopular 'runoff election' 
provision that was touted in the media as being a huge added expense for the taxpayers, 
and the loophole that would have enacted a term limit constitutional amendment that 
failed to apply to over 98% of the incumbent legislators. 
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One way to restructure LHl is to compare term limit measures that would amend 
the state constitution with those that would add a statute to the body of state law. A 
citizen-driven initiative to add a term limits provision to state law bypasses the legislature 
altogether; so in this sense there is no distinction in process from that of the voters using 
the initiative to amend the state constitution, which bypasses the legislature in the same 
manner. However, repeal efforts would involve separate processes. To repeal a statute, 
the legislature need only pass the repeal law by a bare majority in both legislative 
chambers ( as with any other bill becoming law). This was the process used in the states 
of Idaho and Utah. In order to repeal a constitutional amendment, the process is more 
detailed and difficult; and it varies from state to state. Two legislative cases examined in 
this research, Oregon and Wyoming, had efforts to repeal term limit measures which 
were constitutional amendments. Other than by the citizen initiative, the Oregon 
Constitution specifies that a constitutional amendment may be introduced in "either 
branch of the assembly" (Article XVII, section 1 ), where it must be approved by a 
majority of members in both chambers and then approved by a majority of the voters in 
the next general election (Maddex 2006). The Wyoming Constitution makes amending 
the constitution more difficult: Article XX, section 1 prescribes that an amendment may 
be proposed in either chamber, where it must be agreed upon by two-thirds of the 
members in both the house and the senate, after which it must be approved by a majority 
of the electors in the next general election (Maddex 2006). Based on these facts, ideas, 
and arguments, a revised hypothesis would be as follows. 
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Revised LHl: Legislative repeal efforts in states whose adoption of term limits is by 
constitutional amendment are less likely to be successful than states that adopted 
them through legislative statute. 
This proposition seems simplistic and almost self-evident to political scientists, 
but it can be tested empirically. Often times in social research, what appears to be an 
obvious truism fails to hold up under scrutiny. Here this is not the case. The two cases 
where repealing term limits could be accomplished by legislative statute-Idaho and 
Utah-were both successful. The two cases where repealing term limits required a 
constitutional amendment to revoke an earlier amendment-Wyoming and Oregon­
were both unsuccessful. Additionally, in both of these states the repeal effort moved to 
the judicial branch in the year following the defeat of the legislative repeal efforts. This 
revised hypothesis is supported by the data. 
LH2: The fewer the specified number of terms in the law, the more likely that the 
state legislature repeals the term limits. 
There are a number of reasons why this supposition is made. It is theorized that 
legislators who place the highest priority on their own self interest will hold to the 
following rationale: the shorter the tenure allowed by the measure, the more vigorously 
they will oppose the term limits and attempt to repeal it. This theoretical assumption 
applies also for the 'trustee' legislator, but for a different reason. The trustee can make 
better decisions and enact better public policy the longer they are in office, so lawmakers 
of this mindset will more adamantly strive to rescind term limits that are more restrictive. 
So the basis for this hypothetical proposition is sound. However, as the earlier 
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explication of the various term limit provisions detailed, the severity or stringency of a 
term limitation measure is the product of the number of terms one can serve in the 
legislature plus the length of the 'waiting period' before the officeholder is qualified 
again to be elected to the same seat or chamber. In states with lifetime bans after serving 
a set number of terms, the waiting period is indefinite. Based on these facts and 
observations, a revised hypothesis would be as such. 
Revised LH2: The greater the severity of the term limits measure, the more likely 
that the repeal effort will be successful. 
Idaho's provision states that a legislator may serve no more than 8 years in a 15 
year period. So someone elected in 2002 would be denied ballot access in the 2010 
election and remain ineligible until 2017. Since elections for these offices fall on even 
years, that individual could not actually run again until the elections of 2018. In effect, 
this means that there is an 8 year waiting period. The other 3 states are more direct in 
their term limitations. The Utah statute capped service at 12 consecutive years: 3 four­
year terms for senators and 6 two-year terms for house members. Multi-term incumbents 
could then be ballot eligible after sitting out one term. This translates into a 4 year layoff 
for senators and a 2 year layoff for members of the house. Wyoming is twelve years in 
and twelve years out for either chamber, thus allowing a longer tenure than normal for 
term limitations in state legislatures but a correspondingly lengthy waiting period of a 
dozen years. Oregon had lifetime bans after 12 years served in the legislature total, with 
no more than 6 years allowed in the house and 8 years in the senate during that 12 year 
total. 
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The data in this instance does not support the hypothesis. Wyoming and Idaho 
have term limits with a 'moderate' degree of severity (Lopez and Jewell 2004), both 
allowing the same number of years of eligibility as the number of years one must sit out. 
Wyoming' s  repeal effort failed, while Idaho's succeeded despite the governor' s veto. 
The state with the weakest term limit provision-Utah-overturned the statute, while 
Oregon's legislature failed to repeal the toughest term limit provision in the country. 
LH3: The higher the legislators' pay and compensation package, the more likely 
that the state legislature repeals term limits. 
This hypothesis is based on human nature and assumes that legislators are 
motivated by self-interest. Therefore the higher the pay, the greater the lengths they will 
go to keep their jobs. I address this variable over a wide span of years rather than use the 
snapshot of legislative pay at the time of the repeal attempts. I believe that looking at 
salary over time is a better measure because it can capture trends in salary that show a 
movement upwards or downwards relative to other states, which I presuppose would 
make that state legislature a more coveted and desirable career (if the trend is up). It 
turns out that the four states in this research are all among the lowest in the country in 
terms of pay, and their positions in a ranking among all states has remained fairly static 
and stagnant over time. Meinke and Hasecke (2003) tallied the total compensation 
package during the 1 990 to 1 998 period, on average, and categorized each state in an 
attempt to construct an operational definition for 'professionalization' .  Idaho, Oregon, 
Utah, and Wyoming are in the bottom third in legislator compensation. 
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Likewise, DiSarro (2005) displays a table of annual salaries and salary ranks for 
state legislatures from 1960 and then for 2005. Based on a total ranking of 32 
positions-due to a number of ties--Oregon and Idaho ranked at number 23 , Utah was 
placed at 25, and Wyoming at 29. In 2005 there were 48 rankings due to a much greater 
differentiation among states in legislative salaries. Oregon was ranked at number 30, 
Idaho 3 1, Utah 38, and Wyoming at 41. For 2004, in actual dollars, Idaho legislators 
were paid $ 15,646 per annum, $ 15,396 in Oregon, Utah's legislators were paid per 
session day, which is approximately $ 10,800. Wyoming's legislature pays its members 
$ 125 a day but meets less often than in Utah, so the annual pay was $9K (Book of the 
States 2005). In determining additional compensation, the 2005 Book of the States cites 
figures from 2002. Oregonian lawmakers meet every other year with no limitation on 
length of session. They receive $85 a day for committee meetings, $ 1,3 18 annually per 
session in additional compensation, plus $400-550 a month depending on the geographic 
size of the district. 
Idaho lawmakers must verify all expenses with vouchers, and are then 
reimbursed. Additionally, they get $ 1,700 in other compensation a year. Legislators in 
Utah receive a combined $117 per session day, which matches their base pay almost 
exactly. Wyoming's legislature pays $ 1,800 a year in additional compensation, plus $85 
per day for traveling expenses. In sum, the rankings remain constant over time for these 
4 states. Oregon ranks highest in pay and compensation, and there the repeal effort 
failed. Idaho is next on this ordinal scale, and successfully repealed term limits. Utah 
weighs in third, and there the repeal effort succeeded; lastly, Wyoming failed to repeal 
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term limits. Thus there is no clear directional pattern that associates the level of pay and 
compensation with the likelihood that the term limit repeal would succeed. LH3 is not 
supported by the data. 
LH4: The larger the legislative staff, the more likely that the state legislature repeals 
term limits. 
The rationales for this hypothesis are the same as for LH2. Concerning staff size, 
the NCSL 'Backgrounder' (2005) examined full and part time legislatures. They use a 5 
category classification scheme, and from most professionalized to least they label the 
categories red, red light, white, blue light, and blue. Oregon is ranked as 'white' , putting 
that legislature in the 3rd category and in the middle of all states in terms of staff size. 
Idaho is 'blue light' , meaning fourth. Utah and Wyoming are positioned in the bottom 
category, 'blue' , thus the smallest number of legislative staff. According to the NCSL 
(2004), the size of total staff during the 2003 legislative session was Oregon (N=465), 
Idaho (N=183), Utah (N=l 81), and Wyoming (N=l 14). Oregon's legislative repeal 
attempt failed, Idaho's succeeded, Utah successfully repealed term limits, and the effort 
failed in Wyoming. Thus there is no clear directional pattern that associates staff size 
with the likelihood that the term limit repeal would succeed. LH4 is not supported by the 
data. 
LHS: The higher the turnover rate before the introduction of term limits, the less 
likely that they are repealed. 
The rationale for this hypothesis is that a state with high legislative turnover will 
experience fewer political effects and less change in the institutional environment than 
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states that had a comparatively lower turnover rate before the term limit provision was 
enacted, as term limits will mandate some scheme of cyclical turnover in membership. I 
assume that the greater the initial impact of term limits, the more extreme the repeal 
efforts will be. This would then make it more likely that the repeal effort will succeed. 
The states of Idaho and Utah passed term limits in 1 994, while Wyoming and Oregon 
passed the measure two years earlier in 1 992. So ideally in my view, the turnover data to 
be examined would be for 1 992, 1 990, and 1988 for Idaho and Utah, whereas for the 
cases of Wyoming and Oregon the key data would be the amount of legislative turnover 
in 1 990, 1 988, and 1 986. The data comes from various editions of the Book of the States, 
published by the Council of State Governments. 
The best possible dataset was not available to test this hypothesis. The Council of 
State Governments did not calculate the per cent of legislative turnover for Idaho in 1 992, 
because redistricting reduced membership in the legislature. Therefore I compensated by 
examining various turnover rates, including snapshots and trends over time. For these 
four cases, I looked at four sets of data: the turnover rates in 1 990 and 1 988,  as well as 
the total turnover rates from 1 979- 1 989 (Book of the States 1 992-93 and 1 990-9 1 ). I also 
incorporate a turnover rate for the years of 198 1 - 1 990, based on the average per cent of 
new members in each newly elected legislature (Moncrief et al 2004 ). My goal is to 
determine if these states were high turnover states, low turnover states, or somewhere in a 
middle grouping before term limits passed. I examined the 1 988  turnover rate to serve as 
a control on the 1 990 numbers, in case the turnover was abnormally high or low in 1 990 
due to some idiosyncratic internal factors. See Appendix F. 
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When ranking the states from 1 to 4 based on the highest turnover, the 1988 
turnover numbers go completely against the data for 1990, in almost an almost perfect 
inverse order for both legislative chambers. Further, Oregon staggers elections for senate 
seats; so not all of the senators were up for reelection in any one election, as was the case 
in the other 3 states. Due to these limitations, I decided to rely on the two sets of data 
that look at turnover rates over time. Based on an examination of this data, I rank the 
states from highest to lowest in turnover volatility as follows: Idaho, Utah, and then 
Wyoming and Oregon tied at the bottom according to my index. According to this 
ranking, LHS is not supported by the data; in fact, the two states with the highest degree 
of turnover before term limits were enacted overturned the stricture, and the two states 
with the lowest turnover retained term limits. 
LH6: State legislatures with Republican majorities are less likely to repeal term 
limits than in legislatures without a Republican majority. 
This hypothesis is predicated by the preponderance of evidence already cited that 
term limits has been an issue embraced by the National Republican Party; and limits on 
tenure have been publicly opposed by Democratic House leaders. Whether due to 
political principle or expediency, in most instances I have found that state legislative term 
limit measures have been proposed by Republican lawmakers. The information provided 
in this section comes from NCSLnet, which can be found at the NCSL Web site. 
The Idaho Legislature repealed term limits in February of 2002, overriding a 
Republican governor's veto. The composition of the two chambers at the time were both 
overwhelmingly Republican: 61-9 in the house, and 32-3 in the senate. As previously 
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cited from the literature, Republicans in Idaho have bucked the term limit trend of their 
national party, and it has been argued that the GO P's long-time control of the state 
legislative branch is the reason. Utah resembles Idaho in its partisan composition. Utah 
repealed term limits in March of 2003, and the partisan breakdown was as follows: a 56� 
19 Republican majority in the house, and a 22-7 preponderance in the senate. Wyoming 
had Republican majorities in both chambers when it failed to repeal the term limit 
provision in March of 2003: 46-14 in the house and 20-10 in the senate. Oregon had a 
more balanced legislature in terms of partisanship when the repeal effort failed in April of 
2001. This balance swung in favor of the GOP, making all four cases equivalent in 
having Republican majorities in both houses of the legislature. In Oregon's case, 
Republicans held a 32-28 advantage (house) and a 16-14 majority (senate). 
LH6 is not supported by the data. All four state legislative bodies, in fact each of 
the eight chambers, had Republican majorities. In two cases the legislative repeal effort 
failed, and in the other two they were successful. These findings seemingly reinforce 
some of the conclusions from the literature, namely that support for term limits may be as 
much attributed to situational circumstances as to genuine ideological conviction or the 
view that it is good public policy. So while Republicans nationwide are more likely to 
support term limits, they will at times oppose the measure in states where they enjoy 
control of the legislature, as evidenced by Idaho in particular. In order to see if there is 
divergence between ideology and partisanship regarding term limit support, I used a 
"2000 Policy Liberalism Index" (Gray and Hanson 2002). Interpreting the index from 
the assumption that the degree of 'conservatism' in a state's legislative policy is directly 
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inverse to its liberalism ranking (the authors do as well), Wyoming is the most 
conservative state (43rd in liberalism), followed by Utah (39th), Idaho (37th), and Oregon 
(7th). Based on these rankings, there is no pattern of correlation between ideology and the 
success of a repeal effort. Term limits were upheld in the most conservative state and the 
most liberal state, while they were repealed in the two states that fall relatively in the 
middle of this index. 
F. Other Factors and Conclusion 
Another factor that I theorized to have a possible causal connection was the level 
of public support. As I have previously stated, public opinion polls are not comparable 
across states. However, the level of voter support for the citizen initiative can be verified, 
so this variable can be tested empirically as I did in chapter five. Utah is the only case 
that does not apply, as it passed term limits by legislative statute. The other three states 
did institute term limits by way of the citizen initiative, which requires voter affirmation 
at the polls. Wyoming (77.2% support) had the highest affirmation, followed by Oregon 
(69.5%). In theses two cases, the repeals failed. Idaho, where the approval rate for term 
limits was 59%, is a case where the legislature repealed term limits by legislative statute, 
even overriding a veto by a governor from the same political party as the legislature. An 
additional hypothesis may be constructed as such. 
LH7: The higher the percentage of voter support for the term limits initiative, the 
less likely that they are repealed. 
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Based on the small number of cases (N=3), LH7 is supported. Where the term limit 
initiatives passed by a 7 out of 10 proportion, the repeals failed. In the case where voters 
supported term limits by a fraction of 6 out of 10, the repeal effort was successful. 
The remaining factors discussed in chapter one, whether a copy cat phenomena or 
regional emulation is occurring, are inconclusive regarding legislative activity. These 
four states are contiguous, thus share a regional commonality. However, beyond that 
there is no discernible pattern. Likewise with the copy cat supposition: the repeal efforts 
in neighboring states Idaho and Wyoming were both in March, 2003. The results 
diverged, as in Idaho the repeal was successful while in Wyoming it failed. I do, 
however, find a pattern from examining the political culture of the four states. Based on 
Elazar' s concepts, Idaho and Utah have moralistic cultures, which lend themselves to 
having political leaders whose outlook is in line with the trustee theory of representation. 
These leaders, in order to produce sound policy and promote the general welfare, will 
pass legislation that is highly unpopular, 'for the people's own good'. Wyoming and 
Oregon have individualistic cultures, which translate into a political elite that is more 
responsive to public opinion and citizen initiatives. So it would follow that the 
legislatures in these two states failed to repeal term limits. 
From my analysis of potential causal factors particular to each case, I found the 
following. In Idaho, there was strong interest group support for the repeal proposal, 
forming a united front of business groups, professional groups, organizations from 
various local governments, and other associational organizations. Another factor was the 
strong support by the state Republican Party for a repeal, and the GOP controlled the 
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legislature. Third, there was strong opposition in the rural areas to term limits and 
weakened support over time in the urban and suburban areas. There was also a 
widespread perception term limits would devastate local governments. Lastly, term 
limits were close to taking effect. In Utah as well, the moment of impact for term limits 
was nigh approaching. Distinct from the Idaho case, the major newspapers in Utah 
played an important role in the repeal bill's passage, in lieu of heavy interest group 
activity. Also, there was bi-partisan support for a repeal, the legislative leadership were 
all on board with the repeal, and support for a repeal was cross-sectional. Finally, Utah's 
governor signed the bill into law, whereas in Idaho the repeal bill had to override a veto. 
I speculate that this was because the Utah statute also term-limited the governor and other 
executive branch officers in addition to state legislators. The repeal bill threw out 
gubernatorial term limits in Utah as well legislative limits. 
Concerning the failed repeals, in both Wyoming and Oregon the legislatures had 
recourse to the state court system. In Idaho the high court had upheld the 
constitutionality prior to the legislative repeal action. In Utah the measure never reached 
the judiciary. The ability to sue was coupled with the belief that the lawsuits would 
succeed. In Wyoming, the Attorney General had issued an Opinion that stated that the 
term limit law would be difficult to defend, constitutionally speaking. In Oregon, a 
recent court case established a clear precedent that appeared to have bearing on the term 
limit measure passed by Oregon voters. Also common to both Wyoming and Oregon is 
an individualistic political culture, where political leaders are more likely to defer to 
public preferences rather than overrule a popular measure. In Wyoming, additionally, 
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there was no bi-partisan support for the repeal-as no Democrats voted for the measure. 
The situation in Oregon was a bit different. There was support across the aisle for a 
repeal, however, no consensus could be reached among legislative leaders on whether to 
repeal or modify the term limitations. No single proposal gained widespread support. 
In sum, though I based my hypotheses on solid theoretical principles I have mixed 
conclusions. There were not enough contrary cases to test whether term limits adopted 
by the citizen initiative were more likely to be repealed than those passed by legislative 
statute. I did, however, examine the citizen initiative as a potential causal factor by 
bringing in another factor I had discussed, public opinion. I constructed an additional 
hypothesis based on the degree of voter support for the term limitation initiative, and the 
data did show an association in a directional pattern that supported the hypothesis. 
Likewise, the revised first hypothesis was supported by the data: legislative statute term · 
limits provisions were more likely to be repealed than were constitutional amendment 
term limits measures. The remaining hypotheses were not corroborated by the evidence. 
These are: legislators pay and compensation, staff size, degree of turnover before term 
limits had been adopted, partisanship and ideology, and lastly the severity of the term 
limits. This final factor, the severity of the limitations on tenure, showed a possible 
reverse trend. One common factor was that the repeal bills passed very close to the time 
when term limits would take effect. Political will galvanized against term limits as the 
date of impact became close, leading to the passage of a repeal in two cases, and quick 
movement by way of lawsuits into the court system in the other two cases. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this research was to expand our understanding of the political and 
policy implications of term limits in state legislatures by examining efforts to repeal term 
limits for state legislators. Proponents of term limits portrayed it as a remedy for 
unresponsive and inefficient government controlled by long-serving politicians. Those 
opposed to the measure claimed that it would lead to a host of negative effects on 
legislative memberships, institutions, and policy-making. Over the past decade the 
effects of term limits have been observed, measured, and reported; and improvements to 
this body of research are developing as this thesis is being concluded. Though often 
conflicting and inconclusive, it is apparent and hardly debatable that state legislative term 
limits have had an effect on membership and their career paths ( as proponents intended), 
legislative leadership, the committee system, and the power of the legislature when 
interacting with the executive branch and in particular the office of the governor. 
Anything beyond these assertions is highly disputable and basically unsettled among 
scholars. When the large-scale collaboration entitled the 'Joint Project on Term.Limits' 
is finally completed, there will be more evidence and findings introduced to weigh in on 
one side or the other in this debate. Concerning any normative conclusions, I see the 
early predictions by Barcellona and Grose (1994) as accurate: "time will not tell" because 
the effects will be viewed through "ideological lenses". Those predisposed to oppose 
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term limits will note the adverse effects, while supporters will focus on what they see as 
the positive results. 
Although the effects of term limits are being studied-and already forming a large 
body of scholarly literature-there has been very little written about the political and 
legal efforts to repeal term limit measures in states that have adopted them. It has 
become a common political practice in the states that have adopted term limits that soon 
after the measure passes, and well before it would impact membership, a flurry of both 
legislative and judicial activity takes place which attempt to repeal term limits. Six were 
successful. Only one of the states that successfully rescinded term limits did so after 
incumbent legislators began being turned out, and that was in Oregon by a high court 
ruling after legislative efforts had repeatedly failed over numerous legislative sessions. 
So in studying repeal efforts the areas of analyses begin with the effects of term limits on 
political behavior. The vast preponderance of policy effects would be observable after 
term limits began instituting a prescribed turnover in membership, which would in tum 
alter the leadership structure. I leave open the possibility that simply having future term 
limits 'in the books'-hanging over numerous legislators' heads like the Sword of 
Damocles-would have an effect on policy decisions. The judicial analysis addresses a 
different set of criteria, but most noteworthy is the fact that the Justices are not deciding 
on the length of tenure for their own careers in public service, as legislators are indeed 
doing. 
I address these inadequacies in the literature by investigating term limit repeal 
efforts in eight cases involving five states, including both legislative processes as well as 
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judicial action. Below is a review of important findings, emphasizing significant 
similarities and key differences in the eight cases among the five sample states. I also 
discuss the implications of my findings on legislative and judicial research and its 
limitations. Next, I address directions for future research, followed by the conclusion of 
this project. 
A. Important Findings 
The most significant discovery is the absence of a clear causal connection that 
applies to both the legislative actions and the judicial rulings. The results of the 
legislative analysis indicated support for only two of the hypotheses proposed. Term 
limits adopted by statute were repealed, whereas term limits that were an amendment to a 
state constitution were not repealed. Second, the degree of voter support for the term 
limits initiative appears to have some bearing on the likelihood of a successful repeal. 
Only three cases were applicable, but among them the two cases with voter support at 
around the 70% mark were failed repeal efforts, while the one case where voter approval 
was close to 60% had a successful repeal. 
In the judicial analysis, only the hypotheses pertaining to legal theory and legal 
precedent were supported by the data. The less clear the term limit proposal was in its 
wording increased the likelihood of it being ruled unconstitutional. Also, the less clear 
the state's constitution is concerning adding qualifications for legislative office, the more 
likely that the Court invalidated the measure. 
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In addressing the broader research questions, the degree of structural impediments 
in sta.te government has a clear correlation with the success or failure of a repeal attempt 
in the legislative branch of state government. It would also seem that the degree of . 
popular affirmation of term limits has some impact on the success or failure of a repeal 
effort. For the state high courts, the pertinent factors are the wording of the citizen 
initiative, the constitutional language concerning adding qualifications for elected office, 
and the legal precedent of the United States Supreme Court in the U.S. TL. v. Thornton 
(1995) decision. All of these factors are unique to judicial decision-making, which I find 
important. 
B. Significant Similarities and Key Differences 
The similarities between the analyses in the two branches of government can first 
be found in looking at ideology and partisanship. Partisan control of the sample 
legislatures was the same: all eight chambers in the four legislatures studied had 
Republican majorities, yet the legislative outputs diverged. For the state high courts, 
apredominantly Republican-appointed high court upheld the legality of term limits, as did 
a state supreme court packed with Democratic appointees. Hence no pattern of causality 
exists in this regard. I also looked at ideology as a stand-alone variable in the legislative 
analysis by using a policy liberalism index (Gray and Hanson 2002). No correlation 
between ideology and a particular legislative output was discovered. 
So in essence we see that the similarities in the legislative and judicial branches, 
between the decision-making processes and the outputs regarding the term limits 
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measure, lay in the disproving of proposed relationships between variables. For the state 
legislatures analyzed in the comparative case study, the following factors were shown not 
to have an effect on the success or failure of the repeal attempts: the severity of the limits 
on tenure, the amount of pay and compensation for legislators, staff size, and the 
institutional turnover rate before the enactment of term limits. Whether or not the state 
constitution allows for the citizen initiative could not be tested adequately, but the 
indications are that having the initiative sends a message to lawmakers regarding the 
popular degree of support for the measure, which elected lawmakers ignore at their own 
peril. Self interest would hardly be served if the institution repealed term limits, only to 
result in those lawmakers who rescinded the measure being turned out at the next election 
due to the voters' 'wrath' regarding their votes. The judicial analysis examined ideology 
by using partisanship as a proxy variable, and likewise found no support from the data. 
Regarding regional emulation or a copycat phenomenon as a causal factor, there 
are similarities and differences between judicial and legislative institutional activity. 
Similarities exist concerning when the repeal activities took place, but there is no pattern 
of association among the institutional outputs rendered. For the timing of the repeal 
attempts, an impressionistic examination gives some support for the contention of 
regional emulation. Term limits are most prevalent in the Mountain West region. All 
four of the legislative cases, and three of the four judicial cases which were analyzed in 
this research project, are contiguous geographically. The same holds true on the subject 
of copycat activity. All of the states in the U.S. that passed term limit provisions did so 
between the years 1990 (4 states) and 1995 (LA), and 1 1  of the 21 states that limited 
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legislative tenure passed the provision in 1992. Concerning the five cases studied in this 
research project, term limits were passed in 1992 for three of the cases, and in 1994 for 
the other two. So there is some sort of copy cat phenomenon occurring apart from 
geographic location, as term limits were enacted in all parts of the United States 
regardless of region, and the location of repeal successes is primarily in the Mountain 
West region (successes: MA, WA, OR, WY, ID, UT). 
Pertaining only to the institutional outputs, the four judicial cases examined were 
between 1999 and 2004, in a chronological order where the date of impact for term limits 
coincided with the temporal order in which the high courts made their decisions. I find 
this observation important. Beyond that, however, there is little support for the 
contention that regional emulation or a copycat phenomenon is taking place, with the 
exception of the Wyoming high court citing the Oregon case as precedent and a 
component in their decision. For the state legislatures examined, there is no pattern of 
association in terms of the success or failure of the repeal efforts. For example, the 
decisions in two of the legislative cases were in March, 2003. The results diverged: in 
one case the repeal was successful while in the other it failed. So, in sum, there is a 
correlation regarding when the term limit repeal efforts took place; however, this was 
purposive, as I chose the four most recent repeal efforts in the state judicial systems, and 
purposefully chose four legislative repeal efforts that were within the same timeframe as 
the judicial actions. In both the legislative and judicial cases, the results of the repeal 
efforts failed to follow any distinguishable pattern. 
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The key differences between the analyses in the two branches reside first in 
recognizing and reiterating that the causal factors which show support in the data are 
those that are distinctive and particular to the two sets of institutions. The judicial 
hypotheses which have some degree of affirmation are unique to various models 
developed that explain the decision-making processes used by law courts. The legislative 
hypotheses that appear corroborated by the evidence pertain to institutional structure and 
to a lesser extent public opinion, or rather those members of the public who voted on the 
citizen initiatives. 
I see the relationship between the level of voter support for term limits citizen 
initiatives and the institutional outputs of repeal attempts as the single most important 
difference. In the legislative repeal efforts, the degree of voter support for the measure 
showed a directional association with the amount of voter approval for term limits: the 
higher the level of support, the less likely the repeal succeeded. In the judicial decisions 
concerning term limits, the legal rationale used by the various high courts did not include 
the degree of voter support for term limits, with the exception of Florida. Being the 
exception, the Florida Court has shown a consistent predilection to include the 'will of 
the voters' in its decisions, so the term limits case was not an anomaly or exception to 
their standard modus operandi. 
I see these preliminary findings as a confirmation that the American political 
process reflects what the U.S. Federal system was intended to do. The Founding Fathers 
intended that the legislatures be bound closer to the will of the people than are the other 
two branches of government. Support for LH7 affirms this characteristic. Further, the 
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stronger correlation between the hypotheses and the data pertains to the institutional 
structures created in the American Federal system, and reinforces the stability of this 
institutional arrangement. The system was designed so that it is easier to pass statutory 
law than it is to enact constitutional amendments. Mechanisms of direct democracy 
during America's Progressive Era altered this institutional array, making it possible that 
the electors may bypass their elected representatives and create law and new 
constitutional provisions by popular affirmation. However, repealing laws by 
countervailing methods show that the original institutional design still functions as it was 
intended. Efforts to repeal constitutional amendments are more difficult to a verifiable 
degree than are efforts to repeal statutory law, as the revised LHl clearly shows. 
C. Implications for Legislative and Judicial Research 
My research has important implications in the understanding of legislative and 
judicial institutions, as well as the political behavior of legislators and the decision­
making processes of high court judges. I find suggestions for state legislative and 
judicial research in at least four areas. First, this study alleges that the self interest of 
legislators is tempered and constrained by the structural arrangement of political 
institutions and by public opinion as expressed by voter preferences. Mechanisms of 
direct democracy allow for the voting public to rival legislative bodies in lawmaking 
powers and capacity. The citizen initiative, in particular, allows for measures to become 
law or constitutional components that are unpopular with elected representatives and 
effect personal power and power relationships in state government. The initiative forces 
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elected lawmakers to compete more directly in the political arena with the public whom 
they are intended to serve. At times, legislators must actively oppose the 'will of the 
people' if they hope to offset the power of organized groups that are using this 
mechanism of direct democracy to openly make laws and amendments, instead of 
employing the more traditional methods of affecting legislative output. This in tum 
complicates lawmakers' calculations for reelection; and since term limits also 
predetermine legislators' reelection prospects to a certain degree, the internal calculations 
of self interest and the ordering of preferences to produce a desirable outcome become 
much more of a conundrum. In other words, utility maximization becomes more difficult 
and more problematic, which in tum affects the ability of social scientists to explain and 
predict the behavior of these political actors. 
Second, this research gives some support for those theoretical models and 
explanations that assert the differences in behavior between the political actors who make 
law and those who interpret the law. Judges and legislators are all political actors. 
However, my findings give credence to the conception that judges as individuals and 
courts as a collective entity engage in a fundamentally different decision-making process 
from individuals serving in legislative bodies. One interpretation of my findings is that 
while both branches of government endeavor to produce institutional outputs that best 
meet the public interest, judges make decisions by a more structured deliberative 
procedure than do legislators. Court rulings are bound and delimited by the wording and 
clarity of the measure in question, the measure's intent and effect in the context of the 
state constitution, and also constrained to a degree by precedent. Legislators have a more 
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open-ended decision-making process: one that must take into account the fact that elected 
lawmakers are much less insulated from popular sentiment and opinion than are judges. 
Legislative retention rates are high in state legislatures, but the instances of a judge being 
turned out in a retention election or defeated by a challenger in an open election are very 
few and far between. A cynical interpretation of my findings would assert that judges 
can be sophists who hide behind both the law and legal methodology: judges have a 
predetermined political outcome in mind, and then simply choose from an array of legal 
arguments and rationales to support the outcome they prefer. Comparatively, self interest 
and political machinations by legislators are less transparent. 
Third, there is no previous scholarly research that focuses on multiple term limit 
repeals. The evolution of academic interest in state legislative term limits began in the 
1980s, focusing on who among the American public supported term limits and what the 
future effects of term limits would be. The more empirical studies examined projected 
turnover rates after term limit measures would take effect. Beginning in the mid-1990s 
the impact of term limits and their effects could be documented and analyzed. Over the 
last ten years there has been an ever growing body of literature on the effects of term 
limits in state legislatures. I argue that term limit repeal efforts is an avenue of research 
that has of yet been chartered or explored, one that merits study and investigation. 
Finally, the idea that term limits are the death-knell to legislative competence and 
effectiveness is incomplete. I include this, though the assertion is tangential to my 
analysis. Based on an analysis of prior research and from my comparative case study, 
new career paths are being formed that have transformed the political culture in the state 
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and local governments of numerous states. City and county officials are prominent 
among the new faces in term-limited state legislatures, so the conceptualization of 
inexperienced legislators must be qualified to get at the important specific question of: 
experienced at what? Training sessions and seminars are required of incoming legislators 
in many term-limited states, and I see a paucity of research that examines these attempts 
by legislatures to compensate for new members who are unfamiliar with the institution. 
Relating to efforts to repeal term limits, only in Oregon can we find a state that 
successfully rescinded term limits that actually had legislators turned out by the 
limitations; so in most cases there are no known ill policy effects of term limits to serve 
as the primary reason for a repeal, at least directly from first-hand experience. This 
clarifies that a fundamental research question surrounding term limit repeal efforts 
concerns the political rights of both voters and potential officeholders, whereas the 
research that gauges the effects of term limits naturally seeks as its ultimate 
determination whether or not the measure leads to bad public policy. In sum, term limit 
research involves important empirical and normative questions that scholars should 
address. 
D. Limitations of this Proiect 
Grofrnan (1996) aptly characterizes the early predictive literature on legislative 
term limits as "hypotheses in search of data". I found myself in a similar situation. The 
preeminent restraint for this research project was the small number of cases available to 
analyze. While I could have included almost every state that presently has legislative 
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term limits when looking at repeal attempts, only six states have successfully repealed the 
measure. This puts a significant restraint on the methodologies and research strategies 
that could be employed. I opted for a mid-level approach. My intent has been to produce 
a synthesis of case study research-one rich in detailed explanations--coupled with a 
comparative examination of numerous cases that could begin to generate generalized 
hypotheses that explain and predict. However, I realize that since this project only 
samples eight cases in five states, it may not be generalizable to other states. 
The data for this project was collected from numerous sources. The primary data 
came from multiple bases that I cross-checked, though they often use each other as 
sources, so a circuitous data error may have been generated. For example, the National 
Council of State Legislatures occasionally cites various editions of the Book of the States, 
published by the Council of State Governments . .  The Book of the States reciprocates by 
frequently naming the NCSL as its foundation of information. Also, I use secondary data 
that are indexes or categorizations, so I am relying on the accuracy of research by others. 
Further, I encountered recording errors in some research regarding dates and figures 
concerning term limits, so I was restricted to data that I could verify from other 
authorities. 
Lastly, my use of proxy variables and my personal interpretations from a 'content 
analysis' of court cases, initiative measures, constitutional provisions, and statutory codes 
may not have accurately recorded and measured the raw data. Republicans are not 
always more conservative than Democrats, as region plays a role in how party affiliation 
translates into ideology. Also, I intertwine three levels of analysis in making 
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determinations concerning legislative and judicial decision-making: a more empirical 
examination where feasible and reliable, qualitative methods when this modus operandi is 
the best fit, and some impressionistic causal connections that I find important enough to 
the research questions for inclusion. The soundness and effectiveness of this multi­
faceted approach may be in question. I have made every effort to not allow these 
potential pitfalls to weaken this research, and I do not believe that they have. 
This research is primarily qualitative in nature, though I utilize whatever 
methodological tools are available. I believe that given the small universe of cases that 
can be studied, I have combined various research strategies into a synthesis that results in 
a sound exploratory research project on efforts to repeal state legislative term limits. 
E. Directions for Future Research 
Since this is an analysis that includes legislative institutions as well as state high 
courts, there are numerous avenues for future research to transverse. For one, it should 
look at failed term limit repeal efforts in state legislatures. As I displayed in a 
perfunctory, limited manner in chapter four, there were one hundred thirty-five instances 
of attempts to either modify or repeal the limitations on tenure from 1999 until the 
summer of 2006 among the fifteen states that have· legislative term limits .. This is a 
significant number of cases to analyze. Did most of these bills die in committee? How 
many were held over to the next legislative session? Other questions could include 
whether or not the exact modifications to the term limit measure had an effect on how far 
in the legislative process the bill went. This line of research would also add to the body 
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of literature that focuses on why bills fail in general. Do failed term limit repeals or 
modifications fit the general pattern? 
Another path of interest is to explore high court decision-making, seeking to 
determine why some courts prioritize certain legal and democratic principles over others. 
I found in my analysis that one court paid particular attention to the 'will of the voters', 
since the term limit measure had originally been a citizen petition for an initiative. Other 
courts failed to mention voter support at all in their written decisions, leaving the reader 
to conclude that voter preference wasn't considered relevant to their ruling. Some courts 
focused on the rights of the electors and of otherwise qualified candidates, while others 
directed attention to the wording and constitutional ripple effects that implementing term 
limits would have. Also, some courts cited the federal precedent (US. TL. v. Thornton 
1995), some courts cited precedents of term limit decisions from other states, and other 
high courts limited themselves to intra-state precedents on related constitutional and legal 
questions. I understand that judges may pick and choose what to include and exclude 
from a legal decision, as they wish, but a systematic exploration of this question could be 
fruitful. 
Third, I would find it interesting and important to learn more about the political 
effects of impending term limits, and also potential policy effects. Are there differences 
among term-limited states in the quantity and quality of legislation during the term before 
the impact of term limits were felt? The political effects concern career paths and 
choices. There would be utility in examining in more detail how many term-limited 
legislators became lobbyists, or ran for other office, or went into occupations unrelated to 
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politics and government (if such exist) after their tenure ended. It is important to 
remember that consecutive term limits allow a lawmaker to run for their old seat again in 
a future election; lifetime bans do not. Term limits have serious career and lifestyle 
effects felt by real people. Here in Knoxville, the Tennessee State Supreme Court very 
recently ruled that term limits for most elected county officials were valid, in effect 
overruling a lower decision that allowed the incumbents to run for reelection . Numerous 
county officials must be replaced early into their terms of office, and this may have a 
profound effect on the operation of local government for some time to come. For the 
affected local officials, one morning they had a job and at mid-afternoon they found out 
that their employment status in local government had changed. Voters and voter choice 
are affected as well. Since the 'maimed-duck' officials have only served a few months of 
a four year term in office, will the replacement process be one of selection or election? It 
has yet to be determined how these county commissioners, the sheriff, and other officials 
are to be replaced, though the county commission has rejected the idea of a special 
election. So it appears that selection will be the process. In all, I believe that research 
should continue into these and other areas, for term limits and their application have had 
and will continue to have profound ramifications for American democracy. 
F. Final Conclusion 
In this dissertation I have attempted to broaden our understanding of the political and 
policy implications of term limits in state government by examining efforts to repeal term 
limits. This is a little studied subject. My focus has been on judicial as well as legislative 
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activity. I have integrated theory from various models of political behavior and 
democratic theory to hypothesize whether a term limit repeal would be more likely to 
succeed or fail. We can understand whether it is institutional obstacles, voter preference, 
or other factors which present the greatest barrier to a successful repeal in state 
legislatures. We can also comprehend how judges who sit on state high courts prioritize 
democratic and legal principles in their rulings. As with other political research, the most 
important determination to make from a successful or a failed repeal attempt is: 'Who 
benefits'? The goal of democratic government is for the public interest to be served. The 
rights of citizenship and the personal liberties we enjoy center around our right to vote 
and our broader rights and duties of participation in the political system; as Aristotle put 
it, to rule and be ruled. Term limits present intellectual and operational challenges to 
democratic systems. Our voting rights, and the right to hold elective office, depend on a 
determination as to whether term limits are to be included in this political experiment 
called the American federal system, or an affront to voting freedom. 
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State Year Enacted 
Florida 1992 
Oregon (a) 1992 
Idaho (a) 1994 
Oregon (b) 1992 
Idaho (b) 1994 
Utah 1994 
Wyoming (a) 1992 
Wyoming (b) 1992 
Table 1 
Cases Selected 
Year of Repeal Effort 
1999 (Sep.) 
2001 (Apr.) 
2001 (Dec.) 
2002 (Jan.) 
2002 (Feb.) 
2003 (Mar.) 
2003 (Mar.) 
2004 (May) 
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Branch of 
Government Did it Repeal? 
Judiciary No 
Legislature No 
Judiciary No 
Judiciary Yes 
Legislature Yes 
Legislature Yes 
Legislature No 
Judiciary Yes 
APPENDIX B . 
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Table 2 
Political Rights and Term Limits 
Constitutional Rights Constitutional Provision(s) Court Precedents 
Affected by Term 
Limits 
1. Right to Amendment XIV, section 1 Clements v. Flashing (1982) 
Candidacy 
2. Right to Vote Candidacy Provisions Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 
for the Article I Bullock v. Carter (1972) 
Candidate of Anderson v. Celebreeze 
One's Choice Amendments IX, X (1983) 
3. Right to Vote Amendment I as applied to Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 
Effectively the States by Amendment 
XIV 
4. Right to Amendment I Williams v. Rhodes (1968) 
Associate 
5. States Right to Article I, section 4 Smiley v. Holm (1932) 
Regulate Oregon v. Mitchell (1970) 
6. [People's] Amendments IX, X *Would be used in Judge 
Right to Limit Thomas' Dissent in 
Ballot Access US. TL. v. Thornton (1995) 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
U. S. TERM LIMITS, INC., et al. v. THORNTON et al. 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 
No. 93-1456. Argued November 29, 1994 -- Decided May 22, 1995 
Respondent Hill filed this suit in Arkansas state court challenging the constitutionality of 
§3  of Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution, which prohibits the name of an 
otherwise eligible candidate for Congress from appearing on the general election ballot if 
that candidate has already served three terms in the House of Representatives or two 
terms in the Senate. The trial court held that §3  violated Article I of the Federal 
Constitution, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. A plurality of the latter court 
concluded that the States have no authority "to change, add to, or diminish" the age, 
citizenship, and residency requirements for congressional service enumerated in the 
Qualifications Clauses, U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 2, and Art. I, §3, cl. 3, and rejected the 
argument that Amendment 73 is constitutional because it is formulated as a ballot access 
restriction rather than an outright disqualification of congressional incumbents. 
Held: Section 3 of Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution violates the Federal 
Constitution. Pp. 6-61. 
(a) The power granted to each House of Congress to judge the "Qualifications of its own 
Members," Art. I, §5, cl. 1, does not include the power to alter or add to the qualifications 
set forth in the Constitution's text. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 540. After 
examining Powell's analysis of the Qualifications Clauses' history and text, id., at 518-
548, and its articulation of the "basic principles of our democratic system," id. , at 548, 
this Court reaffirms that the constitutional qualifications for congressional service are 
"fixed," at least in the sense that they may not be supplemented by Congress. Pp. 6-18. 
(b) So too, the Constitution prohibits States from imposing congressional qualifications 
additional to those specifically enumerated in its text. Petitioners' argument that States 
possess control over qualifications as part of the original powers reserved to them by the 
Tenth Amendment is rejected for two reasons. First, the power to add qualifications is not 
within the States' pre-Tenth Amendment "original powers," but is a new right arising 
from the Constitution itself, and thus is not reserved. Second, even if the States possessed 
some original power in this area, it must be concluded that the Framers intended the 
Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifications for Members of Congress, and 
that the Framers thereby "divested" States of any power to add qualifications. That this is 
so is demonstrated by the unanimity among the courts an<:} learned commentators who 
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have considered the issue; by the Constitution's structure and the text of pertinent 
constitutional provisions, including Art. I, §2, cl. 1, Art. I, §4, cl. 1, Art. I, §6, and Art. I, 
§5, cl. 1; by the relevant historical materials, including the records of the Constitutional 
Convention and the ratification debates, as well as Congress' subsequent experience with 
state attempts to impose qualifications; and, most importantly, by the "fundamental 
principle of our representative democracy . . .  ' that the people should choose whom they 
please to govern them,' " Powell, 395 U. S., at 547. Permitting individual States to 
formulate diverse qualifications for their congressional representatives would result in a 
patchwork that would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National 
Legislature representing the people of the United States. The fact that, immediately after 
the adoption of the Constitution, many States imposed term limits and other 
qualifications on state officers, while only one State imposed such a qualification on 
Members of Congress, provides further persuasive evidence of a general understanding 
that the qualifications in the Constitution were unalterable by the States. Pp. 18-50. 
( c) A state congressional term limits measure is unconstitutional when it has the likely 
effect of handicapping a class of candidates and has the sole purpose of creating 
additional qualifications indirectly. The Court rejects petitioners' argument that 
Amendment 73 is valid because it merely precludes certain congressional candidates 
from being certified and having their names appear on the ballot, and allows them to run 
as write in candidates and serve if elected. Even if petitioners' narrow understanding of 
qualifications is correct, Amendment 73 must fall because it is an indirect attempt to 
evade the Qualifications Clauses' requirements and trivializes the basic democratic 
principles underlying those Clauses. Nor can the Court agree with petitioners' related 
argument that Amendment 73 is a permissible exercise of state power under the Elections 
Clause, Art. I, §4, cl. 1, to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections. "  
A necessary consequence of that argument is that Congress itself would have the power 
under the Elections Clause to "make or alter" a measure such as Amendment 73, a result 
that is unfathomable under Powell. Moreover, petitioners' broad construction is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers' view of the Elections Clause, which was 
intended to grant States authority to protect the integrity and regularity of the election 
process by regulating election procedures, see, e.g. ,  Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 
733, not to provide them with license to impose substantive qualifications that would 
exclude classes of candidates from federal office. Pp. 50-60. 
( d) State imposition of term limits for congressional service would effect such a 
fundamental change in the constitutional framework that it must come through a 
constitutional amendment properly passed under the procedures set forth in Article V. 
Absent such an amendment, allowing individual States to craft their own congressional 
qualifications would erode the structure designed by the Framers to form a "more perfect 
Union. " Pp. 60-61. 
316 Ark. 251, 872 S. W. 2d 349, affirmed. 
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Stevens, J. , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, JJ. , joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J. , and O'Connor and Scalia, JJ. , joined. 
Notes 
� Together with No. 93-1828, Bryant, Attorney General of Arkcmsas v. Hill et al. ,  also on 
certiorari to the same court. 
source: Cornell Law School - Supreme Court collection 
supct.law.comell.edu/supct/html/93-1456.ZS.html 
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Table 3 
Total Bills to Repeal or Modify 
Modify: # Modify: # Modify: Total # of 
# of of of # of N = 91 Bills 
Repeal Change Increase Both Total 
State Efforts Length TLs Types Modified Proposed 
AZ 6 6 4 0 10 16 
AR 2 2 7 0 9 1 1  
CA 1 1 3 0 4 5 
co 0 0 4 0 4 4 
FL 3 0 6 2 8 1 1  
LA 1 0 0 0 0 1 
ME 9 3 13 0 16 25 
MI 3 0 16 0 16 19 
MO 6 1 13 0 14 20 
MT 1 0 3 0 3 4 
NE 7 0 2 0 2 9 
NV 1 0 0 0 0 1 
OH 1 0 0 0 0 1 
OK 1 1 0 0 1 2 
SD 2 2 2 0 4 6 
44 16 73 2 91  135 
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Consecutive term limits (C) N = 9 total of 77 bills proposed 
Lifetime term limits (L) N = 6 total of 5 8 bills proposed 
* Total Average 
C = 9.67 
L = 8.56 
*To Repeal TLs 
C = 30 
L =  14 
* Repeal average 
C = 3.33 
L = 2.33 
*To Modify TLs 
C = 47 
L = 44 
*Modify Average 
C = 5.22 
L = 7.33 
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State 
AZ 
co 
FL 
LA 
ME 
MT 
NE 
OH 
SD 
AR 
CA 
MI 
MO 
NV 
OK 
Table 4 
Consecutive or Lifetime Term Limits 
Consecutive TLs 
or Lifetime 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
T-Test 
Formula=TTEST(C3 :Cl  l ,C l2 :C l 7,2,3) 
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Total # of Bills 
Proposed 
16 
4 
1 1  
1 
25 
4 
9 
1 
6 
1 1  
5 
19 
20 
1 
2 
135 
0.801609313 
State 
AZ 
co 
FL 
LA 
ME 
MT 
NE 
OH 
SD 
AR 
CA 
MI 
MO 
NV 
OK 
Table 5 
Bills to Modify Term Limits 
Consecutive TLs 
or Lifetime 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
T-Test 
Formula=TTEST(C3:C l l ,C l 2:C l 7,2,3) 
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# of Bills 
to Modify TLs 
10 
4 
8 
0 
16 
3 
2 
0 
4 
9 
4 
16 
14 
0 
1 
91 
0.53354075 
State 
AZ 
co 
FL 
LA 
ME 
MT 
NE 
OH 
SD 
AR 
CA 
MI 
MO 
NV 
OK 
Repeal 
Table 6 
Bills to Repeal Term Limits 
Consecutive TLs # of 
or Lifetime Repeal Bills 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
consecutive 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
lifetime 
T-Test 
Fonnula=TTEST(C3 :C l l ,C l 2 :Cl  7,2,3) 
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6 
0 
3 
1 
9 
1 
7 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
6 
1 
1 
44 
0.46732261 
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Florida 
LIMITED POLITICAL TERMS IN CERTAIN OFFICES INITIATIVE 
The people of Florida believe that politicians who remain in elective office too long may 
become preoccupied with re-election and beholden to special interests and bureaucrats, 
and that present limitations on the President of the United States and Governor of Florida 
show that term limitations can increase voter participation, citizen involvement in 
government, and the number of persons who will run for elective office. 
Therefore, to the extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States, the people of 
Florida, exercising their reserved powers, hereby declare that: 
1. Article VI, Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Florida is hereby amended by: 
a. inserting "(a)" before the first thereof and, 
b. adding a new subsection "(b)" at the end thereof to read: 
(b) No person may appear on the ballot for re-election to any of the following offices: 
( 1) Florida representative, 
(2) Florida senator, 
(3) Florida lieutenant governor, 
( 4) any office of the Florida cabinet, 
(5) U. S. Representative from Florida, or 
(6) U. S. Senator from Florida, 
if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will have served ( or, but for 
resignation, would have served) in that office for eight consecutive years. 
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2. This amendment shall take effect on the date it is approved by the electorate, but no 
service in a term of office which commenced prior to the effective date of this 
amendment will be counted against the limit in the prior sentence. 
3 .  If any portion of this measure is held invalid for any reason, the remaining portion of 
this measure, to the fullest extent possible, shall be severed from the void portion and 
given the fullest possible force and application. The people of Florida declare their 
intention that persons elected to offices of public trust will continue voluntarily to 
observe the wishes of the people as stated in this initiative in the event any provision of 
this initiative is held invalid. 
Ballot title and summary: 
LIMITED POLITICAL TERMS IN CERTAIN ELECTIVE OFFICES 
Limits terms by prohibiting incumbents who have held the same elective office for the 
preceding eight years from appearing on the ballot for re-election to that office. Offices 
covered are: Florida Representative and Senator, Lieutenant Governor, Florida Cabinet, 
and U. S. Senator and Representative. Terms of office beginning before amendment 
approval are not counted. 
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Idaho 
An interesting feature of judicial selection in Idaho is the frequency with which judges 
initially gain their seats through interim appointments. This trend is particularly apparent 
for the supreme court. Between 1 968 and 1 998, the governor made ten consecutive 
appointments to fill vacancies on the Idaho Supreme Court. 
http://www.ajs.org/ 
Proposition Two 
Section 1 .  This act shall be known and may be enacted as "The Idaho Term Limits Act of 
1 994. "  
Section 2 .  That Chapter 9. Title 34 ,  Idaho Code, be and the same is  hereby amended by 
the addition of a new section to read as follows: 
34-907. Limitation of ballot access for multi-term Incumbents. ( 1 )  A person shall not be 
eligible to have his or her name placed upon the primary or general election ballot for a 
county, state or federal office which they have previously held if they have served, will 
serve or but for resignation would have served, in that same office by the end of the 
current term of office for a length of time as follows: 
a. As a member of the U.S.  House of Representatives representing any district within the 
state, during six ( 6) or more of the previous eleven ( 1 1 ) years. 
b. As a member of the U.S .  Senate, during twelve ( 1 2) or more of the previous twenty 
three (23) years. 
c. As a state elected official, during eight (8) or more of the previous fifteen ( 1 5) years. 
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d. As a state legislator, representing any district within the state, including all House seats 
within the same district, during eight (8) or more of the previous fifteen ( 15) years. 
e. As a county commissioner, representing any district within the county, during six (6) 
or more of the previous eleven ( 11) years. 
f. As any other county elected official, during eight (8) or more of the previous (15) 
years. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting any qualified voter of this 
state from casting a ballot in a general election for any person by writing the name of that 
person on any ballot, or as prohibiting such a properly marked general election ballot 
from being counted or tabulated, nor shall any provision of this section be construed as 
preventing or prohibiting any person from standing or campaigning for any elective 
office by means of a "write-in" campaign in a general election. 
Section 3. That Chapter 4, Title 50, Idaho Code, be and the same is hereby amended by 
the addition of a new section to read as follows: 
50-478. Limitation of ballot access for multi-term incumbents. (1) A person shall not be 
eligible to have his or her name placed upon a special or general election ballot for a city 
office which they have previously held if they have served, will serve or but for 
resignation would have served, in that same office by the end of their current term of 
office for a length of time as follows: 
a. As mayor during eight (8) or more of the previous fifteen ( 15) years. 
b. As a member of city council representing any district or assigned member council seat 
during eight (8) or more of the previous fifteen ( 15) years. 
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(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting any qualified voter of the city 
from casting a ballot for any person by writing the name of that person on any ballot, or 
as prohibiting such a properly marked ballot from being counted or tabulated, nor shall 
any provision of this section be construed as preventing or prohibiting any person from 
standing or campaigning for any elective office by means of a "write-in" campaign. 
Section 4. That Chapter 4, Title 33, Idaho Code, be and the same is hereby amended by 
the addition of a new section to read as follows: 
33-443 . Limitation of ballot access for multi-tern incumbents. ( 1 )  A person shall not be 
eligible to have his or her name placed upon the school election ballot for the office of 
school district trustee which they have previously held if they have served, will serve or 
but for resignation would have served, in that same office by the end of their current term 
of office, representing any zone of the district, during six ( 6) or more of the previous 
eleven ( 1 1 ) years. 
(2) Nothing in the section shall be construed as prohibiting any qualified voter of the 
school district from casting a ballot for any person by writing the name of that person on 
any ballot, or as prohibiting such a properly marked ballot from being counted or 
tabulated, nor shall any provision of this section be construed as preventing or prohibiting 
any person from standing or campaigning for any elective office by means of a "write-in" 
campaign. 
Section 5. This act shall take effect and be applicable to all school district, municipal, 
county, state and federal candidates whose elected terms of office begin on or after 
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January 1, 1995. Service prior to January 1, 1995 shall not be counted for purpose of this 
act. 
Section 6. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any 
provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is 
declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the 
remaining portions of this act. 
304 
Oregon 
Constitution of Oregon, Article 2, § 19. 
Limits on Oregon Terms. 
To promote varied representation, to broaden the opportunities for public service, and to 
make the electoral process fairer by reducing the power of incumbency, terms in Oregon 
elected offices are limited as follows: 
(1) No person shall serve more than six years in the Oregon House of Representatives, 
eight years in the Oregon Senate, and twelve years in the Oregon Legislative Assembly in 
his or her lifetime. 
(2) No person shall serve more than eight years in each Oregon statewide office in his or 
her lifetime. 
(3) Only terms of service beginning after this Act [ sections 19 to 21 of this Article] goes 
into effect [December 3, 1992] shall count towards the limits of this Section. 
( 4) When a person is appointed or elected to fill a vacancy in office, then such service 
shall be counted as one term for the purposes of this Section. 
( 5) A person shall not appear on the ballot as a candidate for elected office or be 
appointed to fill a vacancy in office if serving a full term in such office would cause them 
to violate the limits in this Section. 
(6) This Section does not apply to judicial offices. [Created through initiative petition 
filed April 23 , 1991, and adopted by the people Nov. 3, 1992] 
Note: The leadline to section 19 was a part of the measure proposed by initiative petition 
filed April 23, 1991, and adopted by the people Nov. 3, 1992. 
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Utah 
Utah Code Ann., § 20A-10-201. 
Term limits -- State officers. 
(1) (a) A state executive officer may not seek reelection or be elected to an office if, 
by the end of the state officer's current term, the state officer will have served, or 
but for resignation would have served, 12 or more consecutive years. 
(b) The lieutenant governor may not certify the name of any state officer for 
placement on the ballot if, by the end of the state officer's current term, the state 
officer will have served, or but for resignation would have served, 12 or more 
consecutive years. 
( c) A county clerk may not allow the name of any state officer to be printed on a 
ballot if, by the end of the state officer's current term, the state officer will have 
served, or but for resignation would have served, 12 or more consecutive years. 
(d) The state board of canvassers may not declare any state officer "elected" if, by 
the end of the state officer's current term, the state officer will have served, or but 
for resignation would have served, 12 or more consecutive years. 
(2) (a) A state representative may not seek reelection or be elected to an office if, 
by the end of the state representative's current term, the state representative will 
have served, or but for resignation would have served, 12 or more consecutive 
years. 
(b) The lieutenant governor may not certify the name of any state representative 
for placement on the ballot if, by the end of the state representative's current term, 
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the state representative will have served, or but for resignation would have served, 
12 or more consecutive years. 
( c) A county clerk may not allow the name of any state representative to be 
printed on a ballot if, by the end of the state representative's current term, the state 
representative will have served, or but for resignation would have served, 12 or 
more consecutive years. 
( d) The state board of canvassers may not declare any state representative 
"elected" if, by the end of the state representative's current term, the state 
representative will have served, or but for resignation would have served, 12 or 
more consecutive years. 
(3) (a) A state senator may not seek reelection or be elected to an office if, by the 
end of the state senator's current term, the state senator will have served, or but for 
resignation would have served, 12 or more consecutive years. 
(b) The lieutenant governor may not certify the name of any state senator for 
placement on the ballot if, by the end of the state senator's current term, the state 
senator will have served, or but for resignation would have served, 12 or more 
consecutive years. 
( c) A county clerk may not allow the name of any state senator to be printed on a 
ballot if, by the end of the state senator's current term, the state senator will have 
served, or but for resignation would have served, 12 or more consecutive years. 
(d) The state board of canvassers may not declare any state senator "elected" if, by 
the end of the state senator's current term, the state senator will have served, or 
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but for resignation would have served, 12 or more consecutive years. 
( 4) For purposes of calculating the term limits established by this section, no 
person may count the time a state officer, state representative, or state senator 
served in a particular office before January 1, 1995. Enacted by Chapter 264, 
1994 General Session 
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Wyoming 
§ 22-5-103. Legislative service; limits on ballot access; state offices 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of Wyoming law, the secretary of 
state or other authorized official shall not certify the name of any person as the nominee 
or candidate for the office sought, nor shall that person be elected nor serve in that office 
if the following will occur: 
(i) The person, by the end of the current term of office will have served, or 
but for resignation, would have served eight (8) or more years in any sixteen (16) year 
period in the office for which the candidate is seeking nomination or election, except, that 
any time served in that particular office prior to January 1, 1993, shall not be counted for 
purposes of this term limit. This provision shall apply to the offices of governor, 
secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer, and state superintendent of public 
instruction; 
(ii) The person, by the end of the current term of office will have served, or 
but for resignation, would have served twelve (12) or more years in any twenty-four (24) 
year period as a state representative, except that any time served in the_ office of state · 
representative prior to January 1, 1993, shall not count for purposes of this term limit; 
(iii) The person, by the end of the current term of office will have served, or 
but for resignation, would have served twelve (12) or more years in any twenty-four (24) 
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year period as a state senator, except that any time served as a state senator prior to 
January 1, 1993, shall not be counted for purposes of this term limit. 
[15] The initiative also contained a specific statement of "findings and declarations": 
( a) The people of the state of Wyoming hereby find and declare as follows: 
(i) State and federal representatives who remain in office for extended 
periods of time become preoccupied with their own reelection and for that reason devote 
more effort to campaigning for their office than making legislative decisions for the good 
of the people of Wyoming; 
(ii) State and federal representatives have become too closely aligned with the 
special interest groups who provide contributions and support for their reelection 
campaigns, provide special favors and intense lobbying, all of which causes corruption or 
the appearance of corruption of the legislative system; 
(iii) · Entrenched incumbency has discouraged qualified citizens from seeking 
office and lead to a lack of competitiveness and a decline in robust debate of issues 
important to the people of Wyoming; 
(iv) Due to the appearance of corruption and the lack of competitiveness for 
entrenched incumbency seats, there has been a reduction in voter participation which is 
counter-productive in a representative democracy; 
(v) The people of the state of Wyoming have determined that the declarations 
and findings contained herein threaten their vital interest in maintaining the integrity of 
their state and federal office holders and avoiding the appearance of corruption and lack 
of response to the needs of the people of Wyoming. It is their purpose and intent in 
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enacting this law that term limitations is the best method by which to insure that these 
vital interests are guarded for the people of the state. 
1992 Initiative No. 1, § 2. 
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APPENDIX F 
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Table 7 
Turnover Rates 
Legislative Turnover 
State & Chamber 1990 T.O. 1988 T.O. 1979-89 1981-90 
Idaho House 29 20 81 27 
Utah House 25 28 87 31  
Wyoming House 22 20 79 24 
Oregon House 20 32 83 25 
Idaho Senate 36 17 91 25 
Utah Senate 24 21  66 21  
Wyoming Senate 13 23 87 23 
Oregon Senate 3 27 83 20 
numbers in % total total total average 
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